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vForeword
In my many years of experience on the magnifi cent lower Missis-
sippi River I have read many articles, books, and periodicals concern-
ing the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. I am certain that the 
major change I have discerned through all this reading is that, for some 
reason that I have never really examined, modern-day historians such 
as Charles Camillo have found the secret of making their writings of 
historical events a lot more “readable” than those experts of years past. 
I am certain that the readers of this account of the Great Flood of 2011 
will agree with that personal assessment.
Mr. Camillo was there on the spot, if you will, during those periods 
of anguish when the Mississippi River Commission made the diffi cult 
decisions that allowed this fl ood of record to fl ow to the Gulf of Mexico 
without the loss of a single life and with not one acre of land fl ooded 
that was not supposed to be fl ooded. Those gut-wrenching moments 
are captured in this book in such a manner that you do not have to be a 
water resources engineer to feel the tension and the need for the correct 
decision to be made at the proper time.
What happened during the Great Flood of 2011 did not happen 
because of some overnight miracle. It happened because of the fore-
sight of the people that formed a triad more than 80 years ago. The triad 
consisted of the United States Congress, the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers, and last, but certainly not least, the local people who had 
organized themselves in 1922 into what is now the Mississippi Valley 
Flood Control Association. Working together to solve the problems cre-
ated by uncontrolled fl ooding of the Mississippi River and its tributar-
ies, the triad successfully secured passage of the Flood Control Act of 
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May 15, 1928 that created, among other things, the Mississippi River 
and Tributaries Project. The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project 
is a comprehensive project that not only provides fl ood control but also 
a permanent and reliable navigation channel. In addition, the project 
plays a large role in the protection and restoration of man’s natural 
environment. It turns the third largest watershed on the planet into the 
greatest river basin in the world, not because of its size but because of 
its greatness, greatness because of the benefi ts derived from the entire 
watershed. These benefi ts are possible because the mighty river from 
Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to the Gulf of Mexico has been controlled. 
It is now a huge asset to the entire Nation and one that belongs to the 
people because the people made it possible. It could well be called the 
People’s River.
No one in his right mind looks forward with any degree of pleasure 
to experiencing a major record-setting fl ood because they are always 
a devastating and damaging event; but when a great fl ood has been 
experienced and passed in record time to the Gulf, then it has at least 
two benefi cial results. One, it gives us confi dence that what man has 
designed and constructed has been well done and two, it discloses where 
the weaknesses are in the system, even the one that worked so well. 
If we are smart, we will learn and make the necessary corrections, 
improvements and repairs before the next fl ood occurs as it surely will.
This book will be of great assistance to those who read it and learn. I 
hope you use it wisely and for the good of the people of this great Nation.
George C. Grugett
Executive Vice President
Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association
January 29, 2012
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Preface
As the historian for the Mississippi River Commission and the Mis-
sissippi River and Tributaries project, I face the dilemma of leaving 
behind a record of current events for future generations. Oddly, it is 
easier for me to document the activities and accomplishments of the 
commission and the project from one hundred years ago than fi ve or 
ten years ago. This is because very few paper records exist nowadays. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commis-
sion generate voluminous amounts of memoranda, studies, correspon-
dence, and briefi ngs, but most can only be found in an electronic format. 
It was against this backdrop that I endeavored to produce this study.
I do not view the pages that follow as a historical study, although I 
do incorporate historical material to provide context for key elements 
of the story. Instead, the narrative is more representative of an eye-
witness account of a historic event. During several presentations and 
speaking engagements that I delivered after the fl ood, my audiences 
seemed to want the answer to three basic questions. The fi rst involved 
the  decision-making processes at the three fl oodways placed into opera-
tion in 2011. The second involved the history of the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway. The third involved the absence of a fl oodway to 
relieve pressure between the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway and 
the Old River control complex. This study attempts to addresses those 
questions.
The chapters that chronicle the 2011 fl ood rely heavily on my own 
notes – a diary of sorts – interviews conducted after the event with key 
players that I identifi ed during my coverage of the fl ood, daily situation 
reports from the district offi ces, daily emergency management briefi ngs 
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that tracked changing conditions, and electronic correspondence. To that 
end, one of the purposes of this study is to leave behind a transparent 
record of the 2011 fl ood so that future historians will have a central 
repository to work from. Yet, there is one caveat. The fl ood roughly 
spanned a three-week period and impacted the entire Mississippi River 
and Tributaries project system. Naturally, I could not be in all places at 
once, so coverage is limited to the three fl oodways and the fl ood fi ght 
in the Vicksburg Engineer District. Heroic fl ood fi ghts took place along 
both banks of the Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau, Missouri, 
to the Gulf of Mexico and the Atchafalaya River from Simmesport 
to Morgan City. The absence of a detailed discussion at any specifi c 
location is in no way intended to trivialize those desperate efforts to 
convey the fl ood.
The chapters that provide historical context rely heavily on my 
personal collection of primary source material accumulated over the 
past decade in the form of correspondence, technical papers, reports, 
and Engineering News-Record articles. For those interested in learning 
more about the history of the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, 
I strongly recommend Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in 
the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995, by Martin Reuss and Upon Their 
Shoulders: A history of the Mississippi River Commission through the 
advent of the Modern Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, by 
Charles Camillo and Matthew Pearcy. For those interested in compar-
ing what could have been during the historic 2011 fl ood to what hap-
pened in the valley during the 1927 fl ood prior to the establishment of 
the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, I recommend Rising Tide: 
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America, by 
John Barry.
I am grateful to serve as a historian in the United States Army. The 
military as a whole appreciates the fi eld of historical study for what 
it really is: a tool to strengthen the understanding of the past so that 
improvements can be made for our future. The uniformed and civilian 
ix
Preface
leadership of the Army live by that creed, as evidenced by their reli-
ance on after-action reports and lessons-learned studies. During the 
2011 fl ood, the Mississippi River Commission and leaders from the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers’ district offi ces in the lower valley granted 
me full access to meetings, operations, personal discussions, and docu-
mentation so I could produce an account of events to strengthen their 
decision-making processes. This unfettered access provided the unique 
opportunity to note facial expressions, body language, verbal exchanges, 
tone of voice, and sense of urgency that otherwise would have gone 
undocumented. These elements bring the story to life. Most profes-
sional historians – at least historians of river engineering in the Mis-
sissippi Valley – can only dream of incorporating such features when 
constructing a narrative.
This behind-the-scenes narrative is edgy at times, yet there was no 
attempt by the Mississippi River Commission or the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to sanitize the story during the review and approval process. 
That is a testament to the integrity of both agencies. Some reviewers 
disagreed with my interpretation of certain events or the conclusions I 
developed from the evidence at hand. As Mark Twain once opined, “The 
very ink with which all history is written is merely fl uid prejudice.” As 
a historian, I am very cognizant of that fact. As much as I might try to 
suppress my own infl uences and biases, they are certain to be refl ected 
in the pages that follow. For this reason, it must be noted that the views 
and conclusions expressed in this study are mine; they do not necessarily 
represent those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Mississippi 
River Commission, the Army, or the United States.
I accumulated many debts throughout the preparation of this book. 
My supervisor, Stephen Gambrell, provided generous understanding and 
support from concept to completion. Pam Vedros and Edie Whittington 
selfl essly took on many of my routine responsibilities as I concentrated 
on research and writing. The staff at the Louis Latzer Memorial Public 
Library in Highland, Illinois, graciously provided a comfortable and 
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quiet space from which to work – an environment free from visitors, 
email, and telephones. I am also indebted to my colleague Damon 
Manders, who, had it not been for his untimely deployment to Afghani-
stan with the Alabama National Guard, most likely would have been 
co-author of this study. Prior to his deployment, Mr. Manders prepared 
much of the background material in chapters one and three. Without 
the aforementioned support, I would not have accomplished my goal 
within the tight self-prescribed deadline.
Even though I am a historian for the world’s premier engineering 
organization, I must admit that I only know enough about engineer-
ing to be dangerous. I relied heavily on the expertise and input from 
several engineers and professionals. Charles Shadie and Bill Frederick 
of the Mississippi River Commission and Mississippi Valley Division, 
Deborah Lee of the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division, David Busse, 
Russell Errett, Elizabeth Behrens, and Jacob Prebianca of the St. Louis 
Engineer District, David Berretta and Jon Wilson of the Memphis Engi-
neer District, Robert Simrall, Lanny Barfi eld, and Kent Parrish of the 
Vicksburg Engineer District, and William Veatch of the New Orleans 
Engineer District all generously withstood my constant requests for 
clarifi cation, analysis and information. I truly appreciate their knowl-
edge, professionalism, and patience.
Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, Col. Vernie Reichling, Col. Jeffrey Eck-
stein, Col. Edward Fleming, Charles Shadie, Stephen Gambrell, David 
Busse, Deborah Lee, Russell Davis, James Lloyd, Robert Simrall, Lanny 
Barfi eld, John Lonnquest, Douglas Wilson, and Matthew Pearcy, repre-
senting either the Mississippi River Commission or the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, graciously reviewed and commented on parts or all of the 
manuscript, as did external reviewers George Grugett, Lester Goodin, 
Kevin Pritchett, Peter Nimrod, Robert Rash, and Robert Thompson. 
Col. Fleming, Stephen Gambrell, Deborah Lee, David Busse, Walter 
Baumy, Jon Wilson, Col. Thatch Shepard, and Captain Todd Mainwar-
ing provided crucial access to emails and electronic documents that 
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otherwise would not have been incorporated into the manuscript. I am 
grateful to several Corps of Engineers’ photographers — Alfred Dulaney, 
Brooks Hubbard, Oscar Reihsmann, and others — that captured the 
many images used in this manuscript. My colleague Brian Rentfro 
edited the manuscript. Brian Everitt designed the reference maps and 
Colleen Cummins redesigned several graphics used in the manuscript. 
Their combined efforts greatly improved the fi nal product.
I also extend my gratitude to Marilyn Holt for the layout and graphic 
design of the book and Pat Caldwell for designing the cover. Their tal-
ents are unmatched.
This study is dedicated to everyone who has ever played a role in 
the development of the Mississippi River and Tributaries project — 
from the visionaries who conceptualized it, the engineers who modifi ed 
and improved it, the congressional members who secured funding, the 
levee districts who maintain its features, the Mississippi Valley Flood 
Control Association who champions it, and the great people who call 
the valley home.
Charles A. Camillo
Historian, Mississippi River Commission
January 25, 2012

Prologue
The Mississippi River 
and Tributaries Project
Should Divine Providence ever send a fl ood of the maximum 
predicted by meteorological and fl ood experts as a remote prob-
ability but not beyond the bounds of ultimate possibility, the 
fl oodways provided in the plan are still normally adequate for 
its passage without having its predicted heights exceed those 
of the strengthened levees.
Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin
December 1, 1927
2Divine Providence
MR&T Project Features
3DURING THE OVERNIGHT HOURS OF MAY 1-2, 2011, a powerful thunderstorm hammered the tri-state area fl anking the con-fl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. The storm, the 
last of a series of successive violent storms that had dropped massive 
amounts of rain over the preceding two weeks, was the most severe 
yet. From mid-April through early May, rainfall amounts exceeding at 
least half of the yearly average precipitation fell over large swaths of 
seven states in the mid Mississippi Valley. The heavy rains transformed 
the normally-scenic Mississippi River, made legendary by the quaint 
and entertaining stories of Samuel Clemens, into a swollen, angry and 
indomitable torrent.
As Americans across the nation stirred to the celebratory news that 
U.S. armed forces had killed Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind 
several terrorist acts against the nation, Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, the 
president of the Mississippi River Commission, sat alone in his com-
mand post on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, which sat moored in the 
Mississippi River one mile south of the bridge that connected Cairo, 
Illinois, from what was at the time to most of the general public a little 
known spot on the map called Birds Point, Missouri. Walsh was in 
anything but a cheerful mood as he mulled over his decision to activate 
the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway – the fi rst of three fl oodways 
he ultimately ordered into operation to manage the massive fl ood. He 
was gravely concerned. Driving rain pelted the windows of his lonely 
stateroom as he pored over river forecasts and situation reports from 
fl ood fi ght teams desperately trying to hold the fl ood control system 
that protected millions of people and their homes. Brilliant bolts of 
lightning lit up the night sky, followed by powerful thunderclaps that 
shook the vessel. Walsh was confi dent the system would hold, but he 
knew the storm that night would turn what had been a severe fl ood into 
a historic fl ood. This is the big one, he thought to himself, the fl ood 
we’ve always feared!1
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The burgeoning fl ood around Walsh represented, perhaps, the act of 
“Divine Providence” that Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, the Chief of Engi-
neers during the Great Flood of 1927, had prophesized 84 years earlier 
when he promoted his concept of making room for the river through 
the incorporation of fl oodways into the general plan for fl ood control in 
the lower Mississippi Valley. Whether an act of divine direction or not, 
by all indicators the fl ood was a monster. Before it was over, the fl ood 
shattered previous gage records from Cairo to Caruthersville, Missouri, 
and from Vicksburg, Mississippi, to Red River Landing, Louisiana. 
According to the offi cial measurements taken by the U.S. Geological 
Survey, the fl ood also established new peak fl ood discharge records 
from Cairo to Baton Rouge, Louisiana.2
As the massive fl ood unfolded, the Mississippi River Commission, 
the Corps of Engineers, levee districts, and residents of the lower Mis-
sissippi Valley put their faith in the readiness of the fl ood control system 
that had protected the valley since 1928 – the Mississippi River and 
Tributaries (MR&T) project. The project is a comprehensive fl ood con-
trol and navigation system that sits at the foot of the Mississippi River 
drainage basin. The basin drains roughly forty-one percent of the forty-
eight contiguous United States. Runoff from all or parts of thirty-one 
states and two Canadian provinces drains into the MR&T project foot-
print on its way to the Gulf of Mexico. In that way, the MR&T resembles 
the spout of a large funnel. What began in 1928 as a simplistic plan fi rst 
championed by Maj. Gen. Jadwin to relieve pressure on the levee system 
by providing room for fl oods to expand through designated fl oodways 
has since been transformed into a truly comprehensive project through 
dozens of complex modifi cations during its 84-year life span.
The MR&T project is an anachronism. While today the Corps of 
Engineers uses terms such as fl ood damage reduction or fl ood risk man-
agement to describe its fl ood protection projects, the MR&T system 
remains as what can only be called a fl ood control system. The MR&T 
employs a variety of engineering techniques to control Jadwin’s fl ood 
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of “Divine Providence.” The engineering features include an extensive 
levee system to prevent disastrous overfl ows on developed alluvial lands; 
fl oodways to safely divert excess fl ows past critical reaches; backwa-
ter areas to store surplus fl oodwaters and reduce pressure on the levee 
system; channel improvements to increase the fl ood-carrying capacity 
of the river; channel stabilization features to protect the integrity of the 
levee system and to ensure proper alignment and depth of the navigation 
channel; and tributary basin improvements, to include levees, headwa-
ter reservoirs, and pumping stations, to maximize the benefi ts realized 
along the main channel by expanding fl ood protection coverage and 
improving drainage into adjacent areas within the alluvial valley. Since 
its initiation, the MR&T program has brought an unprecedented degree 
of fl ood protection to the approximate 4 million people living in the 
35,000 square-mile project area within the lower Mississippi Valley. 
The nation has contributed roughly $14 billion toward the planning, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the project. It has proven 
to be a wise investment that has prevented more than $478 billion in 
fl ood damages – a $34 return for every dollar invested.3
The administration of the project also refl ects its throw-back status. 
The project is prosecuted by the Mississippi River Commission, a seven-
member governing body established by Congress in 1879 to heal a grow-
ing schism between the Army’s engineers and the civilian engineering 
community by combining their talents to transform the Mississippi River 
into a reliable commercial artery, while protecting adjacent towns and 
fertile agricultural lands from destructive fl oods. Three general offi cers, 
three civilian members (two of whom must be civil engineers), and one 
admiral from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
comprise the seven members of the commission. The President of the 
United States appoints each member with the advice and consent of the 
United States Senate. Upon its establishment, the commission quickly 
assumed the role of an active federal agent capable of transcending the 
regional issues that had previously hampered the development of a more 
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effective river improvement system. The commission’s biannual inspec-
tion trips, held since the 1880s, promote face-to-face interaction while 
nurturing a connection between a government entity and the people it 
serves that is unmatched anywhere in the nation, possibly the world.
The Project Design Flood
The long and storied success of the MR&T fl ood control program 
can be traced to a change in policy following the 1927 fl ood. Prior to 
that tragic fl ood event, the Mississippi River Commission and levee 
districts attempted to control fl oods on the lower Mississippi by building 
levees high enough to withstand the last great fl ood of record. Since the 
inception of the MR&T project in 1928, however, the comprehensive 
fl ood control system controls a “project design fl ood,” or the maximum 
probable fl ood.
The U.S. Weather Bureau (now the National Weather Service) 
developed the current project design fl ood in 1954 after the Senate 
Committee on Public Works requested a thorough examination of all 
components of the MR&T project. The fl ood represented the worst thing 
the bureau could conjure based on actual storms that had occurred in 
the past. The Weather Bureau study incorporated previously unavail-
able data regarding the sequence, severity, and distribution of past major 
storms and investigated thirty-fi ve different hypothetical combinations 
of actual storms that produced signifi cant amounts of precipitation and 
runoff. The Weather Bureau arranged the historical storms sequentially 
to mimic frontal movements and atmospheric situations consistent with 
those occurring naturally to determine the most likely pattern capable of 
producing the greatest amount of runoff on the lower Mississippi River. 
This included the consideration of storm transpositions, storm inten-
sity adjustments, seasonal variations, and storm mechanics. In simpler 
terms, the Weather Bureau developed the project design storm series 
from various combinations of storms and resultant fl oods—referred to 
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as hypo fl oods—that had a reasonable probability of occurring from a 
meteorological viewpoint. Preferring to err on the side of caution, the 
bureau tweaked the storms to make them as severe as possible. The 
studies revealed that Hypo-Flood 58A had the most probable chance of 
producing the greatest discharge on the lower Mississippi River from 
Cairo, Illinois, to the Gulf of Mexico.
Three severe storms comprised Hypo-Flood 58A. The fi rst storm 
is the January 6-24, 1937 storm that struck the Ohio and lower Missis-
sippi River basins and produced the record-setting fl ood of that year. 
To be conservative, the Weather Bureau increased the runoff from the 
1937 storm by ten percent. Three days later the January 3-16, 1950 
storm that caused widespread fl ooding falls over the same general area 
as the 1937 storm. The 1950 storm is followed three days later by the 
February 14-18, 1938 storm, with its center transposed 90 miles to the 
north and the rainfall pattern rotated by twenty degrees to maximize its 
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coverage over all the tributary basins on the lower Mississippi River. 
To convert Hypo-Flood 58A into the project design fl ood, the Missis-
sippi River Commission assisted the Weather Bureau in developing 
fl ood fl ows that would occur from the three storms and routed the fl ows 
through the tributary systems under three conditions: unregulated by 
reservoirs; regulated by reservoirs that existed in 1950; and regulated 
by existing reservoirs, plus those proposed to be constructed in the near 
future (1960 timeframe). The fl ood fl ows were then routed down the 
Mississippi River to determine the peak discharges at key locations. 
The Mississippi River Commission selected the 58A fl ood with near-
future reservoirs condition, referred to as 58A-EN (existing or near 
completion), as the basis for the project fl ood fl ows and adopted it as 
the project design fl ood in 1956.4
The project design fl ood refl ects the worst that the Weather Bureau 
could dream up. Even regulated by reservoirs, the fl ood is about twenty-
fi ve percent greater than the devastating 1927 fl ood. The peak dis-
charges for the project design fl ood in cubic feet per second (cfs) are: 
Cairo 2,360,000; Arkansas City 2,890,000; and Latitude of Red River 
Landing 3,030,000. Following the 1973 fl ood, the Mississippi River 
Commission reviewed the adequacy of the project design fl ood. The 
review concluded that the thorough approach used in 1955 was based 
on sound technology that was still reliable by current standards. The 
project design fl ood peak discharges remained unchanged.
Conveying the Project Design Flood5
To fully appreciate the performance of the MR&T project during 
the 2011 fl ood, it is important to understand how the system operates. 
Levees are the backbone of the MR&T project fl ood control plan. The 
levees protect the vast expanse of the developed alluvial valley from 
periodic overfl ows of the Mississippi River. The mainline levee system 
begins at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and continues to Venice, Louisiana, 
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approximately ten miles above the Head of Passes near the Gulf of 
Mexico. The MR&T levee system includes 3,727 miles of authorized 
embankments and fl oodwalls. Of this number, nearly 2,216 miles are 
mainline levees along the Mississippi River. Backwater, tributary, and 
fl oodway levees comprise the remaining levees. The grade and section 
of the present levee system dwarfs by comparison those of the levee 
system overwhelmed during the 1927 fl ood. In addition to higher and 
wider levees, the MR&T levee system design incorporates technological 
breakthroughs from the science of soil mechanics that take into account 
the type, condition, and moisture content of material used in the con-
struction of the levees.
The integrity of the current levee system is bolstered by advance-
ments in the design, construction, installation, and maintenance of seepage 
control measures, to include landside berms, drainage trenches, drainage 
blankets, and relief wells. More than 1,000 miles of articulated concrete 
mattress revetment protect the levee system from erosion and assure 
reliability of the navigation channel. In an effort to further guarantee 
the soundness of the system, levee districts and other local sponsors 
implement strict annual levee maintenance programs with their own 
labor and funds. Activities include mowing, clearing brush and trees, 
fi lling holes, restoring rain-washed areas, clearing drainage ditches, cor-
recting drainage problems, and spraying chemicals to control noxious 
and unwanted growth. Personnel from the Corps of Engineers’ district 
offi ces ensure that maintenance requirements are met through annual 
inspections that identify any defi ciencies and weak spots in the levee 
system so that immediate corrective actions can be taken. The addition 
of fi fteen-foot wide, all-weather access roadways on top of the levee 
system aid federal personnel and local levee districts during the inspec-
tion process and during fl ood-fi ghting operations.
To maximize protection from fl oods, current levee grades provide for 
freeboard – the distance between the project design fl ood fl owline and 
the top of the levee. The presently-authorized freeboard is a minimum 
10
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of three feet above the project design fl ood on the Mississippi River 
levees below Cairo, Illinois, and two feet on the Atchafalaya basin 
fl oodway levees. Levee grades between Cape Girardeau and Cairo 
and along the south banks of the Arkansas and Red rivers provide for 
a three-foot minimum freeboard over the maximum tributary fl ood 
meeting the maximum fl ood of record on the Mississippi River, with 
provisions to ensure that the same fl ood meeting the project design fl ood 
will not overtop the levee. In the vicinity of New Orleans, Louisiana, 
the authorized freeboard exceeds fi ve feet because of the increased 
danger to the urban areas from wave wash and storm surges common 
along coastal areas.
When fl ood stages begin to approach project design fl ood dimensions, 
additional project features activate to control and convey potentially-
damaging fl oodwaters to relieve stress on the levee system. The fi rst key 
location on the fl ood control system is in the vicinity of Cairo. When 
the river reaches critical stages on the Cairo gage, the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway goes into operation to prevent the project fl ood from 
exceeding the design elevation of the levees and fl oodways at and near 
Cairo, the levees along the west bank above Birds Point, and the east 
bank levee adjacent to the fl oodway. The fl oodway varies in width from 
about three to ten miles and has a length of nearly thirty-six miles. The 
fl oodway diverts up to 550,000 cfs from the Mississippi River during 
the project design fl ood and provides up to seven feet of stage lower-
ing in the vicinity of Cairo, with smaller reductions above Cairo and 
through the fl oodway reach. The fl oodway has special fuseplug levees 
at its upper and lower end. The fl oodway is activated when sections of 
the frontline levee naturally overtop or when artifi cially crevassed by 
the Memphis Engineer District. The fl oodway requires timely opera-
tion to insure its design effect during a fl ood approaching the project 
fl ood magnitude. For this reason, the plan of operation involves the 
placing and detonation of explosives at the required crevasse locations. 
The president of the Mississippi River Commission, with advice from 
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the members of the commission, directs the operation of all fl oodways 
within the MR&T project after consultation with the chief of engineers.
There are two major reservoirs—Kentucky and Barkley lakes—
on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers that are not features of the 
MR&T project, but are authorized through the 1944 Flood Control Act 
to reduce fl ood stages on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of and 
downriver from Cairo. Because of the close proximity of the reservoirs 
to the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, regulation of the 
reservoirs has a major predictable impact on the operation of the Birds 
Point-New Madrid fl oodway. During the development of the project 
design fl ood, the Weather Bureau accounted for the impacts of these 
reservoirs. The 1944 Flood Control Act directs the Tennessee Valley 
Authority to regulate the release of water from the Tennessee River 
into the Ohio River in accordance with instructions from the Corps of 
Engineers. Objectives developed by the Great Lakes and Ohio River 
Division for the Kentucky-Barkley reservoir outfl ows have priorities to 
safeguard the Mississippi River levee system, to reduce the frequency 
of use of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway and to reduce the fre-
quency and magnitude of fl ooding of lands along the lower Ohio and 
Mississippi rivers which are unprotected by levees. When fl oods threaten 
the fl ood control features along the upper reaches of the MR&T proj-
ect, the Mississippi River Commission president and the Great Lakes 
and Ohio River Division commander—a position that also serves as a 
member of the Mississippi River Commission—work together to regu-
late releases from Barkley and Kentucky lakes with the concurrence of 
the general manager of the Tennessee Valley Authority to accomplish 
these objectives.
Between the lower end of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway 
and the Old River control complex, the system relies on levees to con-
fi ne the project design fl ood. A combination of fl ood control reservoirs 
in the Arkansas-White basin and a comprehensive channel rectifi ca-
tion program supplement the levee system in confi ning fl oods. The 
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channel rectifi cation program greatly improved the carrying capacity 
of the main channel and lowered the project fl ood fl ow line through 
the use of cutoffs (severing large bends from the river) and corrective 
dredging. Between 1932 and 1942, the Mississippi River Commission 
executed fi fteen artifi cial cutoffs that, along with one natural cutoff, 
chute enlargements, and other corrective dredging techniques reduced 
the length of the river by nearly 170 miles and achieved stage reduc-
tions in the project fl ood fl ow line by up to twelve feet.
The levee system between Memphis and Old River is supplemented 
by four backwater areas located at the mouths of the St.  Francis, White, 
Yazoo, and Red rivers. Signifi cant portions of the upper sections of 
these backwater areas receive protection from overfl ows of the Mis-
sissippi River afforded by the mainline levees. The lower portions of 
these areas serve as natural storage during larger fl oods approaching 
the project fl ood design. The backwater levees overtop at a time suf-
fi cient to reduce project fl ood peak stages along the main stem of the 
Mississippi River. When fl ood stages on the Mississippi River or its 
tributaries subside, fl oodwaters from within the backwater areas drain 
through fl oodgates and pumps, with the exception of the Yazoo back-
water area, which does not have a pump station despite congressional 
authorization for one since 1941.
From the Red River backwater to the Gulf of Mexico, including the 
Atchafalaya basin, the MR&T project represents an elaborate plumb-
ing system designed to orchestrate the diversion and control of fl ood 
waters. The fi rst key component of that system is the Old River control 
complex at the head of the Atchafalaya River basin. Construction of the 
complex began in 1954 to prevent the Atchafalaya from capturing the 
Mississippi River. The complex is designed to maintain the 1950 fl ow 
distribution between the Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya River 
of seventy percent to thirty percent, respectively.
Approximately thirty miles downstream from Old River, the MR&T 
fl ood control plan provides for a major diversion of fl oodwaters from 
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the Mississippi River to the Atchafalaya basin through the Morganza 
fl oodway. Governed by a 3,900-foot long and a 125-bay intake struc-
ture, the fl oodway can divert up to 600,000 cfs from the Missis-
sippi River during the project design fl ood when the Mississippi River 
fl ows below Morganza are projected to exceed 1,500,000 cfs. The West 
Atchafalaya fl oodway extends along the west side of the Atchafalaya 
River. The fl oodway contains an eight-mile long fuseplug section of 
levee at its head. When the fuseplug section crevasses or when the west 
bank Atchafalaya River levee overtops, the fl oodway can divert up to 
250,000 cfs. The West Atchafalaya fl oodway would be the last feature of 
the fl ood control system to be used under the project design fl ood. The 
Atchafalaya River, the Morganza fl oodway, and the West Atchafalaya 
fl oodway converge at the lower end of the Atchafalaya River levees 
to form the Atchafalaya basin fl oodway. This fl oodway is designed to 
carry 1,500,000 cfs or nearly one-half of the project fl ood discharge 
of 3,000,000 cfs at the latitude of Red River Landing, including fl ows 
through the Old River control structures. Levees confi ne fl ows to a point 
below the latitude of Morgan City, Louisiana, whereby 1,200,000 cfs 
is conveyed to the Gulf of Mexico by the Atchafalaya River and the 
remaining 300,000 cfs is passed to the Gulf through the Wax Lake Outlet.
The fl ood control system provides protection against the remaining 
1,500,000 cfs in the Mississippi River below the Morganza fl oodway 
through the Bonnet Carré spillway, located approximately thirty miles 
above New Orleans, Louisiana. The 7,200-foot long spillway structure 
is governed by 350 intake bays and connects to a six-mile long fl ood-
way that empties into Lake Pontchartrain. The fl oodway is designed to 
divert up to 250,000 cfs from the Mississippi River, thereby insuring 
a peak discharge fl ow under project fl ood conditions at New Orleans 
not to exceed 1,250,00 cfs.
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Comparing Systems
No one can deny the severity of the 2011 fl ood, but some have 
argued the Great Flood of 1927 that devastated the lower Mississippi 
Valley was a much larger fl ood than the 2011 event; that the stages and 
discharges would have been greater in 1927 than actually measured had 
the federal levee not sustained seventeen major crevasses and allowed 
the fl oodwater to spread out. That may or may not be true. On the other 
hand, it can also be argued that stages and discharges in 2011 would have 
been greater than occurred had it not been for the three fl oodways placed 
into operation and the many dozens of post-1927 reservoirs constructed 
in the Missouri, Ohio and Arkansas/White basins that impounded mas-
sive amounts of water during the winter and early spring, as well as for 
the major dredging program executed in the 1930s and 1940s that dras-
tically shortened the river and increased the fl ood carrying capacity of 
the channel. As a result, the only way to provide a relative comparison 
of the two benchmark fl oods from the standpoint of hydraulics with the 
different protection systems employed would be to approximate fl ows 
and stages of the 1927 fl ood under 2011 project conditions or vice versa. 
In either case, this is a diffi cult task to accomplish. It is fairly simple, 
though, to compare the performance of the fl ood control systems in 
place during the two precedent-setting fl oods.
For nearly fi ve decades prior to 1927, the Mississippi River Com-
mission completed and then improved the general levee system begun 
by the states in the mid-nineteenth century. The commission coordi-
nated local efforts, set standards and specifi cations for levee construc-
tion, and allotted funds to cash-strapped levee districts throughout the 
lower valley. The commission believed the levees not only provided 
adequate protection from fl ooding, but would also promote scouring of 
the riverbed and provide a deeper navigation channel. For this reason, 
the commission rejected alternative methods of fl ood control, such as 
diversions, fl oodways, spillways, cutoffs and reservoirs. Critics derided 
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the commission’s approach as the “levees only” policy. As one fl ood 
after another overpowered the levee system, the commission responded 
by building the levees higher. The policy eventually left the lower Mis-
sissippi Valley shattered after the Great Flood of 1927, as the massive 
fl ood completely overwhelmed the outmatched levee system. Crevasses 
caused by the deluge numbered between 120 and 225, with seventeen 
of those being major crevasses on federal levees. The remainder of 
the breaks – ranging in size from half a mile wide to a mere trickle – 
occurred in state or local levees. The unshackled fl oodwaters inundated 
16.8 million acres in 170 counties in seven states – a swath roughly 50 
to 150 miles wide running from Cairo to Baton Rouge on the east bank 
and Cape Girardeau to the coast on the west bank. The vast majority of 
the properties in the fl ooded regions were a total loss. Those buildings 
that remained standing quickly rotted from exposure. Estimates are that 
nearly one million people lived in the region, only slightly less than 
one percent of the total U.S. population at the time. This means one of 
roughly every 100 to 120 persons in the country lived through or was 
impacted by the fl ood.6
Statistics demonstrate the far-reaching impact of the 1927 fl ood. 
Estimates of the death count range from 150 to 500. Some sources 
suggest a total number as high as 1,000 including indirect deaths such 
as from starvation. Many more were left homeless. Roughly 162,000 
homes were unlivable, and 41,000 buildings were destroyed. The fl ood 
turned approximately 700,000 people into refugees; about 600,000 
received aid from the Red Cross or other organizations. Seventy coun-
ties from seven states received some fl ood damage; nineteen of them 
were more than 70 percent inundated. The fl ood destroyed some two 
million acres of farmland valued at $102.5 million. At maximum market 
value, the amount of land not used or ruined reached nearly $2 million. 
This does not include the value of the more than 1.2 million poultry 
and 271,000 livestock that died in the fl ood, including 26,000 cattle and 
127,000 pigs. In Louisiana, the fl oods decimated the 6.2 million muskrat 
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population that formed a large part of Cajun income. It took years to 
restore these populations. In addition, damages to public infrastructure 
– roads, telephone poles, bridges and railroads – totaled $10 million. 
Estimates of the total value of losses reached up to $1 billion, during 
an era when the federal budget rarely exceeded $3 billion.7
Equally disconcerting for the average citizen were the dramatic 
changes to the landscape imposed by the fl ood, which lingered long 
after it receded. When waters poured through crevasses, they left behind 
grooves and channels. In several locations, blue holes – large lakes 
of clear water a hundred feet deep – remained where fl oodwaters dug 
out holes when dumping through the levees. Such lakes now mark the 
spot of crevasses all along the river. Many landmarks had changed or 
disappeared beneath the silt left behind by the waters. Sandbars four 
and fi ve feet high grew up many miles from a crevasse. Silt and sand 
covered roads, fi rst fl oors of buildings, and acres of farmland, which 
required digging out to reach the fertile valley soil. It took several years 
for many farms to return to pre-fl ood profi tability. Public facilities, if not 
buried, were eroded or destroyed. Bridges washed out, roadways were 
full of holes and gaps, and railroads twisted, appearing as picket fences. 
Debris – driftwood and destroyed homes – piled up in many locations, 
and most buildings had water marks on them. Large gaps existed in 
the levees, which in some cases had eroded until little more than small 
bumps remained. Even after fl oodwaters receded, lands normally prone 
to fl ooding remained underwater. Ditches turned to creeks, and creeks 
to wide rivers. Much of the Atchafalaya Basin returned to swampland. 
The impression it left in the minds of its victims lingered for decades.8
Following the Great Flood of 1927, the nation galvanized its sup-
port to prevent another similar tragedy from happening again. Congress 
authorized the Jadwin plan and then modifi ed it dozens of times to pro-
duce the comprehensive MR&T project. Unlike the levees-only system 
during the 1927 fl ood, the comprehensive MR&T system functioned as 
designed during the 2011 fl ood. Not a single life was lost as a result of 
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Comparison of overflowed areas during the 1927 and 2011 floods.
W i! ESTIMATED MAXIMUM INUNDATION EXTENTS 
-
_ _ __ 0-
c:3 ___ _ 
\ 
\ 
---------_ ... - .--_. 
-----_._- - -
- ... ----~ _._-- ..... _ ... 
 ............... -
----~- .. -_ .. _----
- .... -
19
Prologue
the fl ood. Water lapped at the top of fl oodwalls and levees the length 
of the river, exerting unprecedented levels of pressure on the backbone 
of the protection system, but the levees withstood the record stages 
and pressure due in large part to the operation of three fl oodways and 
the storage capacity provided by non-MR&T reservoirs in the Ohio 
and Arkansas-White basins. Flood fi ght teams, composed of federal, 
state, and local resources that battled unusually frigid temperatures, 
high winds, and stinging rain, also assisted the levees in holding back 
the onslaught of the river. With the levee system not experiencing any 
crevasses, only 6.3 million acres fl ooded within the 22.4-million acre 
project footprint. In other words, sixty-two percent of the property inun-
dated during the 1927 fl ood escaped overfl ow in 2011. Nearly all of the 
land that fl ooded during the 2011 fl ood was located between the levees 
or other unprotected areas, or within the designated fl oodways and 
backwater areas. Approximately 950,000 households, along with major 
industrial, commercial, and retail facilities that stood in harm’s way 
escaped the fl ood undamaged. Most of the estimated 35,000 households 
damaged by the fl ood were located in unprotected areas or within the 
designated fl oodways. MR&T project features also prevented $7.3 bil-
lion in crop losses. All told, the MR&T project prevented $110.6 billion 
in damages, not including potential losses from interrupted business 
activities and related impacts.9
The pages that follow endeavor to provide a transparent depiction 
of the 2011 fl ood within the MR&T footprint and, in the process, give 
evidence to the realities just described, while providing necessary his-
torical context for greater understanding of key features of the project. 
It is the story of prudent foresight, heroic actions, agonizing decisions, 
and extreme personal sacrifi ce.

Chapter One
General Jadwin’s 
Floodway:
Historical Background 
of the Birds Point-
New Madrid Floodway
I do not think that my people have ever been in favor of that 
plan for they do not want to see southeast Missouri made the 
dumping ground to protect Cairo, Illinois, much as we love 
Cairo. That is all the Jadwin plan does. Indeed, it is doubtful 
it accomplishes that objective.
Dewey Short
U.S. Representative from Missouri
1930
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30-Day Rain Totals 
(April 5 - May 5, 2011) 
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DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY OF 2011, a prolonged and active cold weather pattern hit the Midwest, dropping signifi cant snowfall across the Upper Mississippi River Valley and south-
ward along the Ohio River Valley. By mid-February a larger and deeper-
than-normal snowpack covered large sections of the drainage basin 
above the Cairo gage, situated at the confl uence of the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers. As the late winter thaw set in across the region, widespread 
heavy rains dropped up to 300 percent above normal amounts in most 
areas along the Ohio and middle Mississippi. The rivers, which were 
below fl ood stage, began to swell. In late February the rivers climbed 
even higher, as unseasonably warm temperatures rapidly melted the 
remaining Ohio Valley snowpack in less than 48 hours, releasing up to 
four additional inches of water as runoff. The melted snow and weeks 
of excessive rains caused widespread, but minor, fl ooding along the 
Ohio and middle Mississippi rivers. At the Cairo gage, the river reached 
43 feet on February 28, just three feet above fl ood stage, but it had 
jumped 25 feet in the ten days since February 18. The wet pattern was 
not over, though. Heavy and repeated rains continued to pound the 
Ohio Valley. By mid-March, the Cairo gage exceeded 50 feet, eventu-
ally climbing to more than 13 feet above fl ood stage on March 18. Then, 
much to the relief of fl ood-stricken areas along the middle and upper 
portions of the Ohio River, the active storm track shifted northward into 
the upper Mississippi River basin. The heavy rains and warmer tempera-
tures had the same effect on the snowpack and rivers across Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and Iowa. By early April a signifi cant fl ood wave developed 
on the upper Mississippi River, with an anticipated arrival date of late 
April at Cairo. The Ohio River had crested and dropped below fl ood 
stage at Cairo in early April, but the heavy rains returned and reversed 
the descent. The Cairo gage jumped back above fl ood stage on April 10. 
It did not permanently drop below that point again until early July.10
On April 20, the Cairo gage stood at just below 49 feet. It had risen 
almost a foot in 24 hours. The offi cial National Weather Service called 
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for a rise to 52 feet by April 30, but contingency forecasts, which rep-
resent worst case scenarios, indicated a possible rise to 58 feet on the 
gage. How high the river would get was a matter of timing, or unusual 
timing in this instance. The early warm temperatures and sustained rains 
in the upper Midwest led to an earlier-than-normal snowmelt crest on 
the Mississippi River. The arrival of that crest was expected to coincide 
with the arrival of the second crest pulsing down the Ohio River. If both 
crests arrived at the same time, the confl uence area and the lower Missis-
sippi River would face a deluge. If it rained on top of that, the resultant 
fl ooding would be worse – much worse. The National Weather Service, 
indeed, was keeping a close eye on an area of high pressure to the east 
and a trough over the Central and Western United States. That pattern 
created favorable conditions for a frontal system to become stationary 
over the Arkansas and Ohio valleys. If warm and moist air from the 
Gulf of Mexico streamed northward along the western periphery of the 
high pressure system and collided with the cooler air to the north of 
the front, forecasters expected heavy precipitation. With each passing 
moment, the likelihood of persistent rains arriving at the same time as 
both crests on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers became more of a reality.11
On the morning of April 21, Bill Frederick, the staff meteorolo-
gist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division 
(MVD) delivered his daily weather report. The National Weather Ser-
vice expected the frontal system to become stationary over the Ohio, 
middle Mississippi, and Arkansas valleys, bringing daily rounds of 
intense rainfall totaling up to eight inches over the entire area through 
April 27. The National Weather Service still anticipated the Cairo gage 
to reach 52 feet on April 30, but the forecast did not include the heavi-
est rains expected for the ensuing fi ve days. They would release an 
updated forecast, to include the anticipated fi ve-day rainfall totals, later 
in the afternoon during the Lower Ohio-Mississippi River Coordination 
Teleconference – a daily call among representatives from the National 
Weather Service river forecaster centers and Corps of Engineers water 
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control offi ces from the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division (LRD), 
MVD, and the MVD district offi ces.12
During the afternoon coordination call, the National Weather Service 
divulged its contingency forecast. Incorporating expected rainfall over 
the ensuing fi ve days, the contingency forecast showed a possible crest 
of 61.1 feet on the Cairo gage late on May 3 or early on May 4. Isolated 
models called for 62.3 feet on the gage. Anyone on the call remotely 
familiar with the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway immediately took 
notice of those numbers. According to the 1986 fl oodway operations 
plan, the forecast would necessitate the activation of the fl oodway for 
the fi rst time in 74 years. An action that many on that coordination call 
never thought would happen in their lifetimes – blowing up the Birds 
Point-New Madrid levee – had just become a strong possibility.
Bott leneck at the Confluence
Authorized in the aftermath of the 1927 fl ood and constructed during 
the early 1930s, the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway represented 
Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin’s solution to the decades-long fl ood problem at 
the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The confl uence area 
had plagued the Mississippi River Commission’s fl ood control efforts 
since the late nineteenth century. Historically during larger fl oods, the 
Mississippi River found room to expand through a natural outlet or 
diversion through a low gap in the bank below Cape Girardeau, Missouri. 
Depending on the magnitude of the fl ood, up to 300,000 cfs escaped the 
main channel through the gap and coursed through the St. Francis basin 
before returning to the Mississippi River near Helena, Arkansas. While 
the diversion of fl oodwaters proved devastating to low-lying lands in 
both the upper and lower St. Francis basins in Missouri and Arkansas, 
it helped to keep fl ood stages somewhat in check on the east bank of the 
river at Cairo, Columbus and Hickman, Kentucky, and Tiptonville, Ten-
nessee, and the slightly elevated lands along the west bank in Missouri. 
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The diversion, though, clashed with the commission’s levees-only policy, 
which rested on the premise of confi ning fl oodwaters between the levee 
system with the aim of increasing the scouring energy of the river so 
that it would erode or dig the riverbed deeper to lower fl ood heights 
and provide adequate depths for navigation.13
At the twilight of the nineteenth century, the federal levee system 
on the west bank extended in a continuous line from just below New 
Madrid, Missouri, to Pecan Point below Osceola, Arkansas. From New 
Madrid northward to Commerce, Missouri, individual landowners had 
constructed smaller, detached levees that merely connected various 
ridges of higher ground to protect against minor seasonal fl ooding. 
Between 1899 and 1907, the commission assisted local levee districts 
in Missouri with constructing a federal levee between Birds Point and 
Dorena. Because the commission’s jurisdiction at that time was limited 
to the area below the confl uence, the levee districts completed the levee 
line between Commerce and Birds Point with their own resources. In 
1909, the levee eventually sealed off the river’s access to the natural 
diversion into the St. Francis basin and denied the river the necessary 
room to expand. Across the river, Cairo had long enjoyed levee protec-
tion since the 1830s. Further to the south in the Reelfoot basin, the town 
of Hickman did not have a protective levee. Hickman sat on slightly 
elevated ground on the bank of the river, but the levee construction on 
the west bank dictated countermeasures on the east bank. In 1902, the 
commission began assisting the state in constructing a levee from the 
Hickman bluffs down to the state line with Tennessee, where it con-
nected with the existing levee that extended southward for fi ve miles 
to Slough Landing.14
The levees on both banks were built close to the low-water chan-
nel, which created narrow constrictions during high water events. The 
constrictions impeded the fl ow of fl oodwaters and caused the fl oods 
to stack up and place tremendous pressure on the system of levees and 
fl oodwalls extending from above the confl uence to several miles below. 
27
Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway
With the natural diversion near Cape Girardeau walled off by a levee, 
there was nowhere for the water to escape. Eventually the river would 
fi nd the room to expand. Where it would fi nd the room remained an 
unanswered question that haunted landowners along both banks, par-
ticularly those living in Cairo. While the city of Cairo has recently fallen 
on hard times due to labor and racial strife, it represented the crown 
jewel of the area in the early part of the twentieth century. Home to 
approximately 16,000 people, Cairo was a bustling commercial center 
in the heartland of America. Cairo had it all – lavish antebellum homes, 
a quaint garden district, a prosperous downtown lined with shops that 
offered the latest goods, thriving night clubs, a booming “red-light” dis-
trict, and navigation, rail, and highway connections. Cairo’s geographic 
location, which made it the ideal river hub, was precisely the root of the 
problem. The city sat on a massive, low-lying, sand pit. The Mississippi 
and Ohio rivers fl anked the town on three sides, which explains why 
Cairo was the fi rst leveed city on the Mississippi River north of New 
Orleans. During fl oods, the intense pressure on the underbelly of the 
town caused massive sinkholes and underseepage. That same pressure 
also threatened the massive fl oodwalls and levees protecting it, particu-
larly at the neck of the peninsula, where the rivers ran closest to each 
other and the pressure was at its greatest.15
During the fl ood of 1912, the fi rst major fl ood since the commis-
sion and levee districts had completed construction of the confl uence 
area levees, the river established a new record height of 53.9 feet on 
the Cairo gage that shattered the existing fl ood record set in 1883 by 
an astonishing two feet. The U.S. Weather Bureau anticipated an even 
higher crest at Cairo, but the river overtopped and crevassed the east 
bank levee just downriver from Hickman, sending fl oodwaters coursing 
through the entire 304 square-mile area behind the newly-constructed 
levee. In 1913, the river again established a new record stage on the 
Cairo gage, surpassing the stage of the previous year by nearly one 
foot before fl oodwaters crevassed the levee near Birds Point at four 
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locations and caused 29 small breaks on the west bank levee opposite 
Columbus and Hickman. The crevasses allowed the river to spread 
out and spared the east bank levee from crevassing a second time. The 
crevasses also lowered the crest at Cairo by a little more than three feet. 
Prior to the crevasse, the river was forecast to reach 58 feet, but as the 
river expanded into the fl oodplain in Missouri, the Cairo gage crested 
at 54.8 feet. During the 1927 fl ood, the river established a new record 
stage on the Cairo gage for the third time in 15 years when it reached 
a height of 56.5 feet. Once again the river threatened the levee system 
in the confl uence area until a crevasse at Dorena, just north of New 
Madrid, reduced stages at the Cairo and Hickman gages by two feet in 
less than 24 hours.16
As evidenced by the fl oods of 1912, 1913, and 1927, the constric-
tions and closure of the diversion threatened the levee system along the 
entire reach. In May 1927, while the Great Flood was still ravaging the 
Mississippi Valley, Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin instructed the Mississippi 
River Commission to develop an alternative to the levees-only policy. 
By September, the commission submitted a report to address the fl ood 
problem on the lower Mississippi River. The commission’s plan, with an 
estimated cost of a then staggering $882 million, recommended higher 
and stronger levees supplemented by several fl oodways – leveed path-
ways to divert excess fl ows – to make room for the river during larger 
and more severe fl ood events. All of the proposed fl oodways were to be 
located below the mouth of the Arkansas River. From Cape Girardeau 
to the Arkansas River, the commission plan represented a continua-
tion of the levees-only policy. To protect Cairo and the levee system 
along the entire reach, the commission studied a number of alternatives 
to include elevating the town of Cairo above the fl oodplain and con-
structing diversion channels to siphon off excess fl ows from the main 
channel. Elevating Cairo to the prescribed height, according to some 
estimates, would take at least 57 million cubic yards of earth. Elevat-
ing the city also necessitated replacing the sewer system, 23 miles of 
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A flooded store in Hickman, Kentucky, during the 1912 flood. (Library of Congress)
Flood fi ghting at Fulton County during the 1927 flood. (National Archives)
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street, 40 miles of sidewalks, and nearly 4,000 homes and businesses at 
a cost of $30 million. The Commission also investigated fi ve diversion 
routes coinciding with the historic natural diversion prior to its closure 
by the levee system. The diversions were intended to accommodate up 
to 300,000 cfs from the main channel and redirect the water through 
the St. Francis basin to the White River basin, but the commission 
discovered that the cheapest routes to construct would cost at least 
$220 million. Instead, the commission proposed levee setbacks at the 
constriction points on the river where high water tended to pile up and 
threaten the levee system. The commission also proposed raising the 
level of protection at Cairo to 70.4 feet on the Cairo gage.17
Jadwin, though, rejected the report largely because of exorbitant 
costs and instructed the commission to rework the plan. He had previ-
ously held conversations with Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis and 
President Calvin Coolidge emphasiz-
ing the importance of keeping costs 
manageable, and believed lower cost 
solutions were possible if the commis-
sion reduced levee heights and elimi-
nated the $91 million it had budgeted 
for damages and rights-of-way costs to 
local interests. Col. Charles L. Potter, 
the commission’s experienced presi-
dent, argued with Jadwin over the 
issue of damages in the fl oodways. 
He did not believe that spillways and 
fl oodways could be put across people’s 
land without their being compensated 
for it, and he desired to include a “full 
estimate” of costs. On November 28, 
Potter forwarded the revised report 
to Jadwin. The revised plan did not 
Maj. Gen Edgar Jadwin, Chief of Engineers, 
1926-1929. (Offi  ce of History, U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers)
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substantially change the engineering features recommended in the origi-
nal report, particularly with respect to Cairo and the confl uence area, 
but it did reduce the estimated cost to $774 million, including $91 mil-
lion in damages for the planned fl oodways below the Arkansas River. 
Potter knew that the changes would not satisfy Jadwin. In a response to 
a request from Sen. Joseph E. Ransdell of Louisiana for data to defend 
the commission in upcoming congressional hearings, Potter noted that 
“you will probably fi nd arrayed against you some powers from whom 
you might not expect opposition.”18
The Mississippi River Commission of 1926-1927. Front row, from left to right: Charles West, Col. Charles 
Pott er, and John Stipes. Back row: Col. George Hoff man, Col. Charles Kutz, Edward Flad, Capt. Robert Faris, 
and Capt. Willis Teale.
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Potter was correct in his prediction. Maj. Gen. Jadwin was not 
pleased with the revised report and did not submit it to Congress. A 
week later, he submitted his own plan to Secretary Davis on Decem-
ber 1, 1927, who forwarded it through President Coolidge to Congress 
on December 8. The Jadwin plan, which carried an estimated price tag 
of only $296 million – a number that was well-received by the fi scal 
conservatism of the Coolidge administration – differed from the com-
mission plan in a number of ways. One of the more noticeable engineer-
ing differences involved Cairo and the confl uence area. In addressing 
the channel constrictions and the Cairo dilemma, Jadwin argued that 
the levees protecting the town already towered 20 feet above parts of 
the city. The commission’s plan would take those levees 10 to 12 feet 
higher than that. He advised that “levees are now about as high as they 
should be” and the city “should not be subject to the jeopardy of levees 
higher than they are now.” Jadwin insisted on the need to provide room 
for the river to expand, especially at the confl uence area. Instead of 
higher levees and individual levee realignments, Jadwin called for an 
overbank fl oodway on the west bank of the river to be created by the 
construction of a new levee about 5 to 10 miles west of the existing 
levee. The new levee – called the setback levee – would extend from 
Birds Point to St. John’s Bayou just east of New Madrid and would 
form the west boundary of the new fl oodway. Jadwin’s plan kept the 
existing levee in place, but lowered it by three to fi ve feet to allow the 
river to escape into the wide 130,000-acre fl oodway between the new 
and old levees when river stages exceeded 55 feet on the Cairo gage. 
The lowered sections – called fuseplugs – would cause the main levee, 
or frontline levee, to naturally crevasse. Jadwin insisted that the fl ood-
way would only operate at a frequency of about once every ten years. 
He also maintained that the lands within the fl oodway would remain 
“capable of cultivation” during all fl oods with the exception of larger, 
but less frequent, fl oods. By Jadwin’s estimation, the additional room 
for the river provided by the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway would 
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lower stages at the Cairo gage by as much as six feet during extreme 
fl oods, with other areas along the reach achieving smaller reductions.19
Critics lost little time in assailing elements of Jadwin’s plan. The 
incorporation of fl oodways into the general plan represented a neces-
sary, but stark, about-face from the previous levees-only policy. The 
overpowering of the levee system during the disastrous 1927 fl ood 
had forced that change, but even in the wake of the fl ood’s widespread 
devastation, a controversy emerged over the reality of implementing 
the fl oodway concept. Highborn and arrogant, but nationally popular, 
Jadwin was unfazed by the criticism. He boasted, “Neither the plan 
nor any feature of it has yet been punctured by criticism, nor can it 
be, because, previous to its submission, it was subjected to every vital 
engineering test.” Jadwin, though, had not accounted for the upcoming 
test of public opinion. Residents and landowners within the fl oodways 
were ill-prepared for the reality of fl oodways – a reality that assured their 
lands would be sacrifi ced to reduce fl ood damages elsewhere. Under 
the Jadwin plan, the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was designed 
to do just that – protect the levee system protecting Cairo and land 
elsewhere in Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, and even Missouri. Critics 
of the fl oodway desperately needed an alternative to the confl uence 
fl ood problem.20
The Mississippi River Commission had posited an alternative, but 
Jadwin had suppressed their report. Word soon reached Congress, though, 
that a viable alternative plan existed. Slighted that Jadwin had simply 
by-passed them, both houses of Congress requested an offi cial copy. 
At the request of the Senate Commerce Committee and introduced by 
Sen. Thaddeus H. Caraway of Arkansas, the Senate offi cially requested 
a copy in January 1928. Senate Resolution 90 ordered the Secretary of 
War to “furnish to the Senate said preliminary estimates, or suggestions 
and recommendations, if any, of both the Chief of Engineers of the Army 
and the Mississippi River Commission touching fl ood control.” Davis 
responded on January 12 by sending the report “with many caveats.” 
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During hearings before the House Flood Control Committee, Jadwin, 
when asked about the plan, complained, “We have not forwarded their 
report to you offi cially. That report came in the back door.” A week 
later, Rep. Frank Reid of Illinois, the chairman of the committee, asked 
Potter to forward the report through the Secretary of War to Congress. 
“They said that this report got in at the back door. We will get it in at the 
front door.” On Potter’s objection that it would be “very unmilitary” to 
bypass the chief of engineers, Reid agreed to sending it through Jadwin, 
to which Potter responded, “I do not think that I will remain president 
of the Mississippi River Commission long after I do that.” Reid insisted, 
and Potter sent a letter to Jadwin explaining the directive of the commit-
tee to forward the report and quoting the Mississippi River Commission 
Act of 1879: “It shall be the duty of said commission … to submit to 
the Secretary of War a full and detailed report of their proceedings and 
actions, and of such plans, with estimates of the cost thereof … to be 
by him transmitted to Congress.”21
During congressional hearings on the Jadwin plan, critics of the pro-
posed Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway desperately latched onto the 
commission’s plan as a favorable substitution. Opposition to Jadwin’s 
fl oodway came from two distinct angles – one political and the other 
engineering. From the political side, Missouri’s congressional delega-
tion attempted to seize on the sympathy factor. Discounting claims 
that the fl oodway provided protection to the entire reach, including the 
Missouri levees between Commerce and Birds Point and the Reelfoot 
basin in Kentucky and Tennessee; Missouri politicians argued that the 
fl oodway represented an unfair burden on southeast Missouri solely to 
protect Cairo – one city in another state. Rep. James Fulbright, a native 
of Millersville in nearby Cape Girardeau County, blasted the fl oodway, 
calling it “a tragedy to southeast Missouri” that would provide “no 
benefi t to any part of the State.” Rep. William Nelson, a former farmer, 
demanded further study to fi nd a more suitable solution.22
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Col. Potter and Lucius Berthe, a consulting engineer for the three 
Missouri levee districts comprising the upper St. Francis basin, led the 
attack from the engineering side. Potter indicated the fl oodway would 
not provide any relief to stages on the Cairo gage and went so far as to 
say that it was not “feasible from an engineering standpoint.” Berthe 
conceded that the fl oodway would lower stages on the Cairo gage and 
along the levees protecting the Reelfoot and St. Francis basins, but not 
to the level promised by Jadwin. Citing the crevasses along the pro-
posed fuseplug levee during the fl oods of 1912 and 1913, Berthe con-
tended that the overbank fl oodway experiment had already been tried 
by nature. On both occasions, the crevasses lowered the crest at Cairo 
by three feet, not six, according to Berthe. He further pointed out that 
the Dorena crevasse during the 1927 fl ood only lowered the crest by 
two feet. Berthe argued that the overbank fl oodway would not be as 
successful in keeping stages down as the former natural diversion. The 
former diversion rerouted fl oodwaters; the proposed fl oodway did not. 
It kept the excess fl ow in the river. “If we took down all of our levees,” 
Berthe informed the House committee, “I … wouldn’t guarantee your 
getting a fi ve foot reduction at Cairo.”23
The main engineering criticism of the plan, though, was its incor-
poration of fuseplug levees at the entrances to the fl oodways. One 
prominent railroad engineer had never heard of them, and many others, 
including Col. Potter and current and former members of the commis-
sion argued that fuseplugs provided less reliability and control over the 
amount of water sent into a fl oodway than a controlled structure. James 
Kemper, a nationally-renowned civil engineer, denounced the use of 
fuseplugs levees as unpredictable and dangerous. Berthe concurred 
with that sentiment, insinuating that the fuseplug would not trigger as 
expected. He hinted that dynamite might be necessary “to open it up.” 
George Schoenberger, the chief state engineer for Louisiana, argued 
that the kinetic energy from the water released through the crevasse of 
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a fuseplug would destroy private property and insisted that lands within 
the fl oodways should be purchased by the government.24
Not that everyone opposed the fl oodway or at least some form of 
relief through the state of Missouri. For example, Rep. Edward Deni-
son of Illinois blamed the dire situation at Cairo on the closure of 
the natural diversion through Missouri and the creation of bottlenecks 
through levee construction. “Cairo is now absolutely prone and is in a 
position where she can not do anything more for herself,” he told the 
House Flood Control Committee. He suggested that the government 
should not only establish the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, but 
should purchase the land outright as compensation to the landowners. 
To counter the sentiment that Missouri interests were being sacrifi ced 
for the benefi t of another state, Rep. William Gregory of Kentucky 
argued that Hickman and the rest of Fulton County did not suffer from 
fl oods until the state of Missouri constructed levees on the west side 
of the river. Gregory argued that more than 6,000 people in western 
Kentucky faced destruction from fl oods “not by the act of God … and 
not by any mistake on the part of Kentucky,” but because of Missouri’s 
lack of consideration for its neighbors. Kentucky’s senators also blamed 
levee construction in Missouri for pushing more water into their state, 
however, they were quick to defl ect the blame from the state of Mis-
souri by pointing out that the Mississippi River Commission had built 
the levees. Sen. William Sackett argued that if the river were allowed 
to overfl ow into Missouri as it did before the levees were constructed, 
it would provide “a great safety valve to protect the town of Hickman.” 
Sen. Alben Barkley insisted that any permanent solution to the problem 
“must contemplate a widening of the area between the levees.” To sup-
port these arguments, engineers from the Fulton County and Reelfoot 
levee districts provided scientifi c testimony showing that the levees 
on the Missouri side of the river had caused fl ood stages to increase in 
Kentucky and Tennessee with each passing fl ood and pointed to how 
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the crevasses on the west bank of the river in 1913 and 1927 had saved 
their levees from collapse.25
By the conclusion of the congressional hearings in February 1928, 
the federal legislature remained divided on how to protect the lower 
Mississippi Valley from fl oods, not just at the confl uence area, but 
along the entire alluvial valley. A large block in both houses endorsed 
the comprehensive and budget-friendly plan advanced by the Corps of 
Engineers. Others, championed by Chairman Reid, favored the less-
intrusive commission plan that offered fewer and smaller fl oodways 
controlled by gated structures and provided more generous compensa-
tion for the use of private land to be incorporated into the fl ood control 
plan. With competing bills advanced in both houses and with time run-
ning out on the fi rst session of the 70th Congress, federal legislators, 
operating under the constant threat of a presidential veto, crafted a series 
of compromises to appease those legislators holding up passage of the 
bill. Passed by both houses of Congress on May 8 and signed into law 
by Coolidge on May 15, the Flood Control Act of 1928 received great 
acclaim by members from both parties as a nonpartisan effort to provide 
relief to the fl ood victims.26
The new law was a pioneering legislative act, if for no other reason 
than its authorization of what eventually evolved into the MR&T project 
in the form of the Jadwin plan. Hailed by Reid as the “greatest piece of 
constructive legislation ever enacted,” the 1928 Flood Control Act more 
accurately refl ected compromise legislation that resulted in ambigui-
ties and internal contradictions. Section one of the act clearly approved 
the engineering aspects of the Jadwin plan, but it also established a 
special engineering board to help select the best features from among 
the Corps of Engineers and commission plans. The Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway represented one of the few engineering differences 
between the plans to be considered by the board. The fate of the pro-
posed fl oodway, as well as that of the residents and landowners within 
it, hung in the balance.
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Establishment of the Floodway
To critics of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, the adoption of 
Maj. Gen. Jadwin’s plan was to be tempered by the creation of the spe-
cial engineering board, whose job was to evaluate, reconcile, and choose 
the best options presented by both plans submitted to Congress in 1927. 
The chief of engineers, the president of the Mississippi River Commis-
sion, and a civilian engineer nominated by Coolidge would comprise 
the board. The board would consider the engineering differences in the 
plans and make recommendations to Coolidge, whose decision would 
“be followed in carrying out the project.” Congressional supporters of 
the commission plan anticipated major revisions to the project, but the 
special engineering board would not drive those changes. Within days 
of the passage of the act, Coolidge nominated retired Col. Carleton W. 
Sturdevant as the third member of the special board. Sturdevant was a 
prominent railroad and canal engineer who had gotten his start working 
for the Mississippi River Commission, most recently as superintendent 
of dredging from 1897 to 1902. He was, therefore, familiar with the 
Mississippi River problem, albeit primarily from a dredging perspec-
tive. The primary mark against him was that he had a close relationship 
with Jadwin, having served under him in the 15th Engineers in France 
during World War I and consulted on the St. Lawrence Waterway from 
1925 to 1927. Although members of the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee expressed concern that having a third member of the board under 
personal obligation to Jadwin might defeat the purpose of the board, 
Sturdevant made a good impression and convinced them that he would 
keep an open mind and be an independent arbiter of the two plans. As 
a result, the Senate confi rmed his nomination before the end of May 
1928. Still, Sen. Harry Hawes and others believed Sturdevant “was 
appointed at the request of Jadwin, and … nobody else” and that little 
good would come of it.27
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Floodway opponents, though, had great faith that Mississippi River 
Commission president and recently-promoted Brig. Gen. Charles Potter 
would stand up to Maj. Gen. Jadwin and fi ght to replace the Bird’s Point-
New Madrid fl oodway with a plan for higher levees. At a minimum, they 
would settle for a gated or controlled spillway instead of the fuseplug 
levees envisioned by Jadwin. Potter was evidently looking forward to 
the board and had been gathering data. In a letter dated June 8, 1928, 
Berthe stated he had heard from news reports that the board was to 
start conducting hearings within weeks. Surprised at the rumor, Potter 
immediately forwarded the note to Jadwin and wrote that “a lot of study 
is necessary before we can expect local interests to present their side of 
the case, especially where many technical questions are involved.” He 
still believed he would be participating in the board.28
On June 10, after Congress had recessed for the summer, Jadwin 
named Col. Thomas H. Jackson to replace Potter as the Western Divi-
sion Engineer, and Coolidge appointed him as commission president 
pending Senate approval. The move came as a shock to those depending 
on Potter’s infl uence on the board. Jackson had gained a reputation for 
considerable expertise with fl oodways while working on the Sacramento 
River and later as a member of the California Debris Commission, and 
he had even suggested in 1913 that fl oodways could solve Mississippi 
fl ood problems. But he had no experience with the Mississippi River, 
and he also had close connections to Jadwin, having worked with him 
during World War I. No doubt Jadwin chose him both for his experience 
and loyalty and hoped to avoid further delay or confl ict over implement-
ing his plan. Potter took the news gracefully. He spent his last day in 
offi ce preparing memoranda outlining problems with the gage at Cairo 
and supporting his view that the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was 
unnecessary. He then retired. Two months later, he was dead, “hastened 
on his last journey by the shock resulting from his summary dismissal,” 
according to Berthe.29
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The special engineering board made only a single trip  downriver 
to hold hearings. Participants complained of not being given adequate 
notice to prepare. In New Madrid, confl ict over the lack of notice 
curtailed debate over the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Jadwin 
declined a continuance, forcing Berthe to submit a report via mail for 
the fi ve Missouri levee districts opposing the fl oodway. The merits of 
the arguments would not be heard in person.30 On August 8, 1928 – a 
mere 60 days after it had been organized – the special board delivered 
its report. In short, the report summarized, “the adopted project is, all 
things considered, the best comprehensive plan that can be formulated,” 
and it recommended against further studies of the comprehensive com-
mission plan. On August 13, Coolidge approved the recommendations 
of the board, other than acquiring rights-of-way for lands required for 
building the spillways and fl oodways, which he wished to consider. 
Four months later, the president approved the purchasing of property 
and fl owage rights – a one-time indemnity paid to landowners for the 
right to fl ood their land during the operation of the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway – but stipulated that the fuseplug levee could not be 
degraded by the necessary three to fi ve feet until at least fi fty percent 
of the fl owage easements had been secured. Coolidge also authorized 
the purchase of a strip of land adjacent to the fuseplug section at a price 
capped at two times the 1928 assessed value of the land.31
Criticism of the board and its fi ndings started almost immediately. 
Nearly everyone was taken aback at the time it spent coming to its 
conclusions. “There is perhaps no record in the world of so highly 
controversial a question, involving the peace and happiness of so many 
people and the expenditure of such a great sum of money being dis-
posed of with such speed as this,” Kemper concluded. The Engineering 
News-Record editorialized that “the board complied with the letter but 
disregarded the spirit of its mandate,” which was “to inform itself fully 
and obtain such data as might be needed for determining upon the best 
plan.” Another point of contention was that Jadwin and his protégés 
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comprised the board, which one member of congress referred to as the 
“Jadwin, Jadwin, and Jadwin Board.”32
Although the special engineering board made no major surveys to 
support its work, the Corps of Engineers completed several surveys and 
studies to determine details of the plan. To answer critics who believed 
the fl oodway would not lower fl ood heights at Cairo, Maj. Donald Con-
nolly of the Memphis Engineer District completed a new study in May 
1928 that found it would lower fl ood stages by three to four feet. This 
confi rmed studies by consultant E.C. Williamson submitted in late 1927 
that the best plan was to lower the fl ood heights through the use of a 
fl oodway rather than raising the city or its levees. More problematic 
were fi ndings revealed by surveys that the setback levee would cross 
several drainage ditches and cause local fl ooding. A study by consultant 
T.T. Knappen completed July 31, 1929, provided three plans to reroute 
drainage ditches to St. John’s Bayou or place culverts in the Mississippi 
River or setback levee costing between $557,000 and $731,000. The 
fi nal option selected was a modifi cation of the drainage ditch plan.33
Despite calls from the American Engineering Council, who argued 
that “it would be a grave mistake” to begin construction of fl oodways 
“until the engineering practicability and economic feasibility are studied 
by a non-partisan and competent Board of Engineers,” the Memphis 
Engineer District made progress at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl ood-
way. On receiving presidential approval, Jadwin ordered construction 
of levees not impacting drainage canals on December 15, 1928, and 
obtaining fl owage rights and levee rights-of-way through condemna-
tion. Current market value for land was $50 to $150 per acre depend-
ing on location. By December 1928, the district had started receiving 
commitments on sale of rights-of-way. In June 1929, the government 
initiated condemnation proceedings. However, there were already liti-
gants claiming that the government was forcing sale without appropriate 
compensation. Judge Charles Davis of St. Louis denied one request for 
injunction on May 22, 1929. Only a few weeks later, in Kirk vs. Good, 
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George W. Kirk sought an injunction and sued the government on the 
grounds that it was taking his land without due process for less than its 
value, and that he could not borrow money on the land or sell it. Davis 
again denied the injunction and dismissed the suit on July 11. Con-
demnation proceedings had not been initiated on Kirk’s land, and any 
losses of income were, according to Judge Davis, “mere consequential 
damages” to construction of levees. If damages were to be realized 
through the operation of the fl oodway, Judge Davis determined that the 
landowner had “complete and adequate remedy” for compensation under 
the provisions of the1928 Flood Control Act. In response to government 
condemnation suits, one group of landowners argued that offers were 
$12 million to $15 million less than market value and that fl owage rights 
should be purchased simultaneously to avoid impacts to land value. At 
least one organization – the Mississippi County Levee District – had 
been making this argument since November 1928. Even as it proceeded 
with condemnations, the Memphis district was receiving bids for con-
struction. By June 1929, it had received all bids, and with resolution 
of the Kirk suit construction began on the setback levee on October 21, 
1929. This work was completed by the end of October 1932.34
The only remaining work involved degrading the fuseplug levee 
to a height corresponding to 55 feet on the Cairo gage. By 1932, the Mem-
phis Engineer District had come to agreement with 288 of the landown-
ers over fl owage rights. The remainder of the 660 condemnation suits 
remained tied up in court. By 1936, the district had obtained 77 percent 
of fl owage rights, surpassing the mandated 50 percent necessary to 
degrade the fuseplug levee. However, during deliberation of condemna-
tion proceedings for fl owage rights in the U.S. District Court of Eastern 
Missouri in Cape Girardeau, Judge Charles B. Faris ruled he would seek 
an injunction if the Memphis district attempted to lower the fuseplug 
levees before obtaining all of the fl owage rights in the fl oodway.35 The 
acquisition of fl owage easements and land rights had proved diffi cult 
and time consuming. It was not until January 1942, fourteen years after 
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the passage of the 1928 Flood Control Act, that the federal government 
completed the acquisition of fl owage rights on the necessary acres within 
the  fl oodway – a fi gure that did not include acreage in the backwater 
area. The cost of fl owage easements totaled $2,385,546 at an average 
price of $22.34 per acre.36
First Activation - 1937 Flood
As the Memphis district actively pursued fl owage rights, the Great 
Flood of 1937 along the Ohio and Mississippi valleys provided the fi rst 
signifi cant test of the MR&T fl ood control project and its protection 
of the confl uence area. During a three-week period in January, steady 
rain fell over the entire Ohio River basin and the confl uence region, 
with some locations receiving in excess of 15 inches of precipitation. 
The Ohio Valley had already been saturated by heavy precipitation in 
December that, because of abnormally warm temperatures, fell in the 
form of rain rather than snow. The additional intense January rains 
immediately turned into runoff, swelling the Ohio, Tennessee, and 
Cumberland rivers.37 On January 15, the Memphis Engineer District 
mobilized for a fl ood fi ght as the massive crest moved down the Ohio 
River toward the confl uence. With rain continuing to pound the Ohio 
Valley, Brig. Gen. Harley Ferguson, the Mississippi River Commission 
president, approved the request by Col. Eugene Reybold, the Memphis 
district commander, to authorize an evacuation of the 3,000 inhabitants 
residing in the fl oodway. On January 21, the river reached 51.6 feet on 
the Cairo gage – up more than1.5 feet from 24 hours earlier. Radio sta-
tions began broadcasting the evacuation notice while district personnel 
travelled through the fl oodway distributing handbills with the news. On 
January 23, the Cairo gage surpassed 56 feet – one foot higher than 
the height at which the fuseplug levee at the head of the fl oodway was 
intended to overtop and crevasse. The fuseplug levee, though, had not 
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been cut down to a height corresponding to 55 feet on the Cairo gage 
because of Judge Faris’s order.38
The Weather Bureau anticipated that stages would reach 61 feet on 
the Cairo gage within a week, but the fl ood had not yet crested at Pitts-
burgh at the origin of the Ohio River. Rain continued to fall, making 
it diffi cult to accurately predict the ultimate stage on the Cairo gage. 
Nonetheless, Reybold instructed district fl ood fi ghters to prepare the 
levee system between Cairo to Memphis for a possible stage of 62 feet 
on the Cairo gage. With the help of a 15,000-man workforce, composed 
mainly of Civilian Conservation Corps, Works Progress Administration, 
and inmate laborers, the fl ood fi ght teams strengthened and topped the 
levees throughout the confl uence area. While the majority of Cairo’s 
citizens fl ed to higher ground, laborers constructed wooden bulkheads 
or “mudboxes” on the tops of the levees and fl oodwalls protecting the 
low-lying city from complete inundation. After completing the wooden 
bulkheads and bracing them in place, workers lugged sacks of clay 
brought to site on railcars to the top of the structure and dumped the 
contents in the box. They then used wooden tampers to hand-tamp the 
clay into place. Upon completion, the bulkheads effectively raised the 
level of protection to 63.3 feet on the Cairo gage. A similar frantic battle 
against the river took place at Hickman, where the failure of the levee 
would fl ood eastern Kentucky and Tennessee all the way down to the 
Obion River. Engineers also feared the failure of the levee might lead 
to a permanent change in course of the river.39
While the fl ood fi ght continued in the confl uence area, Reybold 
dispatched Maj. R.D. Burdick to the fl oodway to evaluate the situation. 
When Burdick arrived, he joined two senior engineers working for the 
Mississippi River Commission, Charles Schweitzer and George Clemens, 
and Dan Fordice, a surveyman from the district, in making his assess-
ment. The engineers found the river already spilling over the frontline 
levee at several locations. They were concerned. They knew the rate of 
overtopping was not enough to hold the stage below 60 feet on the Cairo 
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gage. The levee needed to be crevassed artifi cially. Burdick instructed 
Fordice’s survey crew to use picks and shovels to cut a trench across 
the crown of the levee to encourage fl ow and scour suffi cient to create 
a complete break, but the attempt failed to achieve the desired results. 
Just as Lucius Berthe had predicted in 1928, Burdick reached the con-
clusion that dynamite was necessary to crevasse the levee. The failure of 
the manmade cuts, though, proved to be a fortunate circumstance when 
the crews discovered several locals had ignored the evacuation order 
and were trying to raise the level of protection along the frontline levee. 
Reminiscent of the 1927 fl ood, some of the stragglers were armed and 
Workers raise the level of protection at the Cairo floodwall during the 1937 flood. 
(Farm Security Administration - Offi  ce of War Information Photograph Collection, Library of Congress)
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threatened to prevent the opening of the fl oodway by force, prompting 
Missouri Governor Lloyd C. Stark to summon the Missouri National 
Guard to protect workers attempting to open the fl oodway.
In the early morning hours of January 25, the Cairo gage read 
58.2 feet. Burdick and his team braved the frigid temperatures and 
began preparations to crevasse the sleet-covered levee with dynamite. 
With stinging rain and sleet whipping across the region, they spent the 
morning digging and drilling three rows of three holes through the 
frozen levee to a depth of eight feet at two locations about 350 feet apart. 
The crews placed approximately 1,000 pounds of dynamite in each hole 
at both locations. At approximately 1100 hours, with the Cairo gage 
reading 58.4 feet, the charge was blown, creating a 70-foot wide gap 
in the levee. The swollen river rushed through the opening. Airplanes 
fl ying over the fl oodway began dropping metal canisters containing 
hand-written U.S. Army fi eld messages that alerted fl oodway residents 
of the impending danger. “Levee has broken. Get out at once.” the 
messages warned. About 90 minutes later, the crew opened a second 
gap measuring 50 feet. More water gushed into the fl oodway. Burdick 
observed active erosion and caving at both openings and anticipated 
that they would grow to form one large crevasse. They crews repeated 
the process and opened two additional gaps in the levee by nightfall. 
By 2300 hours, the river was still climbing, having reached 58.7 feet 
on the Cairo gage. Burdick realized that the crevasses were not enlarg-
ing as quickly as he originally anticipated. By his estimation, the cre-
vasses were only discharging roughly 30,000 cfs into the fl oodway. 
Using an additional 17,000 pounds of dynamite, Burdick and his team 
created fi ve more crevasses in the levee on January 26. By 2000 hours, 
the Cairo gage had dropped four-tenths of a foot to 58.3 feet, despite 
rising stages upriver from the gage. By January 27, the crevasses had 
an aggregate length of 1,000 feet that passed an estimated 150,000 cfs 
into the fl oodway, with additional infl ows coming through the natural 
crevasses and overtopping.40
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The activation of the fl oodway caused only a minor drop in actual 
stages at the Cairo gage, but the fl ood crest had not yet reached the con-
fl uence area and the river resumed its ascent. The Ohio River crested 
10 feet above the previous record stages at Cincinnati on January 26 and 
Evansville on January 27. It took another week for the crest to reach 
the Cairo gage, where the river reached 59.51 feet on February 3. By 
that time, the length of the crevasses had grown to 9,200 feet. Despite 
the fl awed activation process, Burdick concluded that the fl oodway, 
which passed approximately one-fourth of the entire fl ood discharge 
at Cairo at the height of the fl ood, had reduced the February 3 crest at 
Cairo by 3.5 feet – a signifi cant reduction considering that the fl ood-
walls and levees, with the emergency bulkheads in place, only protected 
to a height slightly above 63 feet. The operation of the fl oodway also 
Army Field Message dropped by plane into the Birds Point-New Madrid 
floodway during the 1937 flood. (Photo by Kevin Pritchett )
Inset: Activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway, 1937.
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delayed the crest long enough for the town of Hickman to construct 
bulkheads by placing earth-fi lled bulkheads on top of the fl oodwall and 
levees protecting the city. More importantly, the use of the fl oodway 
reduced the stress on the entire levee system in the confl uence area. Fol-
lowing the fl ood, the Memphis Engineer District closed all crevasses 
in the frontline levee, with the exception of those at the very bottom of 
the fl oodway, with an interim levee by May 1, 1937. According to the 
Annual Report of the Mississippi River Commission, the interim levee 
held back the spring rise on the Mississippi River and the farmers in 
the fl oodway enjoyed excellent crops during the 1937 growing season. 
By the 1938 fl ood season, the frontline levee had been restored to its 
pre-fl ood height.41
The 1937 fl ood shattered stage records on every major gage from 
Huntington, West Virginia, to Cairo on the Ohio River and from the 
confl uence to Helena, Arkansas, on the Mississippi River. At the Cairo 
gage, it surpassed the 1927 record stage by more than three feet; at New 
Madrid it topped the old 1913 mark by more than three feet; at Memphis 
the 1913 record by more than 6.5 feet; and at Helena the 1927 height 
by nearly 3.5 feet. Even though the improved mainline levees along 
that reach held fi rm, communities like Cairo, Hickman, and Tiptonville 
had to raise the level of protection to prevent the levees and fl oodwalls 
from overtopping. Longtime critics of the fl oodway, such as Berthe, 
questioned the adequacy of the operation. Citing the four-tenths of a 
foot drop on the Cairo gage, they scoffed at Burdick’s estimation that 
the fl oodway lowered stages at Cairo by 3.5 feet. To many, the smaller 
immediate reduction proved Berthe’s contention from the congressional 
fl ood control committee hearings in 1928 that the fl oodway would not 
provide the six-foot stage reductions envisioned by Maj. Gen. Jadwin. 
Berthe also questioned the adequacy of the project design fl ood. The 
project fl ood to which the MR&T project was designed to protect against 
allowed for a maximum discharge at Cairo of 2.25 million cfs to 2.4 mil-
lion cfs, with additional levee heights to spare. The 1937 fl ood registered 
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a peak discharge just a shade over two million cfs, yet several towns 
barely escaped disaster with the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway in 
operation.42
Before the fl ood crest had cleared the Mississippi River, the House 
Committee on Flood Control sent a request to Maj. Gen. Edward 
Markham, the chief of engineers, to submit revised comprehensive plans 
for the Mississippi and Ohio valleys. The operation of the fl oodway 
had left an indelible impression on Markham. He had received reports 
detailing the damages in the fl oodway and had seen pictures of homes 
being washed away by the torrent unleashed through the fl oodway. “I 
am now of the opinion that no plan is satisfactory which is based upon 
deliberately turning fl oodwaters upon the homes and property of people,” 
he lamented, “even though the right to do so may have been paid for in 
advance.” Markham conceded that the existing project fl ood dimensions 
at the Cairo gage were insuffi cient and suggested that the maximum 
The Birds Point-New Madrid floodway in operation during the 1937 flood.
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probable fl ood could reach as high as 2.6 million cfs. To keep the rate 
of discharge manageable at the confl uence area, he recommended the 
construction of additional reservoirs in the Ohio Valley.43
Increasing the Level of Protection
Over the next two decades, the Corps of Engineers and the Missis-
sippi River Commission initiated projects and modifi cations to reduce 
the likelihood of activating the fl oodway, while maintaining it as an 
essential safety feature in the event of a fl ood approaching project fl ood 
dimensions. Whether or not it was a direct result of Markham’s plea, 
Congress authorized the construction of Kentucky Dam across the Ten-
nessee River the following year and later authorized the Barkley Dam 
across the Cumberland River. Though not features of the MR&T project, 
the 1944 Flood Control Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to oper-
ate the dams to reduce fl ood stages to safeguard the levee system on 
the Mississippi River in the vicinity of and downriver from Cairo and 
to reduce the frequency of operation of the Birds-Point New Madrid 
fl oodway.44
The fl oodway came perilously close to operation during the 1945 and 
1950 fl oods, with the Memphis Engineer District mobilizing resources 
to activate, but in both instances stages remained below the trigger 
point. After 1950 the Mississippi River did not experience any signifi -
cant fl oods for more than two decades, however, backwater fl ooding 
resulting from minor high water events entering the fl oodway through 
the 1,500-foot outfl ow gap continued to plague more than 80,000 acres 
in the lower portion of the fl oodway. The commission sought to pro-
vide partial protection for the backwater area by recommending a new 
levee to project grade extending across the 1,500-foot gap and provid-
ing for the construction of a gravity drainage structure. Under the plan, 
32,000 acres of low land near the control structure would be utilized as 
a sump area. The plan also required local interests to furnish all lands, 
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easements, rights-of-way, and fl owage rights. In 1959, the St. John 
Levee and Drainage District began acquiring the necessary easements 
within the backwater area, but landowners in the vicinity of the gap, 
where property fell within the proposed ponding area, resisted overtures 
to provide easements. They preferred the construction of a pumping 
plant in conjunction with the authorized gravity drainage structure. 
Because of the lack of cooperation, the levee district was unable to 
acquire the necessary easements, forcing the acquisition program into 
dormancy and preventing the work from proceeding. While the lower 
portion of the fl oodway continued to experience signifi cant backwater 
fl ooding, the inability to close the gap and construct the drainage struc-
ture posed no threat to fl oodway operations.45
Much had changed within the fl oodway since it was fi rst operated 
during the 1937 fl ood. In the 1930s, wooded areas comprised approxi-
mately fi fty percent of the lands within the fl oodway. By the 1950s, that 
same area had been transformed into some of the richest cropland in the 
nation, with nearly 98 percent of the fl oodway invested with agricul-
tural production. As part of that transformation, the Mississippi River 
Commission estimated that nearly 10,000 people lived in several com-
munities, complete with homes, churches, commercial establishments, 
and supporting infrastructure. The stakes were much higher. A second 
operation of the fl oodway would unleash more extensive damage than 
was experienced in 1937. In 1959 the commission advanced a plan to 
raise the frontline levee to a grade corresponding to 62 feet on the Cairo 
gage to provide additional protection made possible by the enlargement 
of the mainline levees in the vicinity of Cairo. The commission plan 
also contained provisions to raise the fuseplug sections to a grade cor-
responding to 60 feet on the Cairo gage. The levee improvements, along 
with existing and planned reservoirs in the Ohio basin, would enhance 
the level of protection within the fl oodway by reducing the expected 
frequency of its operation from once every 17 years with Kentucky 
and Barkley lakes in operation to once every 80 years. The 1965 Flood 
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Control Act authorized these recommendations. The act also stipulated 
that, while the fl oodway would not be placed into operation by over-
topping until a fl ood stage of 60 feet was predicted, the commission 
maintained the right to create artifi cial crevasses in the fuseplug levee 
or elsewhere when stages reached 58 feet on the Cairo gage and a stage 
higher than 60 feet was predicted.46
Following the passage of the 1965 Act, the Mississippi River Com-
mission further modifi ed the plan for operating the fl oodway. The new 
plan raised the fuseplug sections to a height corresponding to 60.5 feet 
on the Cairo gage, raised the frontline levee to 62.5 feet, and raised the 
setback levee to a height of 65.5 feet. The plan called for the operation 
of the fl oodway only through explosives detonation at the upper fuse-
plug section when stages reached 58 feet at Cairo with a forecast of 
stages to exceed 60 feet. These changes necessitated a round of modi-
fi ed easement acquisition covering 80,982 acres of land, of which more 
than 76,000 acres were already embraced under the original easements 
obtained between 1928 and 1942. Between 1968 and 1974, the federal 
government acquired the necessary modifi ed fl owage easements at 
prices ranging from $1 to $100 per tract. The easements conformed to 
the new plan of operation and reserved for the federal government the 
right to operate the fl oodway by artifi cial crevassing. The easement 
also reserved to the owners the right to compensation if operation of 
the fl oodway resulted in “excessive deposits of sand and gravel” upon 
the land.47
After a 23-year hiatus from severe high water, the Mississippi Valley 
experienced a severe fl ood in 1973. Unlike the major fl oods of 1937 
and 1950, the bulk of the fl oodwaters during the 1973 fl ood emanated 
from the upper Mississippi River, not the Ohio basin. The fuseplug 
sections at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway had not yet been 
fully raised to the 60.5 feet on the Cairo gage as called for under the 
modifi ed operations plan. Col. John Parish, the Memphis Engineer Dis-
trict commander, closely watched river forecasts. By March 22, river 
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forecasters announced that they did not expect the river to climb above 
55 feet on the Cairo gage. The Memphis district and local levee boards 
were heavily engaged in fl ood fi ght activities at the Commerce to Birds 
Point levee, Cairo, and the Reelfoot/Obion sector. After surveying the 
situation, Parish was confi dent that fl ood stages would not necessitate 
the activation of the fl oodway. “Our levees are in no danger of failing,” 
he informed local newspapers in the confl uence area.
Parish approached Maj. Gen. Charles Noble, the president of the 
Mississippi River Commission, with the recommendation to fl ood fi ght 
at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway as a precautionary measure 
to prevent overtopping of the fuseplug levee. “We want to be prepared 
for a 60-foot river. We do not expect it.” Noble gave his consent. In late 
March, a crew consisting of 42 laborers and fi fteen bulldozers, under the 
leadership of Jim Patridge of the Memphis district, raised eleven miles 
of the fuseplug levee by two feet – a height equivalent to 60 feet on 
the Cairo gage. Battling rain, wind, and mud, Patridge’s crews pushed 
35,000 cubic yards of material from the landside of the levee to the 
levee crown in less than 48 hours. Throughout the emergency opera-
tion, Parish continued to warn fl oodway residents that the effort was 
a precautionary measure. “If stages hit 58 feet, we must evacuate the 
fl oodway,” Parish told local newspapers. He also intended to activate the 
fl oodway if the forecast changed and pushed stages higher than 60 feet 
on the Cairo gage. The warnings, though, did little to damper the happy 
mood of fl oodway residents. For the fi rst time since Maj. Gen. Jadwin 
had conceived the fl oodway concept, they were being allowed to fl ood 
fi ght to save their property. The emergency action, though, created a 
false sense of optimism that perhaps such actions would be common 
in the future. That optimism would not last long.48
After the fl oods of 1973, 1975, and 1979, the Mississippi River 
Commission once again revised the fl oodway operations plan after 
concluding that activation would be more safe and effective if artifi -
cial crevasses, including the use of explosives, were not limited to the 
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upper fuseplug section. The new plan of operation included artifi cial 
crevasses at four locations along the frontline levee: two at the upper 
fuseplug section, one at the lower fuseplug section, and one in the 
frontline levee opposite Hickman, Kentucky. To assure the artifi cial 
crevasses came at the precise time to protect against fl oods approaching 
the project design fl ood dimensions, the plan incorporated the use of 
explosives if necessary. The Memphis Engineer District, though, soon 
realized that it did not possess suffi cient property rights to enable per-
sonnel to access the levee to place explosive materials as prescribed in 
the modifi ed plan. The original and modifi ed easements obtained under 
the authority of the 1928 and 1965 fl ood control acts covered only those 
lands between the landside toe of the frontline levee and the riverside 
toe of the setback levee. The easements did not extend to lands upon 
which the frontline levee rested. On July 20, 1981, Colonel W.H. Reno, 
the district commander, requested that the St. John Levee and Drain-
age District and Levee District No. 3 of Mississippi County, Missouri, 
grant rights of entry for district personnel to access the levee in order 
to artifi cially crevasse it with explosives in the event river conditions 
warranted operation of the fl oodway. Both sponsors refused.
In 1983 another fl ood struck the Mississippi Valley. The National 
Weather Service forecast fl ood stages to reach 60 feet on the Cairo 
gage, prompting the commission to make contingency plans for the 
operation of the fl oodway. The federal government instituted eminent 
domain proceedings seeking immediate possession of the necessary 
easements to allow Memphis district personnel to access the frontline 
levee and put the plan of operation into effect if conditions warranted. 
In response, several landowners joined with Levee District No. 3 in 
fi ling a lawsuit with the Federal District Court in Cape Girardeau seek-
ing a temporary injunction to prevent the operation of the fl oodway. 
On May 10, Judge Kenneth Wangelin issued a permanent injunction 
against the plan to operate the fl oodway with four artifi cial crevasses. 
In making his decision, Judge Wangelin ruled that the 1965 Act did 
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not provide congressional approval to artifi cially crevasse the frontline 
levees, to include the fuseplug sections, and that no substantial evidence 
existed to suggest that it was necessary to make artifi cial crevasses to 
ensure operation of the fl oodway. Judge Wangelin also ordered that if 
his injunction was reversed by appeal, the federal government must 
deposit $10.4 million dollars with the court for “just compensation” if 
the commission activated the fl oodway. The predicted fl ood stages never 
materialized during the 1983 fl ood due in part to the reduction in stages 
provided by Kentucky and Barkley lakes, but the district court’s injunc-
tion remained intact. The federal government appealed the case to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 15, 1984, the appellate court 
reversed the district court’s decision by fi nding the plan to operate the 
fl oodway was not “arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.” The 
court also questioned Judge Wangelin’s authority to review the case at 
all by fi nding the decision to operate the fl oodway “is one committed to 
agency discretion by law…and is unreviewable.” Last the court ruled 
that the district court had erred in instructing the federal government 
to deposit the $10.4 million as compensation.49
In the aftermath of the 1983 fl ood, the commission tweaked the 
fl oodway operational plan in an effort to reduce preparatory actions 
and to delay the operation of the fl oodway until later in the project 
design fl ood curve. The intent of the modifi ed plan, known as the 1986 
operations plan, was to allow natural overtopping along more than 
eight miles of the upper fuseplug section before artifi cially crevassing 
the levee. To this end, the plan included raising 2.5 miles of the upper 
fuseplug section and 1.5 miles of the lower fuseplug, and imbedding 
the raised sections with polyethylene pipe that could be fi lled with 
blasting agent in less than a day. The additional height in the levee was 
necessary to provide a dry platform for crews to pump the explosives 
through access wells into the buried lines. The explosives could also 
be removed safely in the event that river stages did not necessitate the 
operation of the fl oodway. The timetable for the new operational plan 
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The Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway under the 1986 operations plan.
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was based on the river elevations projected in the design hydrograph 
for fl oods approaching the project design fl ood. When stages reached 
56 feet on the Cairo gage, a tow with the necessary equipment would 
depart the Ensley Engineer Yard. Preparation of the infl ow crevasse 
would begin when stages reached 59 feet and would be completed by 
the time the river reached 60 feet. Artifi cial crevassing of the levee 
would commence upon the command of the commission president prior 
to river stages reaching 61 feet on the Cairo gage with additional stage 
increases forecast. Despite the changes, the federal government reserved 
the right to activate the fl oodway, if necessary, when stages reached or 
exceeded 58 feet on the Cairo gage and the levee system showed any 
signs of severe stress.50
Residents within the fl oodway, though, pushed for its outright 
abandonment. In 1987, Rep. William Emerson of Missouri prodded 
the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation to pass a 
resolution directing the commission to determine feasible alternatives 
to operating the fl oodway. This resulted in a 1990 reconnaissance by 
the Memphis Engineer District that investigated several alternatives 
to include purchasing the land within the fl oodway at a cost of more 
than $200 million and leasing it back to farmers at the their own risk; 
constructing permanent auxiliary channels in the fl oodway to confi ne 
fl oodwaters diverted into the area, rather than allow them to overfl ow 
the entire fl oodway; realigning and setting back the frontline levee at 
fi ve locations to provide a wider fl oodplain; executing a cutoff at Bessie 
Bend to increase the slope and lower fl ood stages upstream of the bend 
throughout the fl oodway reach; and a plan of natural overtopping of the 
frontline levee. The study concluded that several of the alternatives were 
feasible from an engineering viewpoint, but were not justifi ed economi-
cally. The study further concluded that the plan of natural overtopping 
of the frontline levee without artifi cial crevasses would serve as an 
alternative to the 1986 plan of operation and would provide a higher 
level of protection for the lands within the fl oodway. This alternative 
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required raising the upper fuseplug section to a height corresponding 
to 64.5 feet on the Cairo gage, while leaving the elevation of the lower 
fuseplug section and the remainder of the frontline levee unchanged. 
Under this proposed alternative, though, hydraulic models indicated 
an increase of fl ood stages on the Cairo and Hickman of 3.7 feet and 
2.2 feet, respectively.51
The reconnaissance study served as the basis for engineering review 
of the potential impacts of the natural overtopping plan along both banks 
of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Published in 1991 by the Memphis 
district, in coordination with the Louisville district, the engineering 
review determined that the implementation of the modifi ed plan required 
improvements to existing levees and fl oodwalls and alterations to exist-
ing pumping stations and culverts throughout the confl uence area in both 
districts at a cost of $140 million – $100 million in the Memphis district 
and $40 million in the Louisville district. In April 1992, the Mississippi 
River Commission endorsed the modifi ed plan and requested that the 
district furnish copies to local and congressional interests because the 
implementation of the plan would require congressional authorization. 
Congress, however, never took action.52
General Jadwin’s fl oodway remained the authorized solution to the 
dilemma at the confl uence. The fl oodway had been modifi ed several 
times between 1937 and 1986. Through those modifi cations, the Mis-
sissippi River Commission through the Memphis Engineer District 
had raised the fuseplug sections of the frontline levee from a height 
equivalent to 55 feet on the Cairo gage to 60.5 feet. Each modifi cation 
not only raised the level of protection, but also reduced the likelihood 
of activation. Yet, the fl oodway remained as a viable safety valve to 
reduce pressure on the system in the event of a massive fl ood. In 2011, 
as the snowmelt crests on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers converged on 
the confl uence area and the National Weather Service intently watched 
a developing storm pattern that threatened additional intense rains, the 
1986 operations plan remained in effect and set in law.
Chapter Two
Trouble at the 
Confluence:
The 2011 Activation 
of the Birds Point-
New Madrid Floodway
The operation of the fl oodway is the safest method due to 
the non-hazardous ingredients, which are not classifi ed as 
a high explosive even when mixed; the fastest, because the 
explosive is stored at a Corps facility and can easily be trans-
ported, mixed, and pumped into pre-emplaced pipes; and the 
most reliable method that has been successfully fi eld tested 
in various environmental conditions.
James W. Lloyd and Jack H. Hurdle
The Military Engineer, July 1988
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ON APRIL 22, 2011, MILUS WALLACE stood outside his lovely brick ranch home and looked over his sprawling 2,300-acre farm situated in the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. He quietly 
and proudly took in the serenity offered by the little slice of paradise 
that he and his wife, Wanda, had carved out of the landscape during their 
35-year marriage. On that Good Friday morning on April 22, Wallace 
intended to go fi shing to restock his supplies for his famous fi sh fries, 
where anyone and everyone was welcome to stop by the Wallace home 
and enjoy good food and even better company. As he stood surveying his 
land, the backwater fl ooding entering the fl oodway from the 1,500-foot 
gap near New Madrid concerned him. The backwater threatened to cover 
the roads leading from his home to New Madrid. He needed to move 
nearly 17,000 bushels of beans before the roads closed. But that was 
the extent of his worries. The backwater would not fl ood his property. 
Wallace had lived in the fl oodway his entire life. His parents had also 
lived in the fl oodway, having endured the 1937 operation. His mother 
gave birth to one of his siblings in a tent on the levee in the aftermath 
of the great fl ood of that year. Wallace understood the risks associated 
with living and farming in the fl oodway. With each high water event, 
he always knew in the back of his mind that there was a chance that 
the Mississippi River Commission and the Corps of Engineers would 
blow the levee. The fl oodway was designed to save lives and property. 
Wallace respected that. At the same time, a part of him did not think 
that they would ever actually activate it.53
The Rain Begins
The April 21, 2011, contingency forecast for 61.1 feet on the Cairo 
gage late on May 3 or early on May 4 certainly alarmed water control 
managers at MVD and LRD. The specter of activating the Birds Point-
New Madrid fl oodway remained only a remote possibility. The forecast, 
after all, merely represented a worst-case scenario – but it captured the 
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undivided attention of the Mississippi River Commission and the Mem-
phis Engineer District. Up to that point, the fl ood had been a routine late 
winter/early spring fl ood. The new forecast and the threat of additional 
rain represented the fi rst real indication of big trouble. Charles Shadie 
and Deborah Lee, the chiefs of water management at MVD and LRD, 
respectively, and David Berretta, the long time chief of hydraulics at 
the Memphis Engineer District, immediately held a second conference 
call to discuss potential stage scenarios at the Cairo gage, impacts to 
the fl oodway, and possible options to store water in the massive fl ood 
control reservoirs upriver of the confl uence area.
They also alerted their respective commanders of the contingency 
forecast. Shadie contacted Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, the Mississippi 
River Commission president and MVD commander since February 2008. 
A native of Brooklyn, New York, Walsh possessed an impressive resume 
based heavily on civil works experience with the Corps of Engineers. 
He had served as the commander of the Sacramento Engineer District, 
the South Atlantic Division, and the Gulf Region Division in Iraq. He 
had also served stints as the executive director for civil works and chief 
Maj. Gen. John W. 
Peabody (left) and 
Maj. Gen Michael J. 
Walsh during the 
2011 flood.
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of staff at the Corps of Engineers’ headquarters in Washington, D.C. As 
president of the Mississippi River Commission, it would be Walsh’s 
decision as to if and when to operate the fl oodway. Berretta notifi ed 
Col. Vernie Reichling, Jr., the Memphis Engineer District commander 
since July 2010. Reichling, a combat engineer who led his platoon in 
the initial assault into Panama during Operation Just Cause and par-
ticipated in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom, 
was relatively new to the Corps of Engineers’ civil works mission. He 
would be Walsh’s point man on the ground responsible for preparing the 
fl oodway for operation if conditions warranted. Lee notifi ed Maj. Gen. 
John Peabody, the LRD commander and member of the Mississippi 
River Commission since August 2008. A native of northern Ohio and 
a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Peabody had 
spent most of his career as a combat engineer and had been one of the 
fi rst men in during the invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
As LRD commander, he oversaw the fi rst line of defense against fl oods 
represented by the Corps of Engineers’ fl ood control reservoirs in the 
Ohio basin. Peabody would be called upon to store water in those reser-
voirs in an attempt to lower fl ood stages along the confl uence area and 
try to prevent the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway.
Under Section 7 of the 1944 Flood Control Act, Peabody was in 
direct command of the Cumberland River system in the Nashville Engi-
neer District, including Barkley Lake, and the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity’s reservoir system, including Kentucky Lake. As Peabody’s agent, 
Lee directed releases from Kentucky and Barkley dams. At that point, 
the entire reservoir system in LRD was in overall good shape in terms 
of storage utilization. The Cumberland system, though, represented the 
only viable tool to protect the confl uence area. Lee’s immediate plan 
called for the release of water from behind Kentucky and Barkley dams 
to clear storage space for the rains expected over the weekend. The 
main problem confronting LRD water control managers involved the 
Wolf Creek, Center Hill, Dale Hollow, and J. Percy Priest dams on the 
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Reservoirs in the Ohio basin.
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Cumberland River system upriver from Kentucky and Barkley lakes. 
The Wolf Creek and Center Hill dams were undergoing critical dam 
safety repairs to protect the integrity of the structures. They held restric-
tive ratings on the Dam Safety Action Classifi cation (DSAC) ranking 
system, which meant that dam safety offi cers feared failure of the dams 
was a real possibility if the necessary repairs were not completed. As 
such, the pool elevations in the reservoirs behind those dams had been 
lowered substantially to prevent seepage failure. To keep pool elevations 
below restricted levels, the dams were releasing maximum discharges. 
If the anticipated rain over the next week fell behind those dams, LRD 
faced a diffi cult decision – continue maximum discharges which would 
take away valuable fl ood storage capacity at Kentucky and Barkley 
lakes, or hold back water behind the dams with the restrictive ratings.54
On April 22, one to three inches of rain fell over most of the middle 
Mississippi basin below St. Louis and along the Ohio River. Some areas 
received fi ve inches or more of heavy localized precipitation. LRD 
water control managers increased the discharges through the Kentucky 
and Barkley dams to clear additional storage space to accommodate 
runoff from additional storms in the forecast. On April 23, three to fi ve 
additional inches of rain fell between Caruthersville and Chester. South-
eastern Missouri got the worst of it – 3.2 inches fell in Cape Girardeau, 
3.2 inches in Popular Bluff, 4.7 inches in Greenville, and 3.8 inches 
in Fisk – but the rain also hammered the southern portions of Illinois, 
Indiana, and Ohio, as well as northwest Kentucky and western Tennes-
see. Cairo’s two-day rainfall total reached 3.5 inches.55
Deborah Lee pressed the National Weather Service to publish its 
contingency forecast. That forecast typically served only federal audi-
ences for informational purposes because the forecast relied heavily on 
precipitation as far away as fi ve days into the future. Conditions often 
changed, causing adjustments to the forecasts. The weather service nor-
mally did not publish its contingency forecasts out of concern of causing 
an overreaction among the public. The agency considered the forecasts 
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far too unreliable. The service’s various models predicted a broad array 
of expectations at the Cairo gage ranging from 51.3 feet to 62.3 feet, 
which refl ected on the uncertainty of how much rain it expected to fall 
and where it would fall over the ensuing fi ve days. Lee expressed her 
concern about the timing of the rainfall. It was Easter weekend. People 
would be distracted by family festivities. She wanted to get the infor-
mation out to the public so that they and emergency response agencies 
could accelerate their preparedness if, indeed, the worst-case scenario 
materialized. The National Weather Service relented and began pub-
lishing a qualifying statement with its forecasts indicating that, taking 
future rainfall into consideration, river stages could potentially rise two 
to three feet higher than forecasted in some areas.56
At 0600 hours on Easter morning, April 24, the Cairo gage stood 
at 52.5 feet. The river had risen nearly 1.5 feet in 24 hours, one-half 
foot higher than the offi cial National Weather Service forecast from the 
afternoon before. The steady downpour over the preceding two days had 
dropped more rain than anticipated. Still it kept raining. Three inches 
of rain fell at New Madrid. Another 2.3 inches fell at Cairo. Four more 
inches dropped at Paducah. That afternoon, the weather service revised 
its projected crest at Cairo to 60 feet on May 3, but warned that the rain 
was far from over. Another three to eight inches was anticipated over the 
middle Mississippi and the Arkansas, Ohio, and Tennessee valleys. In 
LRD, the torrential rains were fi lling up the reservoir system. System-
wide fl ood storage utilization stood at 15 percent. Nineteen reservoirs 
already topped 25 percent of their authorized fl ood control storage; 
seven of those reservoirs reached greater than 50 percent. Col. Keith 
Landry, commander of the Louisville Engineer District, reported that six 
of the eleven fl ood control lakes in his area of operations approached 
record pool elevations. The situation pressed Maj. Gen. Peabody into 
issuing “over-arching guidance” to the senior leaders on his staff and 
to his district commanders. Stating the ongoing fl ood had “the potential 
to reach epic proportions,” Peabody directed that fl ood duty missions 
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take the top priority over all actions at LRD and its district offi ces. “We 
must do every single thing we possibly can do – no matter how small 
or seemingly insignifi cant – to reduce the projected maximum crest at 
Cairo,” he wrote. Peabody wanted his staff to consider all alternatives, 
including those outside of the division’s normal operating procedures, 
“It is essential that we pull out the stops to fi ght the peak river crest for 
this event.”57
By the morning of April 25, the Cairo gage reached 54.5 feet. The 
confl uence area was a mess as a result of the deluge of the past week. 
Cairo was almost an island, with only a narrow strip of slightly ele-
vated land containing Illinois Route 3 providing access to and from the 
city. Further to the south on the east side of the river, seepwater and 
impounded rain covered much of Fulton County, Kentucky, and Lake 
County, Tennessee. Standing water covered the fl at farmland in the four-
state area and inundated low-lying state and county roads with several 
inches of water. Creeks and drainage ditches overfl owed their banks. 
Because the Mississippi River stages were so high, the interior drainage 
had nowhere to go, unless it was pumped through or over the levees. 
At St. John’s Bayou on the west side of the river, the fl oodgates were 
closed in late February, which caused the bayou to back up and fl ood 
low-lying lands in East Prairie and Sikeston. Water began to encroach 
upon Interstate 55, the major north-south thoroughfare in the Mississippi 
Valley. Levee conditions across the confl uence area degraded. Small 
boils exploded everywhere across the region, particularly in the Cairo 
and Fulton County sectors where relief wells had not been installed.58
Underseepage and sand boils represent major concerns during fl oods. 
When river levels rise, the additional weight of the water creates pres-
sure that tries to fi nd an escape route through the foundation of the 
levee system. As the underseepage makes its way to the surface on the 
landside of the levee, it boils up through the ground – hence the term 
boil. Excessive pressure causes the underseepage to drag or pipe soil 
particles from the foundation along with it – hence the term sand boil. 
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Left unchecked, sand boils create voids under the levee, which can 
lead to an eventual collapse of the levee. The Corps of Engineers uses 
relief wells and seepage berms to dissipate the pressure to the point that 
the underseepage will not erode the levee foundation. In levees where 
relief wells have not been installed, the Corps of Engineers fi ghts boils 
by building rings, usually with sandbags, around the sand boils. As the 
rings fi ll with water, the weight of the water inside the ring dissipates 
the pressure and prevents the piping of foundation material.
On April 25, the National Weather Service expected another 
eight inches of rain over much of the area during the next three days. The 
pressure on the levee system would continue to mount. The Memphis 
Illustration depicting the potential danger of a sand boil.
Inset: A dreaded sand boil piping sediment.
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Engineer District had moved into Phase II operations – the highest level 
possible – across the entire confl uence area the day before. Flood fi ght 
teams, coordinating with local levee districts, patrolled levees and fl ood-
walls on a 24-hour basis, intently searching for any sign of weakness 
threatening the integrity of the levee system. At 0630 hours on April 25, 
Col. Reichling, following the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway opera-
tions plan, ordered crews in Memphis to commence loading the barges 
with the explosives and necessary equipment. Crews loaded two pump 
barges each with 192 barrels of aluminum powder, six 2,500 gallon 
tanks of liquid blasting agent, two mix-pump units, and two forklifts. 
They also loaded two dozers and two backhoes on an equipment barge. 
The process took 12 hours to complete. In the meantime, it kept rain-
ing. Southeast Missouri and the Ohio Valley received another pounding. 
Nearly six inches of rain fell on Poplar Bluff and two inches at New 
Madrid. Cairo received another inch and a half; Paducah received more 
than two inches. Hopkinsville, Kentucky, received nearly 3.5 inches.59
The continued intense rains and rising river stages forced Peabody’s 
hand on April 25. Going into the fl ood, he faced the diffi cult decision 
with regard to storing water behind the restricted dams on the DSAC 
ranking system – particularly the Wolf Creek and Center Hill dams – 
in order to conserve storage space at Kentucky and Barkley lakes and 
keep fl ood stages at the confl uence in check. He had to reduce the out-
fl ows from Kentucky and Barkley, but that action, along with maximum 
releases coming in from the Cumberland system, would rapidly diminish 
his available storage. He knew that he did not stand a chance at prevent-
ing activation of the fl oodway without that extra storage. After intensive 
study and exhaustive analysis of the dam safety issue, Peabody took 
decisive action to initiate reductions from Kentucky and Barkley dams, 
while reducing to nearly zero the discharges from the restricted dams 
at Wolf Creek, Center Hill, Dale Hollow, and J. Percy Priest and other 
dams on the Cumberland system to reduce the amount of water fl owing 
into Kentucky and Barkley lakes. This would have the effect of driving 
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up water levels behind the restricted dams well above acceptable norms, 
but the LRD engineers expressed confi dence that the dams would hold 
if the higher pool elevations lasted only a few weeks.60
On April 26, the Cairo gage reached 56.5 feet, up more than two feet 
from the previous morning. The National Weather Service projected a 
new crest of 61 feet on the gage for May 3. Weather forecasts for the 
day called for up to two more inches of rain over the affl icted areas. 
Conditions at Cairo and Fulton County continued to degrade. At Hick-
man the fl oodwall had cracks that seeped water. Flood fi ghters stuffed 
sandbags around the stop logs in the fl oodwall to prevent additional 
leakage. The Dyer County Little Levee board in Tennessee, facing an 
eventual overtopping of their levee, voted to create an artifi cial breach 
at the south end of the levee to allow fl oodwater to slowly back into 
the area, rather than face the torrent and scour from overtopping at the 
north end. At Lake County, a fl ood fi ght team discovered that a mile-
long segment of the levee was two feet below the designed height and 
began making plans to raise the low spots. At Dutchtown, Missouri, the 
Memphis district worked with local offi cials to raise a portion of the 
Hubble Creek levee to protect the town from fl ooding. At Caruthersville, 
city offi cials contemplated raising the height of the fl oodwall protecting 
the city. Over at Lake Wappapello at the head of the St. Francis basin, 
the rain of the past week had been the most severe. Lake levels had 
risen more than 40 feet in a matter of four days. Corps of Engineers 
offi cials warned that the lake was near full and would soon go to emer-
gency spillway operations. The only shred of good news involved the 
Commerce to Birds Point levee, where patrols reported no problems.61
The Commerce to Birds Point levee is, as David Berretta described, 
“the most critical levee” in the Mississippi Valley. A break in the levee, 
located at the head of the alluvial valley, would inundate more than 
two million acres in the Missouri bootheel and most of the St. Francis 
basin in northeast Arkansas. Some estimates put the number of acres 
potentially fl ooded at more than three million. Following the 1927 fl ood, 
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Areas protected by the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway.
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Missouri congressman William Nelson described the levee as the “roof” 
of the fl ood control system on the west bank of the MR&T project. 
Nelson’s roof needed to be leak proof. The Commerce to Birds Point 
levee had served as the source of major scares during past fl ood events. 
During the severe 1973 fl ood, a 1,500-foot section on the riverside of 
the levee caved into the river. The caving extended to the top of the 
levee, which caused intense fears it would fail. Personnel from the Mem-
phis Engineer District addressed the problem by placing 18,000 tons 
of riprap stone – carried to the site on barges – to prevent additional 
caving and to shore up the levee. The aggressive response saved the 
levee from failure. Twenty years later during the 1993 fl ood, the levee 
again provided an anxious moment. The private Len Small levee on 
the opposite bank of the river typically overtopped or failed during 
larger fl oods, which lowered river stages and reduced pressure on the 
Commerce to Birds Point levee. The owners of the Len Small levee, 
though, had strengthened their levee during the 1980s. During the 1993 
fl ood, the levee held against a stage under which it normally failed. The 
river remained confi ned and it climbed to within a few feet of the top 
of the Commerce to Birds Point levee. Sand boils developed, which 
fl ood fi ght teams attacked with sandbag rings until the underseepage 
stabilized. Beginning in 1995, with strong support and encouragement 
from U.S. Congressman William Emerson and the Mississippi River 
Commission, the Memphis Engineer District raised and strengthened 
the Commerce to Birds Point levee and installed relief wells. But as 
the 2011 fl ood developed, the district kept a close eye on the levee.62
On April 26, Maj. Gen. Walsh ordered the movement of the fl eet 
carrying the explosives and equipment from the Ensley Engineer Yard at 
Memphis to the harbor at Hickman, Kentucky. A driving rain pounded 
the Memphis area with nearly four more inches of rain as the fl eet pre-
pared to ship out. Walsh also ordered the land-based crews to deploy 
to the fl oodway and begin preparations for possible activation. James 
Lloyd, one of the developers of the Birds Point-New Madrid operations 
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plan, gathered the fl oodway task force in the auditorium at the Ensley 
Engineer Yard to do one last systems check. They could not leave any-
thing behind. “If we don’t have it with us, we will have to work without 
it,” Lloyd warned. He also ensured that every single person – the boat 
captains, the survey men, the hose handlers, and so on – knew their 
roles. He expressed the importance of focusing on the mission at hand. 
More importantly, he cautioned them to expect the unexpected. “If we 
have to do this,” Lloyd warned, “fate will probably dictate that we will 
have to do this at night and in the rain.”63
With intense rains hammering much of the confl uence area and Ohio 
Valley with two inches of rain on April 26, total rainfall accumulations 
continued to climb higher, as did river levels on the Cairo gage. By 
the morning of April 27, the river had climbed more than a foot higher 
than the previous morning. Bill Frederick’s morning weather report 
called for another widespread and severe weather event that carried a 
high risk of strong tornadoes, large hail, and damaging winds over the 
Tennessee Valley. The National Weather Service anticipated another 
one to three inches of rain between Cape Girardeau and Arkansas City, 
with the heaviest rains falling along the Cumberland and Tennessee 
watersheds. The report, however, contained some good news. As the 
storm front moved through the region, it would bring an end to the tor-
rential rains of the past week. Clear skies were in the forecast for the 
next two days.64
The Cairo gage stood at 57.9 feet, but the offi cial projected crest 
dropped from 61 feet on May 3 to 60.5 feet on May 1. Maj. Gen. Pea-
body’s decisive move to reduce outfl ows from the restricted dams in 
the Cumberland system to conserve storage at Kentucky and Barkley 
lakes was paying off. While the local population’s concern grew over 
the possible use of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, the perfor-
mance of the LRD reservoirs and the anticipated respite from rains for 
the next few days created a sense of unspoken and guarded optimism 
among Corps of Engineers and Mississippi River Commission offi cials 
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that the fl oodway might not be needed. That afternoon, Maj. Gen. Walsh 
and two civilian members of the commission, Sam E. Angel and R.D. 
James, conducted an aerial assessment of the four-state area impacted 
by the deluge of the past week. Water was everywhere, sometimes as 
far as their eyes could see. The situation remained serious, to be sure, 
but if Peabody could continue to work his magic and the rain held off, 
the commissioners believed the fl ood might be manageable.65
Following the aerial tour, Walsh, Angel, and James travelled to 
East Prairie, Missouri, to attend a town-hall style meeting organized 
by Rep. Jo Ann Emerson. Her congressional district encompassed the 
fl oodway, and she intended to help her constituents. Earlier in the day, 
Emerson along with Missouri’s two U.S. senators, Claire McCaskill 
and Roy Blunt, sent a letter to President Barrack Obama urging him to 
consider alternatives to using the fl oodway. In the cramped Creative 
School Zone building in East Prairie, she took her fi ght to a new level. 
With approximately 75 deeply-concerned citizens packed around her, 
Emerson pulled out a photocopied page from the Mississippi River 
Commission history book, Upon Their Shoulders, and read a quote 
from Maj. Gen. Edward Markham, the chief of engineers at the time the 
fl oodway was last activated in 1937. “I am now of the opinion,” Emer-
son read aloud from the page before her, “that no plan is satisfactory 
which is based upon deliberately turning fl oodwaters upon the homes 
and property of people even though the right to do so may have been 
paid for in advance.” The crowd cheered. “We’re going to do everything 
possible to prevent the Corps from operating the fl oodway,” Emerson 
told them. They cheered again. She then informed the audience that she 
arranged the meeting to help combat rumors about the possible operation 
of the fl oodway—rumors that were leading to panic across the region. 
She hoped that Walsh could help calm the situation by answering their 
questions. She turned the fl oor over to Walsh.66
Maj. Gen. Walsh faced the large audience huddled around him in 
a semi-circle. They were angry and they were right on top of him. If 
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Above: Aerial view of flooding in the confluence area.
Below: Members of the Mississippi River Commission and staff  conduct an aerial assessment of the 
extensive flooding at the confluence area on April 27, 2011.
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Emerson intended for the close proximity of the crowd and the cramped, 
stuffy quarters to make Walsh uncomfortable, her plan worked ini-
tially. His face reddened. His voice wavered when he started to speak, 
but he quickly recovered. “I recognize all of your livelihoods will be 
impacted,” Walsh explained, “but when it gets to 61 feet, these levees 
have never been under this kind of pressure before.” For the better part 
of the next hour, Walsh and Reichling answered pointed questions and 
anxious concerns presented by the highly-intense audience. How much 
notice will we have? Will the setback levee hold? Why won’t you let the 
fl oodway naturally overtop? When you will give the order? Why are 
you willing to destroy my livelihood? Reichling gave his assurances 
that the setback levee was up to standard. He also bravely explained to 
the hostile crowd that the fl oodway protected more than just Cairo – it 
protected the entire system along that reach, especially the critical Com-
merce to Birds Point levee that protected many in attendance. Walsh 
emphasized that no decision had yet been made and that operating the 
fl oodway remained a last resort, but he sternly added, “At the end of 
the day, I am going to do my duty.”67
The April 27 public meeting at East Prairie, Missouri. (Photo by Kevin Pritchett )
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Later that afternoon, Walsh and the commission’s senior leaders 
went to the frontline levee at Birds Point, where Reichling’s task force 
prepared the fl oodway for activation. The frontline levee contained 
two fuseplugs sections that would allow the Mississippi River into the 
fl oodway. The upper fuseplug, located at the northern tip of the proj-
ect area, served as the main introduction point for fl oodwaters. The 
infl ow site was eleven miles long, with nine miles of that length built 
to a height corresponding to 60.5 feet on the Cairo gage. The lower 
elevation allowed gradual overtopping in the event of a massive fl ood. 
The Corps of Engineers, though, constructed sections of the fuseplug 
to a height of 62.5 feet on the Cairo gage – the same height as the 
rest of the frontline levee. The higher elevation sections on the fuse-
plug housed nearly two miles of buried polyethylene pipe connected 
at 1,000-foot intervals by access wells buried in the levee. Under the 
operations plan, crews would pump liquid explosives into the buried 
lines through the access wells. At the lower end of the fl oodway sat 
two infl ow/outfl ow areas equipped with more access wells and buried 
lines. These sections allowed the fl oodwaters to enter the fl oodway, but 
they were also designed to evacuate the fl oodwaters when river levels 
eventually subsided.68
Working under security provided by the Mississippi County Sheriff 
Department to address any potential confrontation with landowners, 
the survey crews, equipped with maps, global positioning satellites, 
and magnetometers, travelled the length of the frontline levee marking 
and locating the 46 buried access wells with wooden stakes and orange 
tape. The ground crews followed behind. Using the backhoes brought 
to the levee on the equipment barge, the ground crews uncovered the 
wells. Workers then used shovels to clear the wells of any loose dirt 
and gravel. Once this was accomplished, they installed fi ttings on the 
pipes to accommodate the hoses from the pump barges, if necessary. 
With Walsh and his staff on the levee, Reichling, Lloyd, Russell Davis 
– Reichling’s operations chief – and Bartley Durst, the explosives team 
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leader from the Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), 
detailed the processes the task force would employ to prepare the access 
wells, charge the lines, and, ultimately, detonate the explosives to arti-
fi cially crevasse the levee. While on the levee someone – most likely 
either Davis or Durst – indicated to Walsh that fi lling the lines with 
explosives did not commit him as Mississippi River Commission presi-
dent to operating the fl oodway. In other words, the action of charging the 
lines did not signal a point of no return as it was possible to neutralize 
the explosive slurry and pump the mixture from the lines. Lloyd, the 
subject matter expert, pulled Walsh aside, though, and explained that 
while it was possible to clear the lines, he knew “from hands-on expe-
rience” that it was a very complicated process that took weeks, if not 
A briefi ng on the levee. From left: Col. Thatch Shepard, James Lloyd, David Sills, Bartley Durst, Edward Belk, 
and Richard Lockwood brief Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh (squatt ing) and Col. Vernie Reichling (with back to 
camera) on the potential operation of the floodway.
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months, to accomplish. If the crews 
pumped the slurry in and Walsh 
did not give the activation order, 
the district would have to arrange 
security until the explosives were 
removed. People would not be able 
to return to their homes until then. 
To complicate matters, the district 
could not clear the lines until after 
the fl ood season ended because 
all available materials required 
for activation were already on site. 
There was not a reserve stash of explosives at the Ensley Engineer Yard 
in Memphis. Lloyd then delivered a stern recommendation to hold off 
on the pumping operations until Walsh was certain he would give the 
order to activate. “Sir, you don’t want to pump it [the explosive slurry] 
in, if you aren’t going to detonate,” Lloyd cautioned. Reichling con-
curred with the assessment. Lloyd’s advice would resonate with Walsh 
through the entire fl ood fi ght.69
The April 27 frontal system that brought an end to the rains that 
pounded the area for the past week did so with a deadly vengeance. The 
National Weather Service reported that 160 tornadoes, 292 damaging 
wind events, and 178 large hail reports had left 178 dead in one day. 
Perhaps the most notorious killer was the massive tornado that ripped a 
132-mile path through Mississippi and Alabama and virtually wiped the 
town of Heckleburg, Alabama, from existence. The rain, though, was 
over for the time being. Since April 20, at least six inches of rain had 
fallen over a huge section of Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi. That was just the minimum amount, 
most areas received a foot or more, with Springdale, Arkansas, record-
ing the most at 19.7 inches. By the morning of April 28, the Cairo gage 
Memphis Engineer District work crews 
unearth the access wells at the Birds Point-
New Madrid floodway fuseplug levee.
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reached 58.7 feet. The river had climbed nearly another foot, testing 
the levee system like never before.70
Pressure on the System
At LRD, the total system storage reached 23 percent on April 28. 
Col. Landry reported to Peabody that three reservoirs in the Louisville 
Engineer District – Rough River, Monroe, and Patoka – were approach-
ing emergency spillway operations. The lakes had almost reached their 
design limitations. Other than that, the LRD and TVA reservoir sys-
tems were in good shape considering the circumstances. Because of 
Peabody’s April 25 order to conserve storage space, Kentucky and 
Barkley lakes still maintained close to 80 percent of their available 
fl ood storage. Peabody’s aim was to hold the Cairo gage steady long 
enough for Walsh to give the order to load the pipes. At 0700 hours, 
he instructed Deborah Lee to operate the Kentucky and Barkley pools 
to an elevation of 374.5 feet – four and one-half feet above the record 
pool elevation – with the goal of managing stages at Cairo. The full 
375 feet as called for in the fl ood control manual could not be used; the 
cofferdam protecting the new Kentucky Lock construction would be 
overtopped at 375 feet with the potential for undermining and loss of 
control of Kentucky Lake. Even leaving only one-half foot of freeboard 
was risky; a wind aligned with the lake’s axis could push the water 1.5 
to 2 feet higher. Lake Barkley’s control gates also were not engineered 
to sustain overtopping and long-recognized vibration issues with them 
precluded surcharging operations (raising the gates to get higher pool 
elevations above 375 feet).
Deborah Lee knew they were walking a very tight line between 
maximizing an effective operation and potentially losing control of 
Kentucky and Barkley lakes with devastating consequences for the 
nation. If the cofferdam project overtopped, the Barkley hydropower 
unit would be destroyed. If that happened, LRD would likely lose the 
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ability to control fl oodwater for up to a year. Peabody, though, had 
seen Lee in action as she masterfully manipulated water levels in the 
system. He had total confi dence in her ability. He also directed further 
increases of storage on the Cumberland system reservoirs in a manner 
consistent with any DSAC concerns. He then sent an email to Walsh 
recommending that the task force load the slurry at the fl oodway as 
soon as possible, as LRD expected the river to rise above 60 feet in the 
next 24 to 48 hours.71
Walsh received Peabody’s recommendation during a decision brief-
ing by Col. Reichling. He did not respond immediately. During that 
briefi ng, Reichling informed Walsh that his engineers were highly con-
cerned about the integrity of the levee system at Fulton County. The 
number of sand boils developing along the levee represented a marked 
increase over previous high water events. If the river continued to climb 
as forecasted, his engineers on the ground were not confi dent they could 
hold for an extended period of time. Engineers from the Cairo sector 
also reported an increased number of sand boils, but, to date, no large 
high-energy boils had been discovered. The situation at the Commerce 
to Birds Point levee, the Caruthersville fl oodwall, and Lake County 
remained stable. Reichling informed Walsh that, while the operations 
plan allowed for activation of the fl oodway at 58 feet on the Cairo gage 
if the levee system could not handle the pressure, the integrity issues at 
Fulton County and Cairo did not warrant activation. Instead Reichling 
favored waiting. The task force needed roughly 24 hours in advance of 
the Cairo gage reaching 60 feet to prepare the fl oodway for operation. 
Based on input from his water control offi ce, his assessment was that 
the gage would not break 60 feet for at least another 48 hours. Reich-
ling recommended that Walsh hold the barges at Hickman harbor for 
the time being.72
Walsh notifi ed Peabody of his decision to hold the barges. Peabody 
responded that he had been making his decisions to hold the stage at 
Cairo to “facilitate the placement of slurry” at the request of MVD. The 
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Memphis Engineer District had earlier sent a plea for LRD to hold the 
Cairo gage at 59 feet so that the task force could prepare the fl oodway. 
Meeting that request, according to Peabody, had “unnecessarily used 
up storage” at Kentucky and Barkley lakes. He went on to add that he 
did not have legal authority to manage those reservoirs for the purpose 
of preparing the fl oodway. He could only operate them to keep the 
maximum crest at Cairo below 61 feet. In other words, Peabody told 
Walsh that as LRD commander he had done all that he could – probably 
more than he should have – to buy Walsh time to prepare the fl oodway 
for activation. He could do nothing more to facilitate that action below 
61 feet on the Cairo gage. Walsh was on his own if he did not get the 
pipes loaded by that stage. “We were holding back everything we could 
to give General Walsh time to load the pipes,” Lee later recalled. “We 
knew we were reaching the breaking point,” she continued, “but he 
wasn’t making the decision” to commence loading.73
Cairo was just starting to reach the breaking point. On the evening 
of April 28, Thomas Morgan, an engineer from the Memphis district 
assigned to the Cairo sector fl ood fi ght team, gave Col. Reichling and 
Malcolm Gay, a reporter with the New York Times, a tour of the Cairo 
area. Morgan attempted to explain to the reporter the immense pres-
sure the river exerted on the fl oodwall and surrounding levee system. 
Almost as an afterthought, he took Reichling and Gay to an abandoned 
piezometer located a few hundred feet from the fl oodwall at one of the 
narrowest points at the neck of the peninsula. The piezometer was well 
known to veteran area fl ood fi ghters. When river stages climbed and 
increased pressure in the aquifer, the piezometer spouted water several 
feet into the air, which perfectly illustrated the point Morgan wanted to 
make. As he explained the pressure on the system, he noticed a small 
sand boil near the base of the piezometer. The throat or opening of the 
boil was only about nine inches in diameter, but it was growing right 
before Morgan’s eyes. Another small boil developed a few inches away 
from the fi rst. Within moments they joined to together to former a larger 
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boil. Then it happened again. Morgan knew the boil was a serious prob-
lem. It was precisely the type of high-energy boil that Reichling had 
reported the absence of during his briefi ng earlier in the morning. He 
called Mike Watson and Chip Newman, two fellow Memphis district 
fl ood fi ghters, and apprised them of his observations.74
Newman arrived at the scene just after 1900 hours. By then the 
boil had grown to two feet in diameter. Newman took one look at the 
high-energy boil and recognized that the traditional treatment of build-
ing a sandbag ring around it to equalize the pressure would not suf-
fi ce. He had another plan in mind, though. Newman called Jeff Denny, 
the Alexander County Engineer, and representatives from the Bunge 
Corporation and the nearby water treatment plant. Newman suggested 
they construct a ring berm around the sand boil using a nearby stock-
pile of fl yash cinder owned by Bunge. The representatives from Bunge 
agreed. As the night’s mission progressed under a bank of emergency 
work lights, the team’s resources grew to include dozers, backhoes, 
loaders, excavators, dump trucks and approximately 40 people, includ-
ing Edward Dean and James Nabakowski from the Memphis Engineer 
District. By 0100 hours, the crew constructed a 50-foot diameter ring 
berm to a height of 6.5 feet. The sand boil, however, continued to pipe 
sediment at an alarming rate. The river was too high and exerted too 
much pressure. The berm needed to go higher.75
Newman was dejected. Fatigue had set in. His mind began to race. 
He had never seen the river this high before or a boil this large. His 
thoughts turned to the people of Cairo. If he could not get the boil under 
control, the fl oodwall would probably fail. He prayed to God that his 
efforts would be successful. So many lives were at stake. At 0130 hours, 
Newman met with the Cairo mayor, Judson Childs, and police chief, 
Gary Hankins. The discussion quickly turned to the possibility of a 
mandatory evacuation, but Childs resisted for the time being. Their 
discussion took place in the middle of the night, so there would be no 
way to spread the word other than by door-to-door. They agreed to meet 
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Above: R.D. James, left, and Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh discuss the mega boil with Chip Newman as rain 
continues to pound Cairo..
Below: The flyash cinder ring berm at the Cairo mega boil.
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again later in the morning. If the work crew could not get the sand boil 
under control by then, Newman would give Mayor Childs an engineer-
ing assessment with regard to evacuation. Newman went back to work. 
The crew raised the berm another two feet. At 0400 hours, though, the 
boil took on more energy and began piping material again at an accel-
erated rate. The crew had hoped to build the berm wider for additional 
stability, but the boil’s increase in energy forced them to abandon the 
notion. They continued building higher without the benefi t of a wider 
base. By 0630, the berm stood 10 feet high. The boil’s energy fi nally 
began to dissipate.76
The crew had the boil under control, but as seasoned fl ood fi ght-
ers, they realized the pressure would try to fi nd a new outlet. Newman 
instructed the crew to search the adjacent fl ooded fi eld for additional 
boils. They discovered another high-energy boil directly behind the 
NAPA auto parts store. Acting quickly, Illinois National Guardsmen 
fi lled sandbags in the parking lot of the NAPA store, carried the bags on 
fl at bottom boats through two feet of water, and constructed a fi ve-foot 
high berm around the boil. Once the second boil stabilized, the crew 
built an access road so they could haul in rock to reinforce the sandbag 
ring. Morgan later found a third mega boil on 27th Street, approxi-
mately 500 feet from the fl oodwall. The boil was smaller than the fi rst 
two, requiring a four-foot high sandbag ring. All three high-energy 
boils stabilized for the time being. The river was still forecasted to go 
higher. The pressure on the levees and fl oodwall would increase along 
with river stages. The fi ght was not over. Mayor Childs recognized as 
much and issued a voluntary evacuation of the city.77
While crews fought the high-energy mega boils at Cairo, conditions 
at Fulton County continued to degrade. The levee in Fulton County 
represented a traditional trouble spot during fl oods along the lower Mis-
sissippi River, due mostly to uncontrolled underseepage. The number 
and size of sand boils appearing in that sector worsened with each high 
water event. If the levee failed at Fulton County, the river would fl ood 
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western Kentucky and western Tennessee all the way down to the Obion 
River. The Memphis Engineer District had designed a plan to solve 
the problem through the extensive application of relief wells, but local 
landowners resisted granting the necessary rights-of-way to allow the 
improvements to proceed.78 By the time the week-long downpour ended 
on April 27, the Fulton County area was a sloppy mess. Darian Chas-
teen, the Memphis district’s man in charge of the fl ood fi ght at Fulton 
County, found it diffi cult to address the signifi cant number of sand 
boils developing in the area. On April 28, the Fulton County Detention 
Center sent roughly two dozen inmates to assist Chasteen, the Fulton 
County Levee Board, and the Kentucky National Guard in the fl ood 
fi ght. To help combat the mud, David Weatherly, the president of the 
levee board, secured three Hydratreks – tracked vehicles capable of navi-
gating through the quagmire while hauling 1,000 pounds of sandbags. 
With the added resources, the fl ood fi ght team successfully gained con-
trol of several severe sand boils at 
the toe of the levee by constructing 
Sand boil rings near the toe of the levee surround a home in Fulton County.
Inset: Darian Chasteen stands next to a sand boil ring in muddy Fulton County, Tennessee.
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fi ve-foot high sandbag rings to equalize the pressure. While Chasteen 
appreciated the inmates, referring to them as “lifesavers,” he realized 
that he could not continue to treat the sand boils on an individual basis. 
More materialized and the crews, no matter how valiantly they tried, 
could not keep pace with their development.79
Chasteen, Nicholas Bidlack, a geotechnical engineer, Jack Ratliff, 
the area commander from the Dyersburg offi ce, and Thomas Minyard, 
the Memphis district’s chief of engineering and construction, met to 
discuss the situation. They knew the National Weather Service expected 
the river to rise at least another two feet. To a man they had reservations 
that the levee could withstand that kind of intense pressure for any pro-
longed period. They devised a plan to construct a berm perpendicular 
to the levee and extending approximately 1,500 feet to higher ground. 
They could pump additional water into the area enclosed by the berm, 
thereby creating a water blanket over the entire area to counteract the 
pressure from the river. If the fl ood fi ght team could not fi ght the sand 
boils individually, then they would create one, large sand boil ring over 
the entire area. It was a plan of last resort. It was also a plan that would 
take time to complete.80
While the fl ood fi ght continued at Cairo and Fulton County, resi-
dents and landowners in the fl oodway continued their evacuations. On 
April 25, Mississippi County Sheriff Keith Moore declared a state of 
emergency in the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Two days later, 
he and New Madrid County Sheriff Terry Stevens ordered all 230 resi-
dents in the fl oodway to evacuate. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, who 
staunchly opposed the activation of the fl oodway, but respected the 
need for law and order, sent more than 700 national guardsmen to the 
area to assist with the evacuation and establish checkpoints to secure 
the homes and property once the people left. With water high on the 
riverside of the levee some 25 to 30 feet above them, people like Milus 
and Wanda Wallace, Mark and Rebecca Dugan, Larry and Cathy Allred, 
McIvan Jones, and hundreds of others packed their belongings, their 
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treasures and heirlooms, and whatever they could move from their 
homes. As national media outlets covered Great Britain’s royal wed-
ding, fl oodway residents boarded up windows and tried to seal their 
homes with little attention other than from the local media. Farmers 
moved what equipment they could and tried to secure the rest. They 
also rounded up livestock and other animals and either sold them or 
whisked them away to nearby farms outside the fl oodway. Deer and 
turkey, too, seemed to sense the danger as they fl ocked to high ground 
on the levee. Utility crews removed electrical boxes. More ominously, 
crews from the U.S. Geological Survey placed sensors to measure the 
discharge if activation became necessary. Tension mounted across the 
fl oodway. Everyone just watched and waited. Aside from the river sta-
bilizing and dropping, there was one last hope. If the river would not 
cooperate, perhaps the courts would.81
The previous Monday, the State of Missouri fi led suit in the East-
ern District Court of Missouri seeking a temporary restraining order 
to prevent activation the fl oodway. Missouri Attorney General Chris 
Koster sought the injunction on the grounds that operating the fl oodway 
violated the state’s Clean Water Act and that alternative fl ood control 
methods, other than operating the fl oodway, could alleviate the fl ood-
ing in the region. On April 27, after reviewing written affi davits, U.S. 
District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., announced his intention to 
hold an evidentiary hearing the following day. During fi ve hours of 
testimony at the U.S. Courthouse in Cape Girardeau, Koster and his 
assistant, John McManus, attempted to prove that the activation of the 
fl oodway would contaminate bodies of water under the jurisdiction 
of the State of Missouri. Farmer Milus Wallace, a long-time owner of 
2,300 acres in the fl oodway, testifi ed that he used many forms of her-
bicides and fertilizer as part of his farming operations and stored those 
chemicals on property, as did other farmers in the fl oodway. Davis 
Minton, the deputy director for operations for the Missouri Department 
of Natural Resources, claimed that numerous petroleum storage tanks, 
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farm chemical storage buildings, and liquid propane gas tanks dotted the 
fl oodway. Some of the tanks in the backwater area and other locations 
were cut off by interior fl ooding and could not be removed or cleared. 
Minton contended that the torrent of water released into the fl oodway 
through activation of the fuseplugs would wash away the storage tanks 
and contaminate surrounding bodies of water in the fl oodway. Knowing 
that the federal government was immune from suit under the federal 
Clean Water Act for activities related to the maintenance of navigation, 
Koster and his team attempted to divorce the navigation and fl ood con-
trol features of the MR&T project by arguing that it was the intent of 
Congress to do so.82
The legal team representing the federal government consisted of 
Nicholas Llewellen, of the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in St. Louis, and 
Department of Justice attorneys Ed Passarelli and Ty Blair. Relying on 
the expert testimony of Memphis district employees David Berretta, 
James Lloyd, and Robert Learned, the defense successfully demon-
strated that the MR&T project was a comprehensive project that encom-
passed both fl ood control and navigation improvements. Berretta, in 
particular, testifi ed that operating the fl oodway would pose less harm 
to navigation than if the fl oodway was not used because an unintended 
levee failure elsewhere in the system might lead to a shift in the course 
of the river that would disrupt navigation and harm commerce.83 Lim-
baugh adjourned the hearing without issuing a ruling from the bench, 
choosing instead to weigh the information before him. The next day he 
fi nally rendered a decision. He denied the temporary restraining order. 
Koster appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The motion was denied. Undeterred, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but once again the State’s request was denied. The path to fl ood-
way activation had been cleared if conditions warranted.84
By Saturday, April 30, landowners completed their mandatory 
evacuation of the fl oodway. The situation at Cairo and Fulton County 
appeared to stabilize after receiving aggressive fl ood fi ghting measures. 
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Conditions at those two trouble spots remained threatening, but the past 
few days of dry weather had helped, as had Peabody’s reservoir direc-
tives. While the Cairo gage reached 59 feet for only the second time in 
history, the rate of rise had slowed considerably, due in large part to the 
diligent efforts by the LRD water control team to store water behind 
the Kentucky and Barkley dams. Throughout the day, though, any lin-
gering hopes that the worst of the fl ood had passed began to crumble.
In the early morning hours, Bill Frederick released his latest daily 
weather report. For several days those reports warned of another round 
of rain slated to begin on April 30, but the slim possibilities remained 
that the expected weather system would shift to the north or south or 
even potentially dissipate. Unfortunately, none of these scenarios mate-
rialized. Frederick reported that the National Weather Service expected 
a frontal system to become stationary along the Arkansas and Ohio val-
leys later in the evening, bringing another round of intense rains – up 
to 7.5 inches – lasting through the afternoon of May 2. The area was 
already completely saturated. Most locations within a 50 miles radius 
of the confl uence area had been pounded with at least ten inches of rain 
between April 20 and April 27. Some locations in southeast Missouri, 
northern Arkansas, southern Illinois, and western Kentucky and Tennes-
see received anywhere from 12 to 16 inches of rainfall during that same 
period. Any new precipitation could not be absorbed; the rain would 
immediately turn into runoff and cause the rivers to swell even higher.85
Despite the expected rainfall, the National Weather Service did not 
raise the projected crest for the Cairo gage. They continued to call for 
a crest of 60.5 feet, but moved the crest date from May 1 back to May 
3. Peabody, though, had a problem. The LRD reservoirs were fi lling 
up. He needed to increase releases from Kentucky and Barkley dams 
immediately to retain storage if the forecasted rainfall fell behind the 
reservoir system. At Kentucky Dam, the pool elevation climbed to 
within feet of overtopping the cofferdam at the new lock under con-
struction. He could not afford to lose that project. Peabody ordered the 
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increase of releases to stabilize the pools and conserve storage. By the 
next morning – May 1 – Kentucky and Barkley dams were releasing 
nearly 2.5 times the amount of water from the previous day into the 
Ohio River.86
At 1030 hours on April 30, Col Reichling provided another decision 
brief over the telephone to Maj. Gen. Walsh. At the time, Walsh and 
Peabody were in a small offi ce in the Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky 
International Airport preparing for a fl yover of the fl ood-stricken region 
in Peabody’s area of operations. Reichling informed the commission 
president that the Cairo sector fl ood fi ght team had discovered a third 
large high-energy boil the previous day. While his engineers did not 
believe the fl oodwall was in imminent danger of failing, they advised 
Mayor Childs to start a mandatory evacuation. Furthermore, fl ood fi ght 
teams at Fulton County discovered more sands boils. “Sir, my engineers 
are concerned about the levee system performance at Cairo and Fulton 
County at these current stages!” Reichling reported before recommend-
ing that Walsh authorize the move to H minus 21 in the operational 
timeline. H minus 21 equated to breaking up the tows and positioning 
the barges on the frontline levee at Birds Point, but stopped short of 
mixing and pumping the explosive slurry into the buried lines in the 
levee. Reichling knew he was running out of time. Walsh knew such 
an action would create a stir with the public, the press, and the politi-
cians. He wasn’t ready to act yet. He still believed that activating the 
fl oodway might not be necessary and he still recalled Lloyd’s advice. 
Instead of approving the recommendation, he modifi ed it by ordering 
the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI and the barges to move from Hickman, 
where they had been staged since April 27, to Wickliffe, Kentucky, some 
three hours closer in the operational timeline to Birds Point.87
Following the briefi ng, Walsh, Peabody and their staffs conducted 
an aerial tour of the Ohio basin. High pool elevations and backwater 
fl ooding at the reservoirs along the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers 
were evident from the air, as were the dire conditions at Evansville, 
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Smithland and Paducah, not to mention Cairo, which remained a virtual 
island. The amount of water was staggering. It was everywhere. Deborah 
Lee could not mask her deep concern over what she saw. She and the 
others on the fl ight found it diffi cult to discern where the normal chan-
nels of the Ohio and Mississippi ended and the surrounding low-lying 
fl oodplains started. “I knew I was sitting on a ticking time bomb,” she 
later remarked. When she fi rst arrived at LRD in July 2001, George 
McKee, the long-time hydrologist who taught Lee how to manage fl ood 
operations, told her, “If we ever hit 13 percent [of total system stor-
age capacity], build an ark!” On April 30, that percentage approached 
30 percent.”88
Upon arrival at the Sikeston Memorial Municipal Airport, Walsh and 
Peabody met up with fellow commissioner R.D. James and began the 
20-minute drive to Cairo to inspect the mega boil that had developed 
near the fl oodwall. When they arrived, they found a throng of report-
ers, cameramen, and photographers crowded across the access road to 
Thomas Morgan (left), Maj. Gen. Walsh, and Capt. Todd Mainwaring at the Cairo mega boil.
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the boil, partially blocking their view. As they made their way past the 
crowd they were stunned by what they saw. It was the largest sand boil 
ring any of them had ever seen. For that matter it was the largest that 
even the most seasoned and experienced fl ood fi ghters had ever seen. 
“My God,” Col. George “Thatch” Shepard, the commission secretary, 
exclaimed, “That’s not a sand boil; that’s more like a swimming pool!” 
The commissioners and accompanying staff made their way to the mas-
sive ring, where Chip Newman and Tom Morgan were busy raising the 
ring berm and shoring it up with rock. Newman and Morgan detailed 
the dramatic effort they and their crews had accomplished to prevent 
the failure of the fl oodwall. Walsh, Peabody and Reichling huddled 
with Mayor Childs. He was considering a mandatory evacuation. They 
turned to the press and began answering their questions. As they did, 
the National Weather Service released a new contingency forecast of 
61.5 feet for the Cairo gage on May 4. That height would be nearly 
2.5 feet higher than the gage reading that morning.89
Walsh and fellow commissioners, Angel, James, and Smith, returned 
to the levee at Birds Point. Water reached high on the riverside of the 
levee. Three feet of freeboard – the distance between the top of the river 
and the top of the levee – still remained where the access wells were 
located, but only one foot remained at the fuseplug sections where the 
levee was constructed to an equivalent height of 60.5 feet on the Cairo 
gage. Members from the fl oodway task force once again described the 
processes for fi lling and charging the lines. Lloyd reiterated his recom-
mendation to Walsh to load the pipes only if he intended to activate 
the fl oodway.90
Following the briefi ng, Walsh, Peabody, James, Reichling, and vari-
ous staff members climbed into a van bound for the Sikeston airport. 
They learned that Childs issued a mandatory evacuation for Cairo. The 
commissioners held serious discussions about precipitation forecasts, 
river stages, and operations. They knew the tide was turning again. 
What was already a major fl ood was about to become a monster fl ood, 
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perhaps even the project design fl ood. The discussion turned to Peabody. 
Could he hold back more water? He told the commissioners that he was 
doing all that he could. Four reservoirs were already at or near spill-
way operations. LRD was nearing record pool elevations at numerous 
reservoirs across the Cumberland, Tennessee, and lower Ohio basins. 
The reservoirs backed up water everywhere in Kentucky, Indiana, and 
Tennessee. He would continue to hold as much as he could for as long 
as he could, but he could not lose the cofferdam at Kentucky Lake.
After dropping off the commissioners, Reichling, Lloyd, and Julie 
Ziino, Reichling’s forward operating executive assistant, sat in the van 
outside the airport and refl ected on the day’s developments. It had not 
started raining yet, but they were deeply concerned. They knew Pea-
body could not hold back much more water. He had to release it. When 
he did, the river would go up quickly. At that point a realization swept 
over Lloyd. He turned to Reichling and said, “We’re going to operate.” 
Reichling looked him back in the eyes and replied, “You’re right.” In 
that brief instant, Reichling, Lloyd, Ziino, and the entire fl oodway task 
force transitioned from preparation to execution mode. A few hours 
later, the rain started to fall. At 0200 hours on May 1, the river on the 
Cairo gage surged past 59.5 feet. The river had never before reached 
that high on the gage and it continued to climb.91
The Decision
At 1000 hours on Sunday, May 1, Maj. Gen. Walsh, Sam Angel, 
and R.D. James arrived at Cape Girardeau Regional Airport to hear 
Col. Reichling’s latest decision brief. Reichling did not waste time 
getting straight to the point, “Sir, we have moved from an ‘if’ to a 
‘when’ situation.” With this in mind, he recommended three immedi-
ate actions. First, he requested permission to move to H minus 3 in the 
operational timeline, which meant moving the barges into position at 
the frontline levee and loading the pipes with explosive agents. Second, 
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he recommended contacting the county sheriff to give him 24 hours to 
begin the fi nal sweep of the fl oodway. He also wanted permission to 
advise the U.S. Coast Guard of the decision to move to H minus 3 so 
they could issue a notice to mariners. Reichling clarifi ed that he was 
not asking for permission to activate the fl oodway, but he explained 
that for the safety of the workers, they needed to begin loading imme-
diately. The safety plan called for crews to be off the levee by the time 
the Cairo gage reached 60.5 feet, which according to his forecasters 
would happen sometime between 0300 hours and 0400 hours on May 2. 
They were running out of time. The fl oodway task force needed to move 
immediately.92 
Walsh, though, was not ready to load the pipes. Looking at the 
current and anticipated stages and realizing how long it would take to 
complete preparations for fl oodway activation, he still thought he had 
more time. He understood the safety risks and adverse conditions the 
crews would face, but he wanted to balance that with the risk of load-
ing prematurely. Lloyd’s advice to Walsh on the levee not to load the 
explosives unless he planned to detonate had made an impact on the 
commission president’s thought processes. Walsh was still not con-
vinced that fl oodway activation would ultimately be necessary. Instead 
of approving Reichling’s recommendation, Walsh ordered the tows to 
move from Wickliffe to the levee at Birds Point. He asked to be briefed 
again at 1500 hours.93
Col. Reichling appeared shocked, perhaps even angry, that Walsh 
denied his recommendation. His jaws clenched; his face reddened. He 
may have come to his realization the previous night, but his superior 
offi cer had not. Reichling quickly recovered, though, and acknowl-
edged the order. He still had a major fl ood fi ght on his hands. His team 
needed leadership.94 At Fulton County, Darian Chasteen remained deeply 
concerned about the integrity of the levee. Construction of the water 
berm had commenced at 0500 hours. The contractor, James Coffey, was 
making good progress under the circumstances, but the standing water 
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and deep mud proved to be tough obstacles. A driving rain pounded 
the area – another three inches fell in the county that day. The river 
exerted unprecedented pressure. New sand boils exploded into existence. 
The levee was coming apart. Chasteen knew it would not hold much 
longer. He desperately needed to know if and when Walsh would give 
the order to operate the fl oodway. Chasteen needed to ease the pressure 
on the levee through activation of the fl oodway or he needed the water 
berm to counteract the pressure – perhaps he needed both. He and the 
team were losing the fi ght.95 A little farther north at Cairo, the heavy 
rains had caused a new problem. Chip Newman and his crew raised 
the berm around the massive mega boil to a height of almost 13 feet to 
combat the increased pressure from the rising river. That was not the 
main concern, though. The heavy rains had saturated the fl yash berm. 
The berm turned to mush. It began to fail. Newman and his crew set 
to work immediately in the cold driving rain to cover the berm with 
plastic and reinforce it with rock. The city of Cairo could not afford to 
lose the berm.96
Back at Birds Point, the fl oodway task force crews assembled prior 
to 0700 hours in anticipation of receiving the order to load the explosives 
sometime after the 1000 hours decision brief. They were eager to get to 
work. Not that they wanted to activate the fl oodway – no one did – but 
they knew what lay ahead. Davis and Lloyd had prepared them mentally 
to handle the diffi cult assignment under less than ideal circumstances. 
Like Col. Reichling, they knew they were running out of time. They 
were on the levee. They saw the river creeping higher and higher into 
their work space. Davis described the workers as “attack dogs on short 
leashes.” They were ready to go. After receiving instruction to stand 
down, Davis and Lloyd set out to keep them focused. “We were trying 
to keep their heads in the game, trying to keep them from wandering 
off,” Lloyd later recalled. Having already come to the realization that 
activation was fait accompli in his own mind, Lloyd knew that Walsh 
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eventually would reach the same conclusion. The crews had to be ready 
to go when he did.97
At around 1500 hours, Col. Reichling, the civilian members of the 
commission, and assorted members of the division, district, and commis-
sion staffs waited patiently in the airport conference room for Maj. Gen. 
Walsh. It was raining hard again. A thick sense of tension permeated 
the room. What will Walsh do? The question entered everyone’s mind. 
They had to wait for the answer. Walsh was in a nearby room engaged 
in a telephone conversation with Robert Fitzgerald, chief of engineering 
at the division offi ce. Fitzgerald provided Walsh with his engineering 
assessment of the levee system in the confl uence area. The river had 
never before reached its current stage. Likewise, the pressure on the 
levee system had never been this great. Fitzgerald voiced his opinion 
that the commission and the Corps of Engineers could manage the fl ows 
under existing conditions, but the system was beginning to unravel. It 
was the last advice Walsh received prior to the decision brief.98
Walsh entered the conference room for the briefi ng and took his 
place at the table next to Col. Reichling. Bill Frederick, calling in from 
the commission’s emergency operations center in Vicksburg, led things 
off. Those sitting at the table leaned in slightly closer to the speaker 
phone to hear Frederick’s thin voice over the driving rain that pelted the 
windows of the airport conference room. His report did not contain a 
shred of good news. The latest weather forecasts called for an additional 
three to fi ve inches of rainfall over the Ohio basin over the next 24 hours, 
with the heaviest rains coming after dark. With the Cairo gage reading 
59.9 feet and rising at 1400 hours, Frederick informed Walsh that the 
river would move above 60 feet within the next few hours and would 
break 60.5 feet late in the morning of May 2. The National Weather 
Service expected the river to remain above 60 feet for nine days and 
above 61 feet for 5 days, with a forecasted crest of 61.8 feet on May 4. 
Frederick then tossed in a wild card for Maj. Gen. Walsh to consider, 
“The National Weather Service is concerned that heavy localized rainfall 
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will cause stages to spike even quicker than forecasted.”99 That caution 
would later prove prescient.
David Berretta and Tom Minyard phoned in their reports. Berretta 
went fi rst, giving a quick snapshot of the reservoir operations in LRD. 
His report contained more bad news. Kentucky and Barkley lakes had 
reached record pool elevations and continued to climb. On the morning 
of April 27, those lakes utilized only 21 percent of their fl ood storage. 
On May 1 they were at 74 percent and 70 percent, respectively. Half of 
the fl ood storage pools fi lled with water in just four days.100 Deborah Lee 
and the LRD water control team had done a masterful job of skillfully 
managing the reservoir system along the Cumberland and Tennessee 
rivers and they continued to try to match releases from Kentucky and 
Barkley dams with the amount of water fl owing into the reservoirs. The 
reservoirs that fed into Kentucky and Barkley lakes, though, were fi lling 
at a rapid pace.101 LRD could not hold back much longer. They would 
need to release water soon. Minyard followed with his own engineering 
analysis. The entire levee system in the Cairo to Caruthersville reach 
remained under tremendous stress. Newman and his crew had kept the 
existing boils at Cairo stabilized. No new high energy boils developed, 
but a signifi cant number of sand boils materialized at Fulton County. 
Conditions at Lake County and Caruthersville continued to degrade.102 
The levee system was holding, but it faced unprecedented pressure with 
each passing hour and would have to continue to handle that pressure 
for at least another nine days, maybe longer.
The mood in the room can only be described as sobering. Rain 
continued to lash at the conference room window; the rumblings of 
thunder to the west hinted that more severe weather was on the way. 
Russell Davis spoke next. As the chief of operations for the Memphis 
Engineer District, he was Col. Reichling’s man on the ground. It was his 
responsibility to prepare the fl oodway for activation once Walsh deliv-
ered the order. He got straight to the point, “Sir, bottom line up front: 
we need to move to H minus three.” Davis recommended breaking up 
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the tows, positioning the equipment and vessels at the frontline levee, 
fi lling the buried pipes with explosives, rigging them for detonation, 
and then going into a holding pattern awaiting command to activate 
the fl oodway if necessary. It would take roughly 18 hours to make the 
preparations. He then articulated his overriding concern – the safety 
of the work crews. Less than two feet of distance stood between river 
levels and the top of the levee at some locations where work needed to 
be done, and the river continued to rise at an alarming rate. Darkness, 
additional pounding rain, and the possibility of lightning concerned him. 
Davis ended his report, “Sir, we need to get the work done as quickly 
as possible for the safety of our crews.”103
Col. Reichling closed the briefi ng with a passionate plea, ‘Sir, con-
ditions are continuing to degrade. You can hear the rain outside lashing 
against this building. The river is rising fast. We need to prep now!” 
Reichling explained that under the operations plan, preparations to acti-
vate the fl oodway should have been completed by the time the Cairo 
gage hit 60 feet and “we are there right now.” With the river rising at 
a rapid clip, his crews would eventually run out of levee to work with. 
The 1500 hours decision brief on May 1, 2011, at the Cape Girardeau Regional Airport. Seated at the table 
from left to right are Sam Angel, R.D. James, Stephen Gambrell, Col. Vernie Reichling, Maj. Gen. Michael 
Walsh, Edward Belk, and Richard Lockwood. Dennis Norris is seated against the window between Reichling 
and Walsh.
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Reichling warned that even if everything went according to plan, his 
crews would be cutting it close. “We run the risk of not being able to 
put this ‘safety valve’ to use if we need to operate later,” Reichling 
emphasized as he ended the briefi ng.104
All eyes in the room turned toward Maj. Gen. Walsh. He calmly 
removed his reading glasses, placed one of the arm pieces in the corner 
of his mouth, and leaned back slightly in his chair. He was deep in 
thought, weighing and processing all of the information just presented 
to him. Col. Reichling, Walsh’s man on the ground, wanted to move now, 
but Lloyd, the subject matter expert on the operations plan, advised him 
not to load the pipes unless he intended to blow the levee. Walsh still 
remained uncertain that he would eventually give that order. Fitzgerald, 
his engineering chief back in Vicksburg, indicated it might be possible 
to manage the fl ow if conditions did not worsen, but Minyard’s systems 
analysis pointed to rapidly deteriorating conditions. Maj. Gen. Peabody 
was holding back as much water as possible, but Frederick warned of 
localized rain possibly causing a spike in river levels regardless of the 
LRD reservoirs. Davis cited concerns about crew safety – one loss of 
life would render the operation a failure. Perhaps most confl icting was 
the fact that across the table sat R.D. James. As a landowner in the 
fl oodway, James personifi ed every single person who lived or owned 
property in the fl oodway and he symbolically brought each and every 
one of them into that conference on that cold and rainy day. That often-
repeated quote from Maj. Gen. Markham after the 1937 activation of 
the fl oodway suddenly fl ashed through Walsh’s mind. I am now of the 
opinion that no plan is satisfactory which is based upon deliberately 
turning fl oodwaters upon the homes and property of people even though 
the right to do so may have been paid for in advance. The quote weighed 
heavily on Walsh. His decision would impact lives.105
Walsh sat back at attention, looked across the table, and asked the 
two members of the Mississippi River Commission present if they had 
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anything to add. R.D. James looked forlorn. His normally broad shoul-
ders slumped forward; both forearms resting on the conference table as 
he stared at the pen that he slowly twisted in his hands. He looked like 
he had something to say. He and his family had a fi nancial stake in the 
decision being made, though, so he recuesed himself from the discussion. 
He only offered his support to Walsh’s decision – whichever way that 
decision went. Walsh then turned to Sam Angel. A 32-year member of 
the commission, Angel knew what the decision needed to be – every-
one in the room did. He looked at Walsh, shrugged his shoulders and 
nodded his head in deference to as if to say, This is a tough decision, 
General, but it is your decision to make.
Walsh still did not announce his intentions. He turned to two of his 
trusted advisors, Edward Belk and Dennis Norris. Belk, a 24-year vet-
eran of the Corps of Engineers, served as the chief of programs for the 
division offi ce. More importantly he had cut his teeth in the Memphis 
Engineer District, serving as the chief of project development, execu-
tive assistant to the district commander, and the deputy district engineer 
for project management. He knew the Memphis Engineer District. He 
knew its projects. He knew the people it served. “Sir, with the forecast 
facing us, our window to prep is getting smaller,” Belk calmly advised, 
“H minus three and hold is where we need to be.” Norris, the commis-
sion’s respected chief of operations, spoke next. He began his career 
with the Corps of Engineers in 1980 and spent 30 of those years in the 
operations sector. He was a river man; someone who got things done. 
When he spoke, his words carried weight. If Belk knew the Memphis 
district, then Norris knew operations like no other. “Sir,” Norris calmly 
stated in his reassuring southern drawl, “in ops things never go as 
planned. Recommend we go to H minus three.” His words would prove 
prophetic in a few hours.106
Walsh nodded in recognition. “In six days the Cairo gage has gone 
up six feet,” he announced. “Go to H minus three and give me a prog-
ress report every two hours.” He had made the decision to move.107
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Activation
At Birds Point Davis relayed Walsh’s approval to deploy the barges 
to the infl ow crevasse site and commence pumping operations. The plan 
was for the tender GOODWIN and one pump barge to begin fi lling the 
lines at the lower end and work their way upriver. The motor vessel 
STRONG and the second pump barge would start at the upper end and 
work their way downriver. As the vessels moved into position on the 
frontline levee, Davis, Lloyd, Durst and other task force leaders met to 
discuss the impact of weather conditions on the operation. The primary 
concern was lightning. Even though the explosives components were 
extremely stable and not yet primed, Durst advised against commenc-
ing pumping operations until the threat of lightning had cleared. Davis 
and Lloyd concurred. The task force would wait out the storm before 
commencing work. If Walsh had his own timeline in mind throughout 
the entire decision-making process, he had not accounted for lightning. 
No one had, not even Lloyd, one of the developers of the operations 
plan. “Working at night didn’t bother us. Rain didn’t bother us,” Lloyd 
recalled, “but when those thunderstorms popped up, we had to shut 
down.”108 Dennis Norris was correct; things were not going as planned. 
Davis notifi ed Walsh of the delay just prior to the general’s press con-
ference with Governor Nixon. The river climbed passed 60 feet on the 
Cairo gage and approached 60.5 feet.
At 1930 hours, Davis informed Walsh that the crews remained in a 
holding pattern awaiting a break in the weather. After completing the 
press conference with Governor Nixon, Walsh established his command 
post on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, which was moored in the river 
channel approximately one mile south of the Birds Point-Cairo bridge. 
Walsh, Angel, James and the commission staff boarded the MUDDY 
WATERS, a small survey boat, and made the long trip to the MISSIS-
SIPPI in the driving rain. As he boarded the vessel, Walsh received 
a note from J. Lawrence Barnett, lead counsel at the division offi ce, 
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informing him that the Supreme Court denied the state’s request for an 
injunction. The fl oodway survived the legal challenges, but if the task 
force could not prepare it for activation, the point was moot. High winds 
continued to rock the MISSISSIPPI. Walsh listened to the rain lashing 
against the windows and decks. These were the heaviest rains yet, but 
he remained confi dent, adamantly so, that the system could manage 
the fl ows without the use of the fl oodway. A mile away at Birds Point, 
Davis shut down the operation. The National Weather Service did not 
foresee an end to the severe weather until after 0100 hours at the earli-
est. The crews were mentally exhausted having experienced so many 
varying degrees of highs and lows throughout the day. They needed 
rest. At 2200 hours, he ordered them back to quarterboats for a few 
hours of dry downtime. As the rain and lighting picked up in intensity 
and the river broke new stage records by the hour, everyone involved 
in the operation wondered if this last storm would be the event that 
would break the back of the operations plan and the MR&T project.109
At 0400 hours on May 2, Frederick informed Walsh that the area 
continued to receive higher than expected localized rainfall. The previ-
ous day, three inches of rain fell over Cairo and Paducah. More than that 
fell over Fulton County, where the fl ood fi ght team continued to build 
the water berm to stabilize the severe underseepage that threatened the 
levee. The Cairo gage was only three inches shy of 61 feet. The National 
Weather Service’s latest forecast, issued at 0230 hours, still projected 
a crest of 61.5 feet on May 4, but the river continued climbing faster 
than predicted. The persistent and heavy localized rains hammered 
areas not protected by the LRD reservoirs. Frederick indicated that the 
forecast center would begin additional model runs in the next few hours. 
He promised to keep the general posted on any development. For the 
fi rst time Walsh’s confi dence that the system could manage the fl ows 
started to erode. Four hours later, it completely evaporated. The National 
Weather Service informed Frederick that the latest models projected a 
crest of 63.5 feet on the Cairo gage on May 5. Upon hearing the news, 
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a recent memory popped into Frederick’s mind – a memory of the time 
he stood face-to-face with Walsh’s predecessor, Brig. Gen. Robert Crear, 
on August 29, 2005, and informed him that the storm surge from Hur-
ricane Katrina would probably overwhelm the levees at New Orleans. 
He could still visualize the long, silent and awkward stare on Crear’s 
face and the slow nod of his head in acknowledgement of the news. 
Frederick shook off the memory and notifi ed Walsh of the forecast.110
At 0800 hours, Maj. Gen. Walsh held a teleconference with all of 
his district commanders and his crisis management team. Just prior to 
the call, Maj. Gen. Peabody reported that conditions on the Ohio River 
were deteriorating. He confi rmed the sentiment shared by Frederick a 
few hours earlier. The heavy rains fell outside of the storage capabilities 
of the LRD reservoirs. The mayor of Smithland, Kentucky, ordered a 
mandatory evacuation. As Walsh took his seat at the conference table 
on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, Frederick delivered another blow. 
The National Weather Service anticipated another one to four inches of 
rain to fall over the next 24 hours. The heavy rains of the previous night 
had not only hit the confl uence area and the Ohio Valley, but they had 
R.D. James buries his face in his hands after hearing the updated forecast crest of 63 feet at the Cairo gage 
during the 0800 hours briefi ng on May 2, 2011, in the second floor conference room on the MISSISSIPPI.
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also pounded the Arkansas Valley. The fl ood was moving south and it 
was growing. The weather service expected the lower Mississippi River 
at Arkansas City to rise by two to four feet. Col. Thomas O’Hara, com-
mander of the St. Louis Engineer District, reported Lake Wappapello 
overtopped a rock berm constructed across the emergency spillway at 
0200 hours. O’Hara expected the pool to rise another fi ve feet before 
cresting, which would result in excess of 25,000 cfs being released into 
the St. Francis River and additional fl ooding downstream.
Col. Reichling spoke next. Normally possessing a reserved demeanor, 
Reichling was anything but that on this day. He talked rapidly, which lent 
a sense of urgency to his report. He notifi ed Walsh that the task force 
commenced pumping operations at 0500 hours. The crews discovered 
medium-sized sand boils along the frontline levee. They also reported 
water fl owing over the fuseplug section of the levee; the fl oodway was 
going into passive operation. Conditions continued to deteriorate across 
the region. The mega boil at Cairo grew and began piping sediment 
again. Sinkholes appeared below the elevated railroad tracks on the north 
end of the town. His engineers questioned the integrity of the fl oodwall. 
Signifi cant underseepage continued to plague Fulton County. Failure of 
the levee was not imminent, but the number and size of the new boils 
presented a major concern. Chasteen and his crew continued to construct 
the water berm, but it would take at least another day to complete it. 
Because of the situation at Lake Wappapello, Reichling reported that 
his engineers were concerned about the potential for levee overtopping 
in the upper St. Francis basin. At the lower end of that basin, the W.G. 
Huxtable pumping plant at the St. Francis backwater area operated at 
full capacity. Flood fi ght teams were also concerned about rising river 
levels on the Commerce to Birds Point levee. The levee faced additional 
pressure because the Len Small private levee had held thus far. The 
freeboard levels at the Tiptonville levee and the fl oodwalls at Hickman 
and Caruthersville were slowly disappearing. “The system is holding,” 
Reichling ended his report, “but it is showing considerable strain.”111
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At the fl oodway, crews had assembled in the early morning hours at 
the infl ow crevasse and commenced pumping operations. Rain contin-
ued to fall, but the lightning shifted to the west and the north, clearing 
the way for work to begin. The task force lost nearly a full day’s work 
due to the lightning. Lloyd was on the levee to monitor the operation; 
Davis and Reichling remained at their command post to provide top 
cover. The GOODWIN crew, at fi rst, worked deliberately. It took more 
than an hour to fi ll the fi rst line. The only prior experience the crews 
had involved test operations conducted on 400-foot sections in dry and 
sunny conditions. The May 2 operation was not an exercise – it was the 
real thing. The crews braved cold temperatures and stinging rain made 
worse by blustery winds. Their work space on the barges, where they 
mixed the liquid blasting agent with aluminum powder, was limited and 
Passive activation of the floodway. The Mississippi River overtops the lower sections of the Birds Point-New 
Madrid floodway fuseplug levee early on May 2, 2011.
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surrounded by a rising river on three sides. The gangplanks were small 
and the levees were muddy. Footing everywhere was slippery. Clouds of 
aluminum powder dust fl oated about and coated everything. The crews 
dragged heavy hoses across the soggy levee and connected them to the 
pipe fi ttings in the wells. One thousand feet away, a crew member stood 
prepared to signal when the line was full. Each 1,000-foot segment had 
three lines to be fi lled. The explosive slurry was a thick mixture so it took 
considerable pressure to move it through the pipes. When the line was 
full and crews attempted to remove the hose, the back pressure caused 
the hose to whip around for a few seconds, spilling the slurry. A member 
from the ERDC explosives team moved in immediately once the line 
was full and placed the blasting cap and detonation cord in place. As 
they progressed down the line and became more comfortable with the 
operation, they reduced the fi ll time to 60 minutes.112
The Goodwin and pump barge at the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway. Note the cloud of aluminum 
powder dust.
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At the upper end of the infl ow crevasse site, though, the STRONG 
crew and its pump barge encountered their fi rst problem. The frontline 
levee in their area of operations took on a horseshoe shape. This was 
a direct result of the 1937 operation of the fl oodway, which caused a 
massive scour hole. When the Memphis district rebuilt the levee, they 
rebuilt a section around the scour hole, creating the large bend. The 
bend was part of the levee to be crevassed; it contained access wells that 
needed to be fi lled. The problem was not the bend; the problem was a 
spur levee – a levee projecting from the frontline to direct erosive river 
currents away from the frontline levee – that blocked the entrance to the 
bend. The STRONG had a seven-foot draft and could not navigate over 
the spur levee to push the pumping barges into place. To alleviate this 
problem, the task force used the WARD, which could safely navigate 
Members of the floodway task force provide the Mississippi River Commission with an operational update.
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over the spur because it only had a fi ve-foot draft. As the STRONG and 
WARD burned up valuable time jockeying the pump barge into posi-
tion around the bend, one of the mix pump units began to break down, 
causing the operation to slow even more considerably.113
After a brief visit to observe operations along the frontline levee, 
Walsh and R.D. James met with Reichling and Davis. Davis informed 
Walsh that the crews would complete pumping operations in 12 hours. 
It was 1030 hours, so by Davis’s timeline, the fl oodway would be ready 
for activation by 2230 hours. Walsh, though, wanted a plan to get the 
job done in eight hours. He intended to operate the fl oodway; however, 
he was not prepared to make his decision offi cial. He would wait to 
inform governors Nixon and Quinn of his intentions until after the 
new timeline had developed. Reichling reminded Walsh that the river 
already exceeded 61 feet on the Cairo gage. They were already past the 
trigger point for activation in the operations plan. Reichling voiced his 
Members of the floodway task force prepare the explosive slurry mix.
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primary concern – preparing the outfl ow channels at the lower end of 
the fl oodway. Reichling was confi dent the task force would complete 
the preparation at the infl ow site, but he expressed concerned about 
having enough time to prepare the two outfl ow channels at the lower 
end of the fl oodway. According to the operations plan, preparations 
at all three sites were to be complete in advance of the gage reaching 
60 feet. If Walsh unleashed up to 550,000 cfs into the fl oodway with 
the lower outfl ow areas remaining closed, he risked overtopping the 
set back levee at New Madrid. Walsh reiterated his demand. He would 
not make his decision offi cial until he received a new and shortened 
timeline.114
After the meeting Walsh, James, and Stephen Gambrell, the commis-
sion’s executive director, climbed into James’s white Denali and set out 
from Birds Point for a visual inspection of the situation at Cairo and to 
meet with Governor Quinn, who was scheduled to hold a press confer-
ence. As they headed out of Missouri on Interstate 57, they observed the 
result of the persistent rains of the past 10 days, particularly the deluge 
that hammered the area the previous night. Water was everywhere. It 
covered low-lying fi elds for as far they could see. The water went right 
up to the elevated highway. The ditches separating the north and south-
bound lanes were fl ooded. Conditions were worse once they crossed into 
Illinois. Sheets of water fl owed across Route 3, the main road leading 
to and from Cairo. At the entrance to the city, two police cars blocked 
the tunnel through the massive levee and railroad embankment. James 
stopped the truck. A police offi cer checked their credentials and then 
waved them through. As they travelled down Sycamore Street, they 
noticed the town looked deserted. Everything was saturated. A thin layer 
of water covered the paved street and sidewalks. As he turned left on 
40th Street – the road leading to the mega boil – James noticed Mayor 
Childs trying to fl ag down his vehicle. James pulled over and rolled 
down the window. Childs, soaked from the steady downpour falling on 
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the city, leaned his head in the window. “General,’ he said, as water ran 
from his ball cap onto Walsh’s lap, “we are ready for your decision!”115
After a brief inspection of the mega boil, where Chip Newman, Tom 
Morgan, and the fl ood fi ght team were raising the ring berm to match 
the rising river and the pressure it exerted, Walsh, James, and members 
of the commission staff climbed to the top of the fl oodwall in a steady 
downpour. As they reached the top, the view before them was unbeliev-
able. The fl oodwall that usually towered above them when they made 
periodic visits to the city during their high and low water inspection trips 
barely stuck out of the water by a few feet. At that moment, the Cairo 
gage read 61.1 feet; nearly 2.5 feet lower than the projected crest. The 
river looked angry, violent. Chocolate colored waves crashed against 
the fl oodwall. James turned to Walsh and shouted through the howling 
wind, “General, there is nowhere for this water to go.” Walsh shook 
his head as if to acknowledge the comment and register his disbelief at 
what he was seeing. “Can you imagine what this river is going to look 
like at sixty-three?” James yelled. Walsh shook his head again.116 If he 
could help it, the river would never reach 63 feet on the gage, but that 
depended on the fl oodway task force fulfi lling its mission.
Back at Birds Point, as Lloyd monitored the pumping operations, 
he realized that the task force was running through the supply of liquid 
blasting agent at a rate not consistent with the amount of pipes that had 
been fi lled. If this continued, there would not be enough explosives to 
fi ll the lines at the infl ow/outfl ow sites at the lower end of the fl oodway. 
Lloyd began conferring with crew leaders to determine the cause of the 
problem. Col. Reichling heard Lloyd’s discussion with the crew lead-
ers over the radio. He asked for Lloyd to come to the command post to 
give him an update. Lloyd told Reichling, “Sir, we’ve got issues. We 
need to make a change.” He explained the operation was using up too 
much of the liquid blasting agent. He was not certain whether this was 
due to waste or the product was getting lost in the lines, but his bottom 
line was “right now we don’t have enough liquid to get the job done.” 
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The task force needed to conserve enough liquid to prepare the lower 
infl ow/outfl ow crevasse site; the other middle infl ow/outfl ow site was 
not important. Lloyd explained that the middle infl ow/outfl ow site was 
designed for use with the 1,500-ft gap at the bottom of the levee closed 
as part of the St. John’s Bayou-New Madrid fl oodway pumps project. 
The project had been delayed, so the gap remained open. To conserve 
liquid, Lloyd recommended abandoning the uppermost access wells at 
the bend. Doing so would reduce the length of the crevasse site from 
the planned 11,000 linear feet to 9,000 linear feet, thereby reducing the 
amount of fl ow into the fl oodway, but he believed the crevasse would 
draw off enough water to get the desired reduction in stages across the 
system. Lloyd’s plan involved allowing the GOODWIN crew to continue 
working up the line because they were making decent progress. Lloyd, 
though, wanted the STRONG to cease operation once it had completed 
fi lling the wells at the horseshoe section and proceed downriver to 
Jim Lloyd discusses options with Russell Davis (left) and Col. Vernie Reichling at Reichling’s command post.
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commence operations at the lower infl ow/outfl ow crevasse site. Reich-
ling conferred with Berretta, who validated Lloyd’s conclusions. The 
plan fi t Walsh’s directive to Davis to complete the preparations in eight 
hours. “Go. Make it happen!” Reichling told Lloyd.117
At 1515 hours, the STRONG departed for the lower infl ow/outfl ow 
crevasse site. Lloyd resumed monitoring the GOODWIN crew. The 
Cairo gage read 61.3 feet. As he looked at the clock and watched the 
river rise, he realized that the operation was taking too much time. 
Before long, there would not be much levee to work with. The crews 
had been concerned about spillage and waste, but Lloyd was more 
concerned about speeding up the process. He instructed the crews to 
run the equipment at a higher rate. He needed to reduce the fi ll time 
from 60 minutes to 20 minutes.118 At the command post, Davis briefed 
Walsh on the shift in the operation. Davis explained that Reichling had 
approved dividing the crews and sent the STRONG downriver to com-
mence preparations at the lower infl ow/outfl ow site. He then articu-
lated the limitations of the plan. The plan meant the task force had to 
Russell Davis explains the 
task force’s accelerated plan 
with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh 
as Col. Thatch Shepard and 
Col. Vernie Reichling look on.
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sacrifi ce any redundancies. If one of the GOODWIN’s pumps went out 
of commission for any reason, they had no back-up measures to insti-
tute. They would have to proceed with a single pump. He also informed 
Walsh the plan necessitated giving up a section of the fuseplug. Model 
tests confi rmed an acceptable reduction in stages, despite the smaller 
crevasse. Last, he informed Walsh about the shortage of liquid blasting 
agent. The task force faced the prospect of running through its supply 
before it could prepare the middle infl ow/outfl ow site for operation.119
After the briefi ng, two additional civilian members of the commis-
sion, Sam Angel and William Clifford Smith, joined Walsh and James 
at Reichling’s command post. Tension grew in the cramped command 
post. Reports from the fi eld detailing the immense stress and pressure 
on the fl ood control system fl owed in on a continual basis. Walsh was 
being overwhelmed by email messages that begged him to activate the 
fl oodway immediately and an equal amount pleading for him not to. 
Rain and wind continued to lash against the command post as a constant 
reminder of the rough weather outside. Even during the intermittent 
dry spells, the television cycled the Doppler radar depicting a narrow 
band of storms centered over the confl uence area and the Ohio River. 
“It just keeps raining,” a dejected Stephen Gambrell complained as he 
watched the radar, “it just keeps raining!” Then Frederick delivered 
more bad news. The National Weather Service released its forecast for 
the entire lower Mississippi River. The service predicted record stages 
at Greenville, Vicksburg, Natchez, and Red River Landing over the next 
three weeks. At approximately 1630 hours, Walsh initiated the offi cial 
notifi cation process. He called Governor Nixon and informed him that 
he would have to operate the fl oodway sometime between 1900 hours 
and 2400 hours. Nixon was gracious in his response and thanked Walsh 
for keeping him informed. Walsh and Gambrell made additional calls 
to other congressional members from the tri-state area. Walsh sent a 
note to Maj. Gen. Peabody asking him to inform the governors of Ken-
tucky and Indiana. Peabody responded that both supported his decision. 
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Next, he called Governor Quinn. Walsh then informed the media of his 
decision to operate.120
By 1900 hours, Lloyd and his crew completed the pumping opera-
tions. They had fi lled 27,000 linear feet of lines with approximately 
115 tons of explosives. It would take the ERDC crews approximately 
three hours to charge the lines and establish a blasting site approximately 
5,000 feet from the fuseplug. The river stymied their efforts. Water 
encroached up the gravel road surface and threatened to inundate two 
wells, forcing the ERDC team to build sandbag rings to keep the water 
out prior to detonation. In the meantime, national guardsmen completed 
their fi nal sweep of the fl oodway. At 2030 hours, Reichling informed 
Walsh that the fl oodway was 45 minutes from being operational.121
The tension in the command post thickened – minutes seemed like 
hours. R.D. James knew the time for activation was imminent. Try as 
he might, he could not displace thoughts of what the operation of the 
fl oodway would mean to his friends and neighbors. He also worried 
about the ultimate fate of his own farm. He stared at the fl ood and qui-
etly “prayed for the safety of all involved and for all affected.” While 
everyone in the command post was tired, James looked completely 
fatigued. The past week had taken its toll on the 30-year veteran of 
the commission. As a member of the commission, he was well-known 
through the entire confl uence area. Both Walsh and Reichling relied 
on him as a liaison with elected offi cials from Missouri and local levee 
districts. Not only was he a local, who owned land in the fl oodway, 
but he was also a native of Hickman on the Kentucky side of the river. 
Throughout the week, parties from both sides of the river besieged him 
with questions and concerns. Floodway landowners begged him for 
constant updates. City leaders from New Madrid asked for his advice 
on the possibility of issuing an evacuation order. Acquaintances and 
offi cials in Fulton County pleaded with him to provide insight into 
Walsh’s thought processes. Missourians everywhere wanted to know 
if the Commerce levee would hold. Perhaps nothing weighed on his 
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mind more than the date – May 2 – which was his beloved daughter’s 
birthday. Virginia Elizabeth James had passed away in 1996. She was 
only nineteen years old. A wide range of emotions danced through his 
conscience as his mind raced from topic to topic. Finally, James broke 
the silence in the command post by asking Gambrell to lead everyone 
present in a prayer. Gambrell obliged:
We remember God’s Word ... I John 1:9 “If we confess our sins, 
He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us 
from all unrighteousness.” Father, in a time like this when we 
don’t know what to pray we ask for You to intercede for us and 
for all the people who will be helped and harmed by the results 
of the actions we take. We acknowledge that You are the only 
one who can forgive sin, restore hope and truly help. In Jesus 
strong name we pray, Amen.122
From the blasting site, Lloyd notifi ed Reichling, “Ready to operate 
on your order.”
 Reichling entered the command post, “Sir, I am requesting per-
mission to blow the levee. The ERDC team leader is ready to go hot.”
“Approved,” Walsh replied. He said nothing else.
Reichling notifi ed Lloyd that Walsh and the commissioners were 
on their way to the blasting site, “As soon as they get there, you are 
green light to go.”123
At 2200 hours, the river reached 61.7 feet on the Cairo gage. As 
the members of the Mississippi River Commission travelled to the 
frontline levee, fl oodway residents and landowners coped in their own 
ways. Some, including Milus Wallace, stood nervously on the setback 
levee to witness the operation, sickened as they pondered the fate of 
the homes and property. Others anxiously watched news coverage on 
television sets in their hotels or at the homes of family and friends. For 
some, the emotional stress was too great – they could not bear to watch 
in person or on the television.124
117
Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence
At Birds Point, it was pitch black outside with the exception of the 
glow from the city lights at Wickliffe, Kentucky, which created a perfect 
backdrop that illuminated the crevasse site. The fl oodway was eerily 
silent. Ponded rain and seepwater extended like fi ngers across the fi elds. 
A light mist fell. Suddenly, Durst called out, “T minus three minutes!” 
The tension mounted. No one said a word. Another minute ticked off 
the clock until Durst broke the silence, “T minus two minutes!” Another 
minute later, he called out again, “Radio silence!” This alerted everyone 
that only 60 seconds remained prior to detonation. After what seemed 
an eternity, but was only less than a minute, he signaled to Walsh to 
begin the countdown.
“Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole!” Walsh bellowed, 
with Angel, James, and Smith echoing in unison. “Five. Four. Three.”
The Mississippi River Commission on the frontline levee at Birds Point just moments before the activation of 
the floodway.
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“Wait!” Durst interrupted. Norris was correct; operations still were 
not going as planned. The episode provided a brief moment of humor to 
an otherwise long and ominous day. “Okay, start over,” Durst declared 
as he fi nished tinkering with his equipment.
Walsh and the commissioners resumed counting, “Five. Four. Three. 
Two. One.”
An impressive fi reball illuminated the fl oodway, then another, and 
another, and so on down the fuseplug. The frontline levee trembled 
slightly from the violent explosion. A pressure wave from the blast 
followed a few seconds later. The force of the wave blew out windows 
in a house in nearby Wyatt. As far away as Cape Girardeau, people 
reported hearing the explosion. A thick cloud of smoke billowed up and 
slowly drifted across the fl oodway, masking the view of the crevasse 
site. As the smoke eventually cleared, the commissioners did not see any 
Fireballs light up the night sky as the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway is placed into operation. (Photo by 
Oscar Reihsmann)
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water rushing through the fl oodway, but heard a roar from the crevasse. 
An hour later, Frederick reported the Cairo gage read 61.3. The river, 
which had been climbing at an alarming rate, had dropped six inches. 
By 0600 hours the next morning it had dropped more than one foot.125
At the 0800 hours commander’s briefi ng on May 3, Frederick 
reported that the rain had fi nally ended. Since April 20, all locations 
from Chester in the north, to Arkansas City in south, and extending 
from Little Rock in the west to Cincinnati in the east, received at least 
eight inches of rain. The vast majority of that region received more 
than 12 inches and several large areas received more than 20 inches. 
An incredible amount of rain had fallen – totals exceeded the normal 
rainfall for that two-week period by 600 to 1,000 percent – and it fell 
just as the snowmelt crest on the Mississippi River and the fl ood crest on 
the Ohio River arrived at the confl uence. Lt. Col. Hamilton, Col. Reich-
ling’s deputy, informed Walsh that the fl oodway operation achieved the 
desired effects. Chip Newman and his crew had the Cairo sand boils 
under control. Conditions at Fulton County stabilized even though the 
water berm remained incomplete. The river came within two feet of the 
top of the Commerce to Birds Point levee at some locations, but already 
stages were dropping. Peabody sent word that the National Weather Ser-
vice, taking the fl oodway activation into account in their calculations, 
lowered the crest at Smithland by three feet. The fl oodway, thus far, 
was operating as designed and reducing the pressure on the system.126
The fl oodway operation, though, was not complete. At 1100 hours, 
Walsh briefed Angel, James and Smith on the progress at the lower 
infl ow/outfl ow site. The vessels encountered severe winds, rains, and 
lightning while travelling from Birds Point to the lower end of the fl ood-
way, which delayed their arrival times. The crews successfully fi lled two 
of the six wells, but found the remaining four wells fi lled with rainwa-
ter. They pumped the water from the wells and successfully fi lled three 
before running out of liquid blasting agent. The crew could not prepare 
the middle infl ow/outfl ow site. Even though his hydraulics experts 
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had advised him that the lower infl ow/outfl ow was suffi cient to drain 
the fl oodway, Walsh wanted to stick to the operations plan. He gave 
Reichling 12 hours to procure additional explosives. At 1240 hours, the 
task force activated the lower infl ow/outfl ow site, with the Mississippi 
River Commission standing on the levee at New Madrid, approximately 
1.5 miles away. The daylight provided a much different perspective than 
the previous night. As the 56 tons of explosives detonated, a cloud of 
black dirt from the levee fl ew high into the air, followed by a billow-
ing cloud of white smoke. It took several seconds for the fi ve distinct 
sounds waves to reach the commission. A large crowd on the levee 
cheered their approval, giving the commissioners a “thumbs up” sign. 
Two days later, the task force opened the middle infl ow/outfl ow site 
using an alternate explosive agent. The alternate explosives used were 
not as effective as the original explosives. The levee only partially cre-
vassed – not anywhere near the optimum design level.127
Water roars through the upper inflow crevasse at the frontline levee the day after activation.
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Above: Activation of the lower inflow/outflow crevasse site on May 3, 2011.
Below: Aerial view of the upper crevasse site after activation of the floodway.
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It took nearly three days for the fl oodway to fi ll with fl ood water. 
Each day, fl oodway residents and farmers travelled through the area 
on boats to examine their property. Water stood high in their homes 
and on their lands – too high to determine the extent of their losses. 
It took weeks for the water levels to recede as the river did not cease 
fl owing into the fl oodway through the crevasse sites until June 8. Their 
sacrifi ce had been great. The Food and Agricultural Research Policy 
Institute estimated the crop losses alone at $85 million, with the broader 
economic impact exceeding $156 million. The fi gures did not account 
for damages to public and private infrastructure. Some lost everything; 
but their sacrifi ce saved so many elsewhere in the confl uence area.128
In its May 2 forecast, the National Weather Service projected the 
river to crest at 63.5 feet on the Cairo gage on May 5. At 0700 hours 
on May 5, the Cairo gage read 59.6 feet – nearly four feet lower than 
originally anticipated. The maximum discharge into the fl oodway mea-
sured approximately 400,000 cfs, nearly 150,000 cfs below the projected 
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maximum project fl ood design capacity. The peak discharge at Cairo 
reached 2.1 million cfs – only 89 percent of the project design fl ood 
fl ow of 2.36 million cfs. Also, the task force only crevassed a portion 
of the levee, which accounted for some of the difference. The success-
ful activation of the fl oodway rested on the shoulders of the task force. 
The crews on the ground braved severe weather and a dangerous work 
environment, while continually changing plans on the fl y. “They did 
everything that was asked of them on short notice and without com-
plaint,” Davis later recalled. LRD had done its part as well in preventing 
a system collapse. April 2011 had been the wettest April in the Ohio 
Valley in the past 117 years. Peabody’s informed and decisive move 
to store water behind the restricted dams on the Cumberland system 
created nearly fi ve feet of storage at Kentucky and Barkley lakes. By 
May 5, ten reservoirs in LRD had reached record pool elevations. Eight 
of those were in the Louisville Engineer District – eight of eleven res-
ervoirs in the district set new records. Four of those went beyond full 
capacity. Total system storage in LRD reached 38.9 percent, shattering 
the old record of 35 percent. Without that storage capacity, the river 
would have reached 65.5 feet on the Cairo gage and overtopped the 
critical Commerce to Birds Point levee and other levees and fl oodwalls 
in the confl uence area. Peabody and his water control managers had 
done all that they could. “This wasn’t a man-made disaster,” Peabody 
later recalled, “It was a God-made scenario.”129
In other words, it was Divine Providence.

Chapter 3
Fergie Fixes 
the River:
Improving the Flood-
Carrying Capacity 
of the River
Whatever credit is due for a courageous effort to lower fl ood 
heights on the confi ned waters of the Mississippi is due to 
Maj. Gen. Harley B. Ferguson. There are many who project 
an idea where danger is involved but there are few with the 
courage to give it effect and to assume the responsibility.
Maj. General Lytle Brown
Former Chief of Engineers
1948
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MAY 10, 2011 WAS A BEAUTIFUL DAY in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The normally sleepy town was alive with excitement. A cool breeze out of the north carrying the sweet fragrance of hon-
eysuckle ushered in noticeably mild temperatures and low humidity for 
that time of year, which the Purple Martins undoubtedly enjoyed as 
they whistled and chirped their delight. Along Washington Street – the 
brick-paved thoroughfare lined with quaint shops and colorful crepe 
myrtles – throngs of onlookers dodged the unusually high numbers 
of cars, pick-up trucks, and recreation vehicles as they nonchalantly 
strolled toward the best unobstructed view of the river creeping higher 
and higher up the wonderfully-decorated fl oodwall. Festive jazz music 
rang out from the speakers outside each storefront along Washington 
Street. The carnival-like atmosphere was reminiscent of the celebra-
tions during the golden age of the steamboat era, when the sound of 
the calliope awakened townsfolk from their mundane and isolated lives, 
drawing them to the riverfront to learn the latest gossip or to be fi rst in 
line to see the new goods for sale.
That beautiful May day in Vicksburg, not a single park bench 
remained empty. Outside the historic Biedenharn Candy Manufactur-
ing Company, one aged reveler commented to his entourage that he had 
never seen the water that high. The others nodded in agreement. Yet, 
the fl ood crest was still days away and the water would rise another 
four feet on the fl oodwall. Similar scenes, no doubt, played out in other 
river towns – Memphis, Greenville, Natchez – but away from the cities 
the mood was anything but celebratory. Engineers, levee boards, and 
fl ood fi ghters along the levee system from Memphis to Natchez were 
engaged in the fi ghts of their lives. River stages attained levels never 
before experienced at most locations along the reach, exerting unprec-
edented pressure on the system. Yet, unlike the northern and southern 
sections of the MR&T project, the middle section was not equipped 
with fl oodways to divert excess fl ow and relieve pressure on the levee 
systems – though that had not always been the case.130
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The Boeuf Floodway
The 1927 fl ood demonstrated the futility of the levees-only policy 
between the Arkansas River and Old River. The severely swollen Missis-
sippi and Arkansas rivers placed incredible pressure on the overmatched 
levee system. The rivers wanted out of their confi ned spaces. The fi rst 
major crevasse of a levee considered commission grade occurred at 
Mound Landing north of Greenville on April 21, 1927. At the time of 
the crevasse, the Arkansas City gage had reached 60 feet – 2.55 feet 
above record. An eddy had been eroding the levee for several days 
and, with water fl owing over the levee at several locations, Greenville 
residents valiantly worked to reinforce it. Despite the heroic effort, 
fl oodwaters eventually blew out the banquette, taking several persons 
with them. The crevasse eventually widened to nearly half a mile as 
nearly 500,000 cfs crashed violently into the Mississippi delta. The 
uncontrolled torrent broke through a back levee protecting Greenville, 
Greenville, Miss., after the Mound Landing levee crevasse.
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fl ooding the city to a depth of six feet on April 24. Several counties, 
including Bolivar, Tallahatchie, Sunfl ower, and Humphreys, saw greater 
than 75 percent losses. More than 50,000 evacuated. On the same day 
that the levee crevassed at Mound Landing, levees on the Arkansas River 
failed at Pendleton and Medford. At Pendleton, water overtopped the 
levee, washing away sandbags faster than crews could replace them. Just 
a short distance downriver at Medford, crews fl ed after the Pendleton 
levee failed out of fear of being isolated. A week later, another Arkansas 
River levee that was below grade washed away after being weakened 
by overtopping. On May 1, Mississippi River levees along a 16-mile 
stretch just south of Natchez crevassed after overtopping at Glasscock, 
Brabston and two locations near Bougere, Mississippi. On May 3, with 
fl oodwaters from Mound Landing returning to the Mississippi River via 
the Yazoo River and increasing stages considerably, another crevasse 
occurred at Cabin Teele in Louisiana across and slightly upriver from 
Vicksburg. The crevasse inundated most of the Tensas basin between 
Macon Ridge and the Mississippi River.131
Floodwaters inundate Tallulah, La., after the Cabin Teele levee crevasse.
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The series of crevasses represented the defi ning moment of the 1927 
fl ood in the region and prompted Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin to incorpo-
rate a fl oodway on the west bank of the river to prevent a repeat of a 
similar tragedy. The Corps of Engineers had considered a fl oodway 
through the Boeuf and Tensas basins in southeast Arkansas and north-
east Louisiana since the mid nineteenth century. Charles Ellet, Jr., and 
Capt. Andrew Humphreys completed thorough investigations for the 
Corps of Engineers that made provisions for a west bank fl oodway to 
accommodate excess fl ow from the river at extremely high stages. Their 
recommendations, however, never came to fruition as the levees-only 
policy became dogma. Jadwin intended to reverse that course. Under 
the original Jadwin plan, the project called for higher and stronger 
levees on both sides of the river from the mouth of the Arkansas River 
to Old River. The levees were to be constructed to the higher 1928 
grade as the fi rst line of defense against fl oods. The only exception was 
a 30-mile stretch of levee extending from Cypress Creek to a point in 
Arkansas nearly fi ve miles west of Greenville. The project called for 
this segment of levee to remain at its existing height in order to func-
tion as a fuseplug entrance into a 1.32 million-acre fl oodway, known 
as the Boeuf fl oodway.132
Historically, Cypress Creek had served as a natural diversion or 
outlet that allowed the Mississippi to expand and disperse overfl ows 
through the Boeuf and Tensas basins. In 1921, the Tensas Basin and 
Southeast Arkansas levee districts, with the consent of the Mississippi 
River Commission, extended the mainline levees across the outlet, 
thereby denying the Mississippi access to its historic fl oodplain. Through 
his fl ood control plan, Jadwin envisioned restoring the Boeuf diversion 
to redirect Mississippi River fl ows in excess of 1,950,000 cfs in the 
vicinity of Arkansas City to keep river stages at or below 62.5 feet on 
the Arkansas City gage. Jadwin estimated the fuseplug trigger point 
to be at a height equivalent to 60.5 feet on the Arkansas City gage. 
This height represented a 10-foot increase over the historical point of 
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Map depicting the guide levees that were to defi ne the Boeuf floodway.
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overfl ow prior to the closure of the Cypress Creek gap. Under project 
fl ood conditions, the 9.5-mile wide fl oodway, fl anked by 80 miles of 
protection levee on the west and 100 miles on the east, would divert 
900,000 cfs through the Boeuf basin to the Red River backwater area 
in Louisiana and eventually to the Gulf of Mexico via the Atchafalaya 
basin.133
Similar to the stiff resistance to the Birds Point-New Madrid fl ood-
way mounted by residents and elected offi cials from southeast Mis-
souri, residents and landowners in the Boeuf and Tensas basins bitterly 
opposed Jadwin’s inclusion of the Boeuf fl oodway in the general fl ood 
control plan for the lower Mississippi Valley. But unlike the situation 
at the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, the Mississippi 
River Commission had also proposed a fl oodway in the Boeuf basin. 
The commission’s fl oodway was smaller than Jadwin’s, with a capacity 
to divert only 600,000 cfs from the Mississippi River, and less intru-
sive by avoiding the inclusion of higher value properties. It was also 
more palatable to those impacted because it was to be governed by a 
concrete weir or a gated structure instead of Jadwin’s dreaded fuseplug 
levee concept.134
The most signifi cant difference between the Jadwin and the com-
mission plans involved payments for damages after use of the fl oodway. 
Jadwin believed that all land within the fl oodway was naturally subject 
to fl ooding and thus the Corps of Engineers was not liable for damages 
if it let nature take its course. The commission argued that the current 
system already protected much of the land – particularly along Cypress 
Creek – and that it was illegal to take land and not pay in some way for 
its use. Adding to the problem was that the Jadwin plan fl ooded more 
land more often – only about two thirds of property in the valley would 
receive complete protection with the others receiving various levels 
depending on their location in the fl oodways and backwater areas. By 
protecting fewer areas and not paying for damages, Jadwin reduced 
the costs considerably. Local businessmen and landowners, meanwhile, 
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argued that forced purchase of fl owage rights and local condemnation 
devalued property and made it impossible to sell. Railway operators 
in particular believed they should receive compensation for moving 
their lines. The only way to ensure fair market value was for the federal 
government to purchase the land at an earlier cost.135
On May 15, President Calvin Coolidge signed the 1928 Flood Con-
trol Act into law. The new law provided for a special board to consider 
the differences between the Jadwin and commission plans. Boeuf fl ood-
way residents and their allies hoped the board would clarify a stark 
contradiction found in section four of the 1928 act. Section four autho-
rized the federal government to purchase fl owage rights for “additional 
destructive waters” resulting from “diversions from the main channel 
of the Mississippi River,” but the last-minute insertion of “additional” 
left it unclear whether all lands in the fl oodways were included. Jadwin 
had announced his attention to purchase fl owage rights at the Birds 
Point-New Madrid and Bonnet Carré, but not the Boeuf and Atchafalaya 
fl oodways. It was a question that would plague the Boeuf fl oodway for 
years to come.136
After the special engineering board refused to touch the compen-
sation issue and endorsed the engineering features of the Jadwin plan, 
President Calvin Coolidge instructed Jadwin to proceed with the imple-
mentation of his fl ood control plan, but specifi cally delayed any decision 
pertaining to the acquisition of land rights for constructing the fl oodways. 
Shortly after the 1928 elections, which boosted Herbert Hoover to the 
presidency, the lame-duck Coolidge approved the site for the Bonnet 
Carré spillway and authorized Jadwin to purchase the necessary land 
and fl owage rights for that element of the plan. Three weeks later he 
did the same for the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Lastly, in two 
separate orders in January 1929, Coolidge authorized the acquisition 
of rights-of-way and construction of the protection levees within the 
Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways. Provisions for the purchase of fl ow-
age rights in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways were conspicuously 
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absent in the fi nal two communiqués. The Corps of Engineers had 
determined that landowners in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways 
would not be subjected to additional destructive waters. There was to 
be no compensation paid to landowners.137
More than 50,000 people resided within the Boeuf fl oodway in the 
late 1920s. Some landowners quickly settled on prices to sell rights-of-
way for levees or agreed to damage waivers for their mostly undevel-
oped land. Others refused to accede to threats of condemnation largely 
because of a recent spike in property values generated by the success of 
gas and oil wells in the region. Many argued that the Jadwin plan con-
stituted a reopening of the Cypress Creek gap. For that, they believed 
the federal government owed compensation. No matter what the reason 
for their refusal, they quickly found allies among leading engineers. 
When Louisiana State Engineer George Schoenberger wrote Sen. Joseph 
Ransdell opposing the fi ndings of the special board in August 1928, he 
explained that fuseplug levees would create great velocity in the fi rst 
few miles and then fl ood the fl oodways to a depth of about 20 feet, 
greatly damaging property. “If water must be diverted down the Boeuf 
Basin ... then the land within the fl oodway area should be bought by 
the government at a fair price and dedicated to fl oodway purposes.” In 
his book published November 1928, James Kemper observed that the 
special board had proposed providing $6 an acre for easements – the cost 
to plant the land – but that many would lose homes, fencing, livestock, 
and food. “It makes one fear that an autocracy is growing that will soon 
be necessary to curb,” he wrote. In the spring of 1929, the American 
Engineering Council’s Flood Control Committee – Baxter Brown, John 
Freeman, Arthur Morgan, and Gardner Williams – noted that “suffi cient 
study … of fl ood control on the Mississippi River has not been made” 
because “the intent of Congress and the best interest of the nation were 
defeated by the constitution and action” of the special board. “It would 
be a grave mistake to permit the letting of contracts” on the fl ood-
ways “until the engineering practicability and economic feasibility are 
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adequately studied by a non-partisan and competent board of engineers.” 
The secretary of the council forwarded the report to President Hoover 
on May 20, 1929.138
From the start, congressional members from the lower Mississippi 
Valley region had advocated a truly comprehensive fl ood control plan 
supported by large federal expenditures. As it became apparent that the 
fl ood control act was fl awed in its application of compensation and that 
the federal government did not intend to purchase property or fl owage 
rights in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways, pressure mounted from 
their constituents to delay and change the project. Many found hope 
in the new president. Coolidge and Jadwin may have been the main 
architects of the project, but it would be implemented by the Mississippi 
River Commission under Hoover’s watch. Although his administration 
represented a continuation of the previous one as far as party affi liation 
and fi scal conservatism, Hoover, unlike his seemingly unsympathetic 
predecessor, was actively involved in the 1927 fl ood fi ght, winning the 
respect of many southerners.
On May 9, 1929, a congressional delegation representing the lower 
Mississippi Valley led primarily by Southern Democrats petitioned 
Hoover to suspend work on the project pending a presidential and con-
gressional interpretation and review of the 1928 Flood Control Act. The 
delegation stressed that Congress’ intent under section four of the act 
was “to assure compensation for fl owage rights over land embraced 
within all spillways and fl oodways and for damage where injury is 
done to property.” They argued that section one placed the responsibil-
ity of approval or rejection of particular elements of the plan squarely 
on the shoulders of the president. Furthermore, the delegation insisted 
that Coolidge issued his instructions to Jadwin to proceed with the 
acquisition of rights-of-way for levees, but not fl owage rights, without 
having before him “a full and complete report” on the commission and 
the Jadwin plans. Therefore, Coolidge did not have the opportunity “to 
pass upon the question of compensation for fl owage rights under both 
136
Divine Providence
plans in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya Basins.” With this in mind, the del-
egation suggested that if Hoover did not reach the same interpretation, 
he then should call for a temporary cessation of work on the project 
to allow Congress to revisit and clarify the issue through a legislative 
amendment. 139
Hoover sent the brief, along with a supplemental support statement, 
to Secretary of War James W. Good. On May 27, Good forwarded the 
documents to Attorney General William D. Mitchell asking for his 
opinion as to whether the adopted project was subject to change at the 
behest of the president or was it fi xed by law. He also asked Mitchell 
if the existing law required the federal government to purchase fl ow-
age rights in the Atchafalaya and Boeuf fl oodways. The attorney gen-
eral published his offi cial decision a little more than three weeks later. 
Mitchell expressed his view that the law did not authorize the purchase 
of fl owage in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya basins. The project was fi xed 
by law and could only be changed by Congress. As to Good’s inquiry 
into the legality involved in purchasing fl owage rights in the Atchafa-
laya and Boeuf fl oodways, Mitchell responded, “I must fully decline 
to express an opinion on your question,” citing existing litigation in 
federal court.140
Mitchell’s reference to existing litigation centered on a number of 
lawsuits brought before the federal courts. Having failed the test of 
public opinion, the Jadwin Plan now faced several legal tests. The most 
prominent suit commenced on June 15, 1929, two days before bids for 
the construction of protection levees within the Boeuf fl oodway were 
to be received. On this date, R. Foster Kincaid, an owner of 160 acres 
toward the lower end of the proposed Boeuf fl oodway, fi led a lawsuit 
in the Federal Court of Western Louisiana against the United States, 
the secretary of war, the Corps of Engineers, and the members of the 
Mississippi River Commission in an effort to halt the receiving of bids 
and the awarding of contracts for construction of the guide levees that 
would defi ne the fl oodway boundaries and confi ne fl oodwaters entering 
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through the fuseplug entrance. The suit alleged that the planned fl ood-
way through the Boeuf basin subjected Kincaid’s land to additional 
destructive fl oods. His lawyers argued that Kincaid’s land was valued 
at $9,000, but the federal government, by advertising and receiving bids 
for construction of the protection levees, had “cast a cloud upon” the 
title of the land, thereby impairing Kincaid’s ability to sell or to borrow 
money against it. As such, the proposal to initiate work in the basin 
without condemnation proceedings was tantamount to the taking of his 
land “without due process of law and without just compensation.”141
A similar application for an injunction to stop the awarding of con-
tracts in the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway – Kirk v. Good – had 
been denied in late May by Judge Charles B. Davis of the Federal Court 
in Missouri. Jadwin desired another decision along those lines. As R.N. 
Duffy and Maj. Paul S. Reinecke prepared to testify for the Missis-
sippi River Commission in the preliminary hearing of the Kincaid case, 
Jadwin worked to coordinate on the message for future legal action. First 
he did not focus on the fact that some of these lands might fl ood, which 
federal lawyers admitted, but instead he stressed that no “additional” 
fl oodwaters would enter the fl oodway from the Mississippi by way of 
operating the fl oodway. Second, he contended that because the overall 
plan lowered fl ood stages on the Mississippi, less water would enter the 
fl oodway from the main channel. Last, he argued that building levees 
to protect property adjoining the fl oodways in no way prevented local 
interests from protecting their citizens by building their own levees as 
they had in the past. When Duffy seemed not to grasp this in an internal 
memo, afraid that “such errors might lose the Government cases in the 
Mississippi Valley,” Jadwin requested Reinecke go over the legal posi-
tion with Duffy or else “keep him out of Louisiana and either handle 
the case yourself or get someone who can. Your other work is of small 
importance compared to this.”142
Despite this preparation, the Kincaid case went against the gov-
ernment from the beginning. Unlike the Kirk case, where the plaintiff 
138
Divine Providence
could fi nd remedy in condemnation proceedings, Judge Benjamin C. 
Dawkins of the Western Louisiana District Court ruled that the Kincaid 
case had merit to proceed to trial and agreed to a temporary injunction. 
This had impact, not just on construction, but on purchase of the levee 
rights-of-way. In an ongoing condemnation case, United States v. Stubbs, 
Dawkins ruled the government could not take immediate possession of 
the property of Col. Frank P. Stubbs and others in the Monroe circle in 
Louisiana without putting up the maximum value of the property until 
the Kincaid case was resolved. In response, Good instructed the attorney 
general, “After decision has been rendered in the injunction suit and 
when it has been decided to resume work on these levees, the matter 
can be taken up and the question of depositing funds in the registry 
of the court then determined.” The only other condemnation ongoing, 
against the Jewell Realty and Chicot Trust companies, which had fi led 
numerous interventions claiming damages for $3 million, was also put 
on hold, essentially shutting down all progress on the fl oodway until 
resolution of the case.143
The Kincaid case went to trial October 15, 1929. Testifying for 
Kincaid were well-known opponents of the Jadwin plan: James Kemper, 
Lucius Berthe, and Harry Jacobs, the new Louisiana State Engineer; for 
the government, commission members Brig. Gen. Thomas Jackson and 
Col. Earnest Graves, as well as Capt. John P. Dean. As expected, the 
trial hinged on the interpretation of “additional” fl oodwaters. On this, 
opinions varied, as there were a number of ways of defi ning additional. 
One was the frequency of the Arkansas City gage reaching 60.5 feet to 
trigger use of the fl oodway, which Kemper placed at one in four years, 
Dean one in 13, and Graves perhaps even more infrequent, compared 
to fl ooding every two to three years previously. Jacobs testifi ed that the 
Cypress Creek levee had protected Kincaid’s land until the current proj-
ect, but Dean stated that “The waters pass naturally as they always have 
passed down through the natural Boeuf basin.” Kemper argued addition-
ally that when fl oods came, they would be violent because of crevassing 
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the fuseplug levee, a statement Graves confi rmed. A second defi nition 
involved the amount of discharge. Mississippi River Commission fi g-
ures used by Kemper showed the fl oodway would pass 350,000 cfs 
more through the basin than experienced in 1927. Although Graves 
disputed the reliability of these fi gures, Jackson admitted there would 
be an increase in discharge of at least 150,000 cfs. A third defi nition was 
the depth of fl oodwaters. Kincaid’s land previously fl ooded frequently, 
but Jacobs argued that construction of guide levees 16 feet higher than 
his property showed intent to fl ood his land to this depth. Although 
Dean initially argued that the levees were to protect “adjoining lands” 
and that fl ood heights would be no higher than in 1927, under “rigid 
cross-examination” he admitted that, in fact, water would rise four feet 
higher on his property than in 1927. In his ruling issued December 13, 
Judge Dawkins reasoned that although fl ooding might be infrequent, it 
would damage property. “It will not be assumed that Congress intended 
to violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution by taking private 
property for public purposes without just compensation,” so the act 
required obtaining property through purchase or condemnation. On 
February 10, 1930, he upheld the injunction to prevent construction of 
the guide levees until purchase of fl owage rights.144
Jubilation sprang forth across the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways. 
An editorial in the Engineering News-Record called Dawkins’ ruling, “a 
common sense decision.” Long opposed to many aspects of the Jadwin 
Plan, in particular to the issue of compensation for fl oodway residents, 
the editors admonished Jadwin, Coolidge, and the Army engineers 
testifying in the case:
The outcome is surprising only in view of the fact that a former 
Chief of Engineers deliberately planned to utilize the land for 
a fl ood control channel without compensation, that a former 
President issued an order to this very end, and that the govern-
ment witness at the trial in Monroe strained their integrity to 
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show that destructive fl ooding would not occur, until after cross 
examination they admitted the contrary.”145
The impacts of the decision extended beyond the immediate issue 
of just compensation for those living within the Boeuf fl oodway. Back 
in September of 1929, after Judge Dawkins ruled that the case had 
merit, Hoover announced that he would delay new work on the Boeuf 
and Atchafalaya fl oodways if “the Senators and Representatives of the 
interested states are willing to assume the responsibility by making 
the request” since “there has been a great deal of division of opinion” 
requiring resolution. After receiving formal requests from at least six 
of the congressmen, he approved cessation of work on the Boeuf and 
Atchafalaya fl oodways. Although his order left the Jadwin plan other-
wise intact, the delay “opened a way for reconsideration of portions 
of the diversion plans for Mississippi fl ood control,” the Engineering 
News-Record editorialized.146
With construction of the Boeuf fl oodway guide levees stalled, how-
ever, the fl ood control system protecting the middle section of the proj-
ect contained an ominous and threatening weak spot. While Jadwin 
envisioned excess fl oodwaters escaping through the natural diversion 
in the Boeuf basins, with no guide levees to confi ne the overfl ow, a 
large fl ood would unleash a torrent of uncontrolled water down the 
Boeuf and Tensas basins, sowing havoc and devastation. Yet, Jadwin 
was gone, having retired in October 1929, just prior to Judge Dawkins’ 
ruling. The new chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown, possessed 
more political savvy and fl exibility than his confrontational and obsti-
nate predecessor. Brown particularly generated great excitement among 
lower valley interests when he hinted that changes to the Jadwin plan 
might be in order by describing the plan as a “piece of emergency work” 
developed hastily to protect the citizens of the lower valley as quickly as 
possible. Moreover, Brown, recognizing that “very little effort has been 
made by those responsible for the work toward inquiry as to how the 
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general plans might be changed,” 
encouraged a reevaluation of the 
existing fl ood-control plan. While 
Brown understood that a wide-
spread hostility toward altering the 
Jadwin plan existed among many 
within the Corps of Engineers and 
certain blocs within Congress—
hostility which discouraged inqui-
ries into potential modifi cations of 
the plan—he was taken aback that 
no suggestion from a responsible 
authority had been made propos-
ing the elimination or modifi cation 
of contested elements of the proj-
ect. Brown promptly issued a challenge to the engineer community to 
explore and develop new answers to the fl ood-control question. It was 
in this context that a new plan emerged—the use of man-made cutoffs 
and channel rectifi cation to lower fl ood stages.147
More Water at Lower Stages
The Mississippi River is an alluvial stream that creates bends or 
loops as it meanders through the valley. Bends reduce the slope or veloc-
ity of the river. As a result, the river typically pools in the bends during 
fl oods, causing fl oodwaters to pile up above the bend. Left unchecked by 
bank revetment, the bends lengthen as they develop until only a narrow 
neck of land separates the upstream bend from the downstream bend. 
A cutoff occurs when a new channel is carved – whether naturally or 
artifi cially – across the neck, eventually divorcing the old bend from the 
river and transforming it into an oxbow lake. Since the 1850s, engineers 
Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown, Chief of Engineers, 
1929-1933. (Offi  ce of History, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers)
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dabbled with the concept of artifi cial cutoffs to prevent fl oodwaters 
from stacking up and to speed fl oodwaters through the system.
While the merits of cutoffs as a method of fl ood control had been 
discussed in engineering circles since the mid nineteenth century, the 
renewed push came from William Elam, an engineer with the Missis-
sippi Levee Board. Elam had been studying cutoffs since 1913, when 
he witnessed the Albemarle Chute Cutoff—a gradual widening of a 
narrow side channel between Willow Point and Newman Towhead about 
30 miles north of Vicksburg that had the same effect of cutting a new 
main channel. The old main channel started to cave in 1910, and the 
commission tried to revet the banks, but within three years abandoned 
it. Because the new channel funneled the current against the east bank, 
the commission started to build a levee in expectation of a cave-in per 
the old theories, but found it unnecessary. “It was enough to create doubt 
about old theories,” Elam wrote. Over the next 15 years, he developed 
his fi ndings of cutoffs. After the Flood of 1927, Elam wrote articles 
for the Engineering News-Record and the Proceedings of the American 
Society of Civil Engineers that laid out a plan that comprised revetment, 
levees, sandbar removal, and cutoffs to fl atten the slope of the river 
and reduce fl ood stages. Altogether, he identifi ed 35 cutoffs – most 
prominently at the Greenville Bends – that would lower fl ood stages 
between Arkansas City and Vicksburg by an estimated 10 to 20 feet.148
By the time Elam prepared the articles, the 1928 act had already 
incorporated Jadwin’s position that cutoffs were “too uncertain and 
threatening to warrant adoption” and that “it is advisable to adhere 
to the present policy of preserving the river generally in its present 
form.”149 The Mississippi River Commission, too, opposed cutoffs, 
having adopted a policy to prevent natural cutoffs in 1880 out of fear 
of harming the regimen of the river. Yet Elam’s articles and the attention 
they garnered appeared to have at least one effect. When a cutoff started 
to develop at Yucatan Point in 1929, Jadwin approved letting it proceed, 
apparently with the intent of proving its ill effects. For some years, the 
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commission was aware of the possibility of a cutoff at Yucatan Point, 
where the Big Black River traversed the neck of the point and emptied 
into the Mississippi River at the lower bend. The bank was caving on 
both sides of the bend, gradually narrowing the distance between the 
Big Black River and the Mississippi River on the upper bend. In August 
and September 1928, the commission placed revetment to prevent the 
Mississippi from breaking into the Big Black, but by order of Jadwin did 
no more work to prevent the cutoff. During the winter months of 1929 
and 1930, fl oodwaters from the Mississippi overwhelmed the ridge and 
broke through to the Big Black, effectively cutting off Yucatan Point. At 
that point, at the request of Brown, engineers began taking gage read-
ings and discharge measurements, and Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Jackson 
ordered establishment of cross-section surveys to observe the cutoff’s 
development. The ensuing cutoff developed slowly and afforded the 
commission its fi rst opportunity in more than a generation to study the 
progress of a cutoff and to make detailed observations on the impacts to 
the river. As the cutoff developed over many months, the commission 
observed no immediate or violent changes to the regimen of the river. 
In August 1930, engineers reported depth measurements in excess of 
18 feet.150
With initial data from the Yucatan Cutoff already starting to disprove 
the long-held belief that cutoffs harmed the regimen of the river, Elam 
submitted his ideas for the improvement of both the Mississippi and 
Atchafalaya rivers through cutoffs to Maj. Gen. Brown in March 1930 
while attending the Mississippi River Commission’s high-water inspec-
tion tour of the Mississippi River. Impressed with the concept as a 
method to perhaps avoid building the Boeuf fl oodway, Brown studied 
Elam’s ideas carefully. He later met Elam in Greenville, Mississippi, 
and continued to correspond with him about cutoffs throughout the 
year. In the meantime, in November 1930, Col. Harley Ferguson, a 
member of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, submitted 
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Map depicting the progression of the natural cutoff  at Yucatan Point, 1929-1931.
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a detailed plan infl uenced by Elam’s fi ndings and the observations from 
the Yucatan cutoff.151
One of the most prominent Army engineers before World War II, 
having earned a reputation by raising the USS MAINE in Havana Harbor, 
Ferguson was the South Atlantic Division commander. He had been 
studying Mississippi fl ooding since at least 1928, when he requested 
that Capt. Lewis A. Pick provide him with data and maps. By October 
1930, when he pulled in his engineer in charge of surveys, Gerard H. 
Matthes, to aid him in drafting the plan, Ferguson had already concep-
tualized a proposal of fl ood stage reductions through cutoffs, correc-
tive dredging, and stabilization of the new channel through revetment. 
Submitted to the Board of Engineers on November 22, 1930, the plan 
outlined the issue: “The fl ood problem above the Arkansas is solved 
by levees. The problem below Old River is solved by the Atchafalaya 
fl oodway and the Bonnet Carré spillway.” The critical stretch was from 
the Arkansas to the Red River, where fl ood heights proved unmanage-
able by other means. His plan argued for increasing the carrying capac-
ity of this stretch through targeted cutoffs, closing secondary channels, 
checking bank erosion using revetment, deepening the channel, and 
restricting crossovers where the river channel crosses from one side 
of a bend to another. These activities would allow the river to further 
dredge its own channel. As Ferguson noted, the kinetic energy of the 
river “is equivalent to more than 50 dredges.” Essential to controlling 
the river and improving drainage in that reach were removal of the clay 
ridge near Natchez, Mississippi, deepening Old River, and improving 
the Atchafalaya River. “The river itself is the main dredge,” Ferguson 
wrote, “The channel from Natchez to Old River is the pipeline.”152
While Ferguson’s channel rectifi cation program proposed various 
bank revetment and dredging operations, the cutoffs represented the 
most revolutionary part of his plan. “There can be no possible harm in 
reducing the river to the length which it had in 1880,” he wrote. Among 
the cutoffs he proposed were at Gaillardo Lake (Glasscock), Giles Bend, 
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Grand Gulf (Diamond Point), and 
the Greenville Bends. He would 
generally work from south to 
north, improving the reach from 
Natchez to Old River and then 
from Greenville to Vicksburg. At 
the same time, it was the combina-
tion of correction and cutoffs that 
defi ned his unique approach. His 
method was to enlarge the river-
bed through “corrective dredging” 
to improve slope and navigation, 
and place revetment and dikes 
to stabilize the river above and 
below a proposed cut. He cau-
tiously added, “it will be neces-
sary to have several dredges on hand” to ensure navigation. He even 
recommended the type of dredges and revetment required. Based on 
these improvements, he predicted lowering fl ood heights by at least 
three to seven feet for $50 million within three years. Finally, he argued, 
“the amount by which the fl ood capacity of the main river channel can 
eventually be increased can be determined only by proceeding with the 
work and measuring the effects.” In other words, Ferguson argued that 
the only real way to prove the stage lowering effects of cutoffs was to 
proceed with his experimental program.153
On reading the plan in December 1930, Pick noted “you will 
meet a lot of opposition to your plan. This, of course, is not based 
on anything except the old school of thought.” Indeed, the plan met 
almost immediate opposition, starting with Board of Engineers for 
Rivers and Harbors member and former Mississippi River Commis-
sion member Col. Edward Schulz. At a hearing of the board to consider 
Ferguson’s plan on January 5, 1931, Schulz tried to convince the board 
Col. Harley B. Ferguson
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mathematically that cutoffs would not lower the riverbed and that its 
benefi ts would dwindle to zero above the cut. Despite Schulz’s efforts, 
on February 5, 1931, the majority of the board approved Ferguson’s 
plan. Many Mississippi River Commission employees, too, opposed the 
plan because of its long stance against cutoffs. Jackson, the commission 
president, made clear his own views in an article that January. While 
not denying cutoffs could improve discharge, he noted their dangers 
and high costs. Jackson concluded, “In fl ood-control plans of the past, 
the cutoff has played an unimportant role, and there is little prospect 
of it playing a more important one in the future.”154
Not surprisingly, Ferguson’s plan impressed Maj. Gen. Brown. The 
bold and innovative approach represented the exact type of exploration 
he had challenged the Corps of Engineers to produce upon replacing 
Maj. Gen. Jadwin as chief of engineers. On February 28, 1931, Brown 
submitted a plan to modify the MR&T project to Congress. The plan 
included the recommendation for the Board of Engineers to initiate a 
program of “experimental work, including channel rectifi cation and 
stabilization, dredging, and bank protection.” Only a year later, after 
receiving permission from Congress to pursue further investigations into 
cutoffs in January 1932, Brown assigned a board of review that included 
Ferguson, Spalding, Dean Anson Marston of Iowa State College, and 
Lt. John P. Dean. The board assembled in Memphis on March 9 and 
proceeded downriver on the INSPECTOR, including a trip to the Atcha-
falaya River. It made another trip in May to Cairo and the St. Francis 
and Tensas basins. Although the ostensible goal of this board was review 
of the fl oodways as well as increases in discharge in the river, it spent 
considerable time discussing cutoffs during its early months. Among 
others, the board interviewed Jackson for suggestions concerning the 
Jadwin plan, but he made no statements showing favoritism to cutoffs 
and suggested that he only desisted from preventing the Yucatan Cutoff 
after revetment had failed.155
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It should come as no surprise that, given Jackson’s disagreement 
with cutoff plans and Ferguson’s interest in implementing them, Brown 
would allow Jackson to retire in May 1932 and nominate Ferguson as 
the new president of the Mississippi River Commission. Ferguson was 
widely considered the most talented offi cer in the Corps of Engineers. 
According to one version of the story, Brown called Ferguson to his 
offi ce to tell him of the assignment. They sat smoking pipes until Fergu-
son fi nally asked his superior offi cer, “Do you want me to write a book 
or fi x a river?” Brown, inhaled the smoke from his pipe then exhaled 
slowly before replying, “Fergie, you get the hell out of here and go fi x 
that river.” From that moment, Ferguson let nothing stand in his way. 
Raised in the North Carolina-Tennessee backcountry, Ferguson had a 
way of explaining his plan that appealed to the public. “The Missis-
sippi wants out. Let it out. Don’t try to bridle it and make it stay inside 
roundabout, twisting, inadequate channels…. Put it to work. Keep it 
from damaging its banks and make it carry the load in its bed.”156
When Ferguson arrived in Vicksburg on June 15, 1932, he initially 
found most of his staff biased against his plan. Therefore, his fi rst act 
was to convince and instruct them in a series of memoranda outlining 
his views in pithy comments. “A cut-off reduces the distance, hence 
the resistance to fl ow, between two points,” he wrote in June. “River 
engineering is fundamentally a question of energy,” he added. “Clay 
will stand a very swift current. Sand will not. The banks are composed 
of alternate layers of sand and clay, or gumbo,” he explained in a discus-
sion of revetment in July. “The correct location of revetment is to put it 
along a line pointing downstream where we wish the river to go for the 
next fi ve miles.” He wrote in October on effective dredging, “For any 
particular depth in a river there is a range of velocities which will not 
cause scour or deposit.” In November, “If we enlarge the section above 
the outlet until its capacity is equivalent to that below … the river will 
be stable.” In December, “If we can increase the power of transporta-
tion in the lower reaches or decrease the erosion in the upper reaches, 
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we will accomplish our purpose.”At the same time, he ordered studies 
of a range of topics and frequently made suggestions borrowed from 
others, such as using Navy torpedo nets to close secondary channels, 
experimenting with board revetment, or deciding where to place dredged 
material. In June, he ordered George Clemens to coordinate revetment 
experiments at the Waterways Experiment Station and the Memphis 
Engineer District. He also requested studies of additional proposed 
cutoff locations at the Waterways Experiment Station. He then began 
an extensive regimen of data collection; personally planned dredging 
work for 1932 based on available funding, and on June 17 and July 5 
held conferences to develop plans for where to correct the channel or 
place revetment and how to proceed with his plan.157
The fi rst cutoff in Ferguson’s program was at Diamond Point below 
Vicksburg. The technique used, as with all of the cuts, was to add revet-
ment and improve the alignment and slope of the river above and below 
Gerard Matt hes, left, and Brig. Gen. Harley Ferguson, with arms crossed, inspect operations at the Diamond 
Point cutoff .
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the cut through dredging and then make a pilot channel from either side 
using dragline machines and cutterhead dredges instead of allowing 
the river to carve its own channel. This avoided the fl ooding below the 
cut that previously resulted from cutoffs. Ferguson left the old bends 
open to allow “valley storage,” or natural reservoirs to temporarily 
store overfl ow from the new channel during high water. He also took 
great care to select the location of the cutoffs. He tried to choose stable 
stretches of river from which to extend the cut, with mild curvature, 
no islands or chutes, and no excessive bank erosion or silting so as to 
avoid any impediments to navigation. He avoided cuts across narrow 
necks where instability already existed, did not attempt to straighten 
the river unduly and risk excessive bank caving, and in general tried 
to plan cuts in close proximity from south to north to allow the cuts 
to carry eroded material from a new cut. The commission initiated the 
cutoff at Diamond Point on January 8, 1933, dramatically dynamit-
ing the narrow ridge separating the pilot channels for a total cost of 
$500,000. The New Orleans States later contrasted this with the fi rst 
shot of the Battle of Lexington. Instead of the shot heard around the 
world, “Nobody even noticed much the shot that should have echoed 
up and down the Mississippi Valley.” Ferguson started work on planned 
cutoffs at Glasscock Point and Giles Bend near Natchez in March and 
May 1933, with preparation begun for several others.158
By the 1935 high-water season, Ferguson had made substantial 
progress implementing his program. Seven artifi cial cutoffs were in 
operation at Diamond Point, Glasscock Point, Giles Bend, Leland Neck, 
Worthington Point, Willow Point, and Marshall Point. Along with the 
natural cutoff at Yucatan Point cutoff, Ferguson’s effort had shortened 
the river by 70 miles. The corrective dredging in the reaches between 
the cutoffs had also signifi cantly widened and improved the alignment 
of the channel, which allowed the kinetic energy of the river to scour its 
bed deeper. While none of the cutoffs had fully developed by the 1935 
high-water season, they, along with the corrective dredging measures, 
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produced substantial results during a fl ood that spring. The fl ood was 
lengthy in duration, but only moderate in height. At the Arkansas City 
gage, the peak fl ow surpassed that of the 1932 fl ood, but the crest of 
the 1935 fl ood was nearly two feet lower – the river carried more water 
at a lower stage. Ferguson’s plan was working.159
Dividends of Channel Rectifi cation
Buttressed by that initial success, the Mississippi River Commission 
proposed several sweeping modifi cations to the Jadwin plan. The most 
intriguing modifi cation involved the Boeuf fl oodway. The commission 
proposed eliminating the 1.32 million-acre fl oodway from the plan and 
replacing it with a smaller 820,000-acre fl oodway through the Tensas 
basin. The proposed replacement, known as the Eudora fl oodway, was 
farther south and east. Under the commission’s new plan, the Eudora 
fl oodway would extend fi ve miles west of the Mississippi River and then 
southward from Eudora, Arkansas, along the eastern edge of Macon 
Ridge to the Red River backwater area. The fl oodway was capable of 
diverting up to 700,000 cfs from the Mississippi River. Along with the 
increased channel capacity created by Ferguson’s program, the fl oodway 
provided the necessary overfl ow relief under project fl ood conditions. 
Being nearly 800 square miles smaller than the Boeuf fl oodway, it also 
eliminated the prospect of future inundation to hundreds of thousands 
of acres of fertile, valuable, and taxable farmlands. To the delight of 
longtime critics of the Boeuf fl oodway, the commission also recom-
mended eliminating the use of a fuseplug levee as contemplated under 
the Jadwin plan. Instead the commission intended to construct control 
works—either gated spillways or concrete weirs—that would com-
mence operation at a stage corresponding to 51 feet on the Vicksburg 
gage. The commission believed that the substitution of control works 
for the fuseplug levee allowed for the fl exibility to open the fl oodway 
only when high and prolonged fl ood stages warranted operation, thereby 
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An earthen plug is all that separates the dredged pilot channels.
Dynamite removes the plug and opens the cutoff .
Anatomy of a Cutoff 
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Fifteen minutes after opening.
One hour after opening, erosion of the plug has spread.
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improving fl owage conditions and regulating the extent and duration 
of diversion.160
The commission also sought to address the nagging issue of com-
pensation by exploiting the generosity of New Deal Democrats, but 
recognized that an impediment still existed in the Corps of Engineers. 
That agency still maintained the position that the fl oodways were natural 
outlets for overfl ows, therefore, the federal government held no obli-
gation to compensate landowners. To remedy the situation, the com-
mission asked the Corps of Engineers to revise its real estate policy by 
advising the secretary of war to enter into an agreement with the states 
of Arkansas and Louisiana to hasten the acquisition process. Under the 
agreement, the states or other local authorities would acquire and trans-
fer land rights to the federal government. The secretary of war would, 
in turn, reimburse the states at a cost not to exceed 1.5 times the total 
1934 assessed value of the land rights acquired. Maj. Gen. Edward 
Markham, Brown’s successor as chief of engineers, concurred with the 
commission’s proposal, but slightly modifi ed the recommendation by 
insisting on 1935 assessed values.161
The commission’s proposed modifi cations, which also included sub-
stantial improvements in the Atchafalaya basin, were warmly received 
by many longtime critics of the Jadwin plan. In commenting on the 
changes in the Atchafalaya basin, James Kemper, an outspoken opponent 
of the Jadwin Plan and long-time critic of the Mississippi River Com-
mission, remarked, “For the fi rst time I appear to approve and support 
. . . the main engineering features of this new project.” Harry Jacobs, 
another vocal opponent of the Jadwin Plan and the former chief engi-
neer with the Louisiana Board of State Engineers, gave a similar ringing 
endorsement by calling the commission plan a “splendid recommenda-
tion” and asked Congress to authorize the modifi cations, posthaste. The 
Board of State Engineers shared its former chief engineers’ sentiments. 
In a letter to House Flood Control Committee Chairman Riley Wilson, 
the board concluded that the plan came “as near being a perfect plan, 
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consistent with justifi able outlay of funds, as it is possible to conceive. 
The Board of Mississippi Levee Board and the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta 
Levee Board also endorsed the modifi cations.162
One obstacle remained. Support for the commission plan ended 
at the Boeuf and Tensas basins. The success of Ferguson’s program 
sparked a movement to eliminate any fl oodway in southeast Arkansas 
and northeast Louisiana. That movement had actually gained momentum 
the year before when the commission completed a study that examined 
a system of reservoirs in the Arkansas and White basins with a com-
bined storage capacity of 15 million acre-feet. The study concluded that 
the 26 reservoirs, if built, would lower fl ood stages between Arkansas 
City and Old River by as much as fi ve feet. Residents in the Boeuf and 
Tensas basins latched onto the fi nding and the results of Ferguson’s 
program and launched a campaign insinuating that they were being 
forced to take on water to protect Mississippi interests across the river. 
In their view, this was a severe inequity worthy of remediation. Their 
proposed solution was to abandon the fl oodway in favor of levees of 
equal height on both sides of the river to give everyone an equal chance 
to life and property.163
Across the river, Mississippi delta interests, led by Mississippi Con-
gressman Will Whittington, opposed the complete abandonment of 
a west bank fl oodway. Citing the historic fl oods of 1897, 1913, and 
1927, they claimed that the equal protection theory was impractical. 
The Tensas and Boeuf basins were natural outlets; the Yazoo basin was 
not. When the historic fl oods crevassed the levees protecting the Yazoo 
basin, the water coursed southward through the Mississippi delta and 
reentered the Mississippi River near Vicksburg, eventually causing the 
levees on the Louisiana side of the river to break as the fl oodwaters 
sought a natural outlet, as had been the case following the Mound Land-
ing crevasse in 1927. The fuseplug levee on the western bank assured, 
in a very certain way, where dispersion would take place; to abandon 
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it and replace it with levees would remove this uncertainty and render 
the entire stretch of the river between the Arkansas River and Old River 
vulnerable to levee crevasses and overfl ow at points nearly impossible 
to predict. Furthermore, confi nement meant higher fl ood elevations in 
the Yazoo backwater area. Appreciably sympathetic to the plight of 
their neighbors on the west side of the river, Mississippians exercised 
great care to not alienate them by reiterating their full support for just 
compensation, controlled spillways, a narrower fl oodway and, perhaps 
eventually, the incorporation of tributary reservoirs.164
For his part, Maj. Gen. Markham recognized the near impossibil-
ity of gaining a consensus between the two camps. While appearing 
before the House Flood Control Committee to answer questions on 
the proposed modifi cations, Markham remarked, “As you talk with 
Tom, Dick, or Harry, each has his own opinions and will stick to it very 
tenaciously.” Markham wanted to fi nd a more equitable solution to the 
fl oodway dilemma, but he was certain that dispersion, not confi nement, 
was the answer. The channel rectifi cation program was paying dividends 
in terms of increasing the carrying capacity of the main channel, yet he 
simply could not consent to any plan calling for the abandonment of a 
west bank fl oodway. He believed that the Eudora fl oodway concept was 
as reasonable and generous a solution as conceivably possible from both 
the engineering and economical view points, much more so in light of 
the provision for a controlled spillway at the head of the fl oodway.165
Ferguson’s testimony somewhat echoed that of Markham. He began 
by explaining that measurements taken during the recent high water 
event of 1935 showed a signifi cant increase in the ability of the main 
channel to carry more water at lower stages between Arkansas City 
and Vicksburg. He indicated, however, that the carrying capacity of the 
river did not reach the point where dispersion was no longer necessary. 
The channel rectifi cation program was designed to confi ne fl oodwaters 
and secure as rapid a discharge as possible, but would permit disper-
sion when absolutely necessary to prevent catastrophe. During a heated 
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exchange with committee member John L. McClellan, in which the 
Arkansas congressman prodded Ferguson with a salvo of questions 
as to whether or not the purpose of the Eudora fl oodway was to divert 
fl oodwaters to protect the Mississippi delta, the commission president 
fi red back, “It permits the diversion of waters where of necessity they 
must go.” He continued, “You have a physical situation that outranks 
the laws of Congress and all the opinions of engineers.”166
After nearly a year of political haggling, congressional delegations 
from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi fi nally brokered a compro-
mise. On June 15, 1936, Congress passed the Overton Act, which, along 
with other system-wide improvements, approved the elimination of the 
Boeuf fl oodway from the project upon the completion of the Eudora 
fl oodway. The Overton Act prohibited the construction of the guide 
levees for the new fl oodway until after the federal government acquired 
at least 75 percent of the required fl owage easements. The new law had 
solved the fl oodway dilemma – at least on the surface. By the end of 
1936, roughly 30 percent of the requisite number had been secured. As 
a new year dawned, the intended fuseplug levee for the Boeuf fl oodway 
remained at a height that stood lower than surrounding levees. No guide 
levees had been constructed. If a major fl ood developed and breached the 
fuseplug levee, there would be no way to confi ne the overfl ow, leaving a 
large portion of southeast Arkansas and northeast Louisiana vulnerable 
to uncontrolled fl ooding. Just such an event occurred in January 1937 
when a staggering amount of rain began falling over the Ohio Valley. 
It was the onset of the Great Flood of 1937.167
As the 1937 fl ood swept down the Ohio Valley, residents on the 
Boeuf and Tensas basins anxiously watched as the swollen river shat-
tered old stage records from Huntington, West Virginia, to Cairo. That 
anxiety turned to gripping fear after the Mississippi River Commission 
activated the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. As the fl ood crest 
rolled past the confl uence and down the Mississippi River, it estab-
lished new stage records at each passing gage – Hickman, New Madrid, 
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Tiptonville, Caruthersville, Osceola, Memphis, and Helena. News out-
lets predicted new records fl ows – as much as 25 percent greater than 
any fl ows experienced before. Rumors began to spread that the Boeuf 
fl oodway would overtop and fail, unleashing an unstoppable wall of 
water through the basin. Local landowners began patrolling the fuse-
plug levee and threatened armed resistance to any attempt to activate 
the fl oodway through artifi cial means.168
Fortunately, the dreaded predictions below Helena never material-
ized. Throughout the stretch of the river between the Arkansas River and 
Old River, Ferguson’s channel rectifi cation program had dramatically 
increased the carrying capacity of the river. Floodwaters did not seri-
ously challenge the fuseplug levee at the Boeuf fl oodway. The cutoffs 
and chute enlargement operations that had performed so admirably in 
lowering fl ood stages during the 1935 high-water season had more fully 
developed in the two years since that event. By 1937, Ferguson had also 
executed four additional cutoffs – Tarpley Neck and Ashbrook Neck in 
the Greenville Bends, Rodney Bend, and Sarah Island. These cutoffs 
brought the total number of artifi cial cutoffs to eleven. Along with the 
natural Yucatan cutoff, they shortened the river by 100 miles. The per-
formance of Ferguson’s program during the 1937 fl ood demonstrated 
the unmistakable signs of improvement, even with variances in the size 
and parameters of fl oods. During the 1929 fl ood, the Arkansas City gage 
had reached 58.7 feet when discharge was 1.78 million cfs. At that same 
discharge during the 1937 fl ood, the gage read 47.2 feet – a reduction 
of 11.5 feet. At 53.7 feet, the discharge was 1.4 million cfs in 1929 and 
2.1 million cfs in 1937, an increase in carrying capacity of more than 
700,000 cfs or nearly 50 percent. Just below the Greenville Bends, the 
peak discharge of the 1937 fl ood was 20 percent greater than that of 
the 1929 fl ood, but the peak crest was one foot lower. Vicksburg saw 
an increase in capacity of 317,000 cfs (18 percent greater than 1929) 
for a reduction in stages of 5.2 feet.169
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In the aftermath of the Great Flood of 1937, Maj. Gen. Markham, 
shaken by the experience of operating the Birds Point-New Madrid 
fl oodway, recommended an $82 million plan calling for thirteen res-
ervoirs in the Arkansas-White basin, in addition to the six reservoirs 
already authorized through the 1936 fl ood control act. His advocacy of 
the reservoir plan, which would reduce the fl ood discharge on the Mis-
sissippi River below Arkansas City by 200,000 cfs was tied to his desire 
to eventually eliminate or at least reduce the probability of operating 
the Boeuf/Eudora fl oodway. Ferguson, for his part, remained confi dent 
in the value of his program, but he would not commit to abandoning 
the fl oodway until that program had fully developed. Until it did, he 
warned that it was necessary to keep the fl oodway as an insurance policy 
to protect the integrity of the mainline levees.170
Ferguson executed one fi nal cutoff at Caulk Neck on May 13, 1937, 
before retiring two years later. In 1941, the Mississippi River Commis-
sion, while maintaining the Boeuf and Eudora fl oodway concepts were 
feasible and sound from an engineering standpoint, but impractical 
because of intense local opposition, conceded that it was possible to 
eliminate the Boeuf/Eudora fl oodway from the MR&T project. Citing 
the success of Ferguson’s program and the storage capacity of newly-
authorized reservoirs in the Arkansas-White basin, the commission 
suggested that if those improvements had been in place in 1928, more 
serious consideration would have been given to confi ning the project 
fl ood with higher levees below the Arkansas River. Through the 1941 
Flood Control Act, Congress eliminated the Boeuf and Eudora fl ood-
ways from the MR&T project. The law also mandated that the mainline 
levee on the east bank of the river south the Coahoma-Bolivar county 
line have a two-foot height superiority over the levees on the west bank. 
In other words, the law authorized the levee on the east bank to have 
three feet of freeboard above the project fl ood fl owline, but limited 
the west bank levee to only one foot of freeboard. Because the higher 
levees on both sides of the river would confi ne fl oodwaters and cause 
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higher fl ood stages in the Yazoo backwater area, the law authorized 
extensive improvements to alleviate backwater fl ooding in the lower 
Yazoo basin.171
Ferguson’s replacement as commission president, Brig. Gen. Max 
Tyler, carried out three additional cutoffs between the Arkansas River 
and Memphis at Jackson, Sunfl ower, and Hardin. By 1942, there were 
16 cutoffs in operation. These reduced the length of the Mississippi 
River between Memphis and Baton Rouge by 151.9 miles. Corrective 
dredging, chute enlargements, and other improvements — carried out 
in addition to the cutoffs — brought the total reduction in length to 
170 miles. The channel realignment program not only lowered fl ood 
stages, it also improved transportation costs. Prior to the cutoffs, the 
average time for a towboat and barges to travel from Baton Rouge to 
Helena took 125 hours. By 1938, with the cutoff program only 75 per-
cent complete, that same trip took an average of 105 hours – a savings 
of nearly one full day. In 1944, the commission reported, “The river 
now has the best alignment, the best navigation channel, and the great-
est fl ood-carrying capacity it has ever had.” The navigation industry 
and levee board engineers heartily agreed.172
The problems of maintaining the stage reductions achieved through 
channel realignment, protecting the integrity of the levee system from 
a meandering river, and providing an adequate channel for safe and 
reliable navigation were inseparable. To retain the stage reductions 
and to prevent the river from regaining its former length, the commis-
sion launched a massive channel stabilization program consisting of a 
large-scale bank revetment program, channel contraction works, and 
dredging. As Charles Senour, the chief engineer for the commission 
explained, the channel stabilization program “is the necessary sequel to 
the fl ood control and navigation improvements hitherto accomplished, 
which it is designed to supplement and protect.”173
From the beginning, Maj. Gen. Brown’s stated intent was to try 
to eliminate or reduce the proposed Boeuf fl oodway, which residents 
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opposed and whose cost had increased by millions of dollars because of 
court rulings that the Corps of Engineers had to pay for fl owage rights. 
Ferguson’s cutoff plan had cut across the grain of accepted engineering 
theory. Despite opposition from leading engineers, Brown had coura-
geously adopted it out of necessity to solve the problems in building 
the fl oodway. Yet it was Ferguson who earned near universal acclaim, 
not just for proposing and implementing cutoffs, but for continuing the 
program until he saw real results. “The remarkable feature of the Fergu-
son plan is its boldness,” Gerard Matthes wrote to a reporter in 1937. “A 
foot or two of stage lowering would have satisfi ed many engineers. Not 
so General Ferguson.” He did not quit until there was a stage reductions 
of 12 feet at Arkansas City and seven feet at Vicksburg. Later cutoffs 
implemented by Tyler improved the carrying-capacity of the river as far 
upstream as Memphis, where the commission estimated up to two feet 
of stage reduction had been achieved. The Ferguson plan thus not only 
affected a profound change in Mississippi River policy but a change 
in engineering practice as well. The only question that remained was 
whether the improvements in the river resulting from the cutoffs were 
sustainable through the channel stabilization program.174
As the 2011 fl ood crest slowly worked its way down the Missis-
sippi River, engineers from Memphis to Natchez asked themselves that 
same question. With no fl oodways to relieve the pressure on the levee 
system, the fl ood-carrying capacity of the channel would be the fi rst 
line of defense.
Chapter 4
The River 
Wants Out:
The 2011 Flood 
in the Heart of 
the MR&T Project
Is there that problem out there that you just don’t see? That’s 
what haunts a geotechnical engineer during fl oods. What is 
out there that I am missing? What is out there that I cannot 
see? Everything we fear is taking place under the surface of 
the levee. That’s what keeps us up at night.
Chuck Mendrop
Chief of Geotechnical Engineering
Vicksburg Engineer District
2011
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ON APRIL 22, SEVERAL STAFF MEMBERS FROM the Vicksburg Engineer District gathered in a conference room in the district head-quarters building to participate in the Lower Ohio-Mississippi 
River coordination teleconference. The teleconference represented a 
daily gathering of forecasters from the National Weather Service and 
Corps of Engineers water control managers. The main focus of the 
day’s teleconference centered on the Mississippi River and Ohio River 
fl ood crests building toward the Cairo gage. Although the major Missis-
sippi River gages in the Vicksburg district at Arkansas City, Greenville, 
Vicksburg, and Natchez remained anywhere from three to fi ve feet below 
fl ood stage, there was a strong hint of trouble in the air. The engineers 
present in the conference room had been alerted to the contingency 
forecast for the Cairo gage in excess of 61 feet issued the previous day 
by the National Weather Service, but they knew that it only represented 
a worst-case scenario. The offi cial forecast was nine feet lower. Still, 
the threat of additional rain over the Arkansas and Ohio valleys created 
an ominous feeling in the conference room. The water at Cairo would 
eventually work its way down the valley and combine with the added 
fl ows of the Arkansas and White rivers before coursing through the heart 
of the MR&T project in the Vicksburg Engineer District. The amount 
of water the district needed to accommodate depended on the amount 
and location of additional precipitation. Finally, the Lower Mississippi 
River Forecasting Center broke the news. Based on anticipated rainfall 
fi ve days into future, the National Weather Service anticipated a crest 
of 59 feet on the Greenville gage on May 11 and a crest of 53.5 feet on 
the Vicksburg gage on May 13.175
Everyone in the conference room was stunned – it was as if a major 
fl ood had just materialized out of nowhere. Amid the gasps and confu-
sion, Robert Simrall, the chief of water control at the Vicksburg district, 
glanced at Wayland Hill, the 35-year veteran river forecaster who had 
spent his entire career studying the dynamics of the river, and blew out a 
long whistle as he leaned back in his chair and placed his hands behind 
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his head. Fifty-three and a half feet! The number bounced around his 
mind as he tried to place the fi gure into context with the stages produced 
by previous major fl oods. That stage, if it materialized, would surpass 
the stages of the devastating fl oods of 1937 and 1973 – the two major 
benchmark fl oods of the MR&T era. That stage would be the highest 
stage and produce the greatest amount of pressure on the MR&T system 
since its establishment in 1928. A gage reading of 53.5 feet would reg-
ister as the second highest stage ever recorded, behind only the Great 
Flood of 1927. The other engineers in the room had similar thoughts. 
Collectively they snapped back to attention. The crest was still three 
weeks away. They still had time to prepare.176
The Weak Link
The forecast shocked Kent Parrish as well. As the district’s senior 
project manager for the Mississippi River levee system, his immediate 
concern was what he considered the weakest link in the entire system – 
the mainline levee at Buck Chute. The levee at Buck Chute, near Eagle 
Lake, Mississippi, represented a signifi cant threat to the safety of the 
lower Mississippi delta. The levee was a traditional problem area in 
terms of underseepage and sand boils, even during periods of low fl ood 
stages. If the levee failed, the delta would see fl ooding not experienced 
since 1927. The Vicksburg district addressed the problem by installing 
relief wells in 1999 and 2007. In early 2010, the Mississippi Levee 
Board identifi ed several sand boils – which had likely formed during 
the 2008 fl ood, but had gone undetected – about 2,000 feet upriver 
from the newly-installed improvements. During the 2010 high water 
season, the board detected several massive sinkholes at the toe of the 
levee. Upon closer inspection, the 10 to15-foot wide and six to eight-
foot deep holes turned out to be the result of sand boils. The fact that 
the boils fi rst appeared when the river was less than a foot above bank 
full alerted the levee board of the signifi cance of the problem. Peter 
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Nimrod, the chief engineer for the levee board, notifi ed the Vicksburg 
district and the Mississippi River Commission of the critical nature of 
the problem. Following the 2010 high water, the district took soil bor-
ings and performed cone penetrometer tests in the area to determine 
the ability of the soil to withstand pressure. Based on the fi ndings, the 
district designed plans to remediate the problem with a 1,500-foot long 
and 200-foot wide landside seepage berm to add extra weight and cross 
section to the levee with the intent of dissipating pressure on the levee 
during fl ood events. The design also included the installation of 25 relief 
wells. The district intended to fi nalize plans and specifi cations and to 
begin advertising the contract for construction in May 2011. They never 
got the chance. The fl ood of 2011 struck before they could take action.177
The early fl ood pulse in March 2011 forced the Mississippi Levee 
Board to take temporary measures. After consulting with geotechnical 
engineers from the Vicksburg district, the board fi lled the holes with 
sand and placed engineering fabric over the sand. The levee board also 
constructed a low earthen dike around the area, which was allowed to fi ll 
with seepwater, to counteract the pressure from the minor fl ood stages 
experienced. Upon hearing the updated forecast for the Vicksburg gage 
on April 22, Kent Parrish and other district offi cials knew that the criti-
cal situation at Buck Chute required immediate and aggressive action. 
The existing temporary remediation measures at Buck Chute did not 
stand a chance against the onslaught of pressure at a stage of 53.5 feet. 
Representatives from the district’s geotechnical, hydraulics, operations, 
and project management offi ces immediately analyzed various options 
to address the problem. In the meantime, Chuck Mendrop, the chief of 
geotechnical engineering at the Vicksburg district, and his staff devel-
oped an interim plan to construct a thick earthen berm over the levee 
board’s makeshift fi lter.
As the district team established a more detailed plan, Parrish imme-
diately called Jimmy Coldiron, a supervisory mechanical engineer from 
the district’s river operations branch, and notifi ed him of the dire nature 
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of the problem at Buck Chute. Coldiron dispatched his assistant, Bobby 
Stokes, to the site to coordinate with the district’s geotechnical engineers 
and to assess what resources and assets were needed to get the job done. 
Stokes immediately observed that the site was a mess. It was heavily 
wooded. A tornado the year before had toppled many of the trees, creat-
ing a tangled mess that needed to be cleared. Below the trees and logs 
stood one to two feet of seepwater impounded by the remnants of the 
levee board’s small water berm. The conditions on the ground did not 
particularly disturb Stokes – his guys could clear the area without any 
problems – but he needed clay to build the berm. The job necessitated 
a lot of it. The district crews could not just take the clay to build the 
dike from anywhere. Taking it from the landside of the levee was not 
an option. Doing so would threaten the integrity of the levee. Taking it 
from a nearby farm was not an option without compensating the land-
owner. Hauling the clay from a distant location would use up valuable 
time. The Mississippi Levee Board, though, had already identifi ed an 
A view of the Buck Chute area prior to clearing operations. Note the elevation marked on the tree.
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adequate borrow pit less than a mile from the site. But the borrow pit 
was on the river side of the levee. The good news was that the river was 
still fi ve feet below fl ood stage. The bad news was that the river was 
coming up fast and would engulf the borrow pit in a matter of days.178
Coldiron and Stokes immediately began securing the necessary 
resources. The equipment and personnel they needed were scattered 
throughout the district on various high-priority projects. Speaking of 
the operation at Buck Chute, Parrish told Coldiron, “This is the new top 
priority. Everything else can wait.” Within hours, Coldiron had lined 
up seven dozers, four trackhoes, a dozen dump trucks and excavators, 
and a bank of emergency lights for the nightshift operations. He also 
assembled two, twelve-man crews, pulling crew members from dredges, 
the mat-sinking unit, and other projects. By Saturday, April 23, the hired-
labor crew and equipment were at Buck Chute clearing debris from the 
area and racing against the river to relocate 20,000 cubic yards of fi ll 
from the riverside borrow pit. It was Easter weekend, but that was the 
farthest thing from their minds. They had a job to do. The safety of the 
lower Mississippi delta depended upon their success.179
By the morning of April 25, the Mississippi River on the Vicks-
burg gage reached 39.2 feet, still nearly four feet below fl ood stage, 
but it had climbed by more than a foot since April 22. Over the week-
end, the district’s multi-discipline team continued to analyze options 
to combat the Buck Chute problem. Coldiron’s hired-labor crew had 
already commenced constructing the dike around the entire two-acre 
area, but Mendrop’s geotechnical team was not overly confi dent that 
an earthen berm alone would provide enough of a safety factor. The 
geotechnical engineers determined that because the levee did not fail 
during the 2008 fl ood, a similar head differential – the difference in 
height between the water level on the outside of the levee and the land 
on the protected side of the levee – would suffi ciently prevent the 
underseepage from undermining the levee. With a predicted stage of 
53.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, that meant they needed to raise the 
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berm on the protected side of the levee to an elevation equal to 87 feet 
– an elevation approximately ten feet higher than the natural ground. 
Mendrop approached Ron Goldman’s hydraulic engineers and asked 
if it was possible to create a blanket of water over the earthen berm to 
provide extra weight. Goldman’s crew indicated it would be no prob-
lem. To make it a reality, Coldiron’s hired labor crew would continue 
constructing the earthen dike around the Buck Chute, fi ll the dike with 
a three-foot layer of sand, and cover the sand with a two-foot thick clay 
cap. In the meantime, the water control offi ce would open the gates 
at the Muddy Bayou control structure and allow Steele Bayou to back 
into and raise the elevation of Eagle Lake, which, in turn, would fl ood 
and blanket the earthen berm with several feet of water until it reached 
an elevation of 87 feet, perhaps even higher if conditions warranted.180
The plan faced a few obstacles. First, the job required sand for the 
core of the Buck Chute berm. The Vicksburg Engineer District had 
an available stockpile across the river in Delta, Louisiana, at a local 
mat casting fi eld. The sand, which was to be used to make articulated 
concrete mattress for bank revetment purposes, had been stockpiled on 
the riverside of the levee. The rising river would soon engulf the mat 
casting fi eld and the sand stockpile along with it. The district quickly 
awarded an emergency contract to remove and relocate the sand to Buck 
Chute. Within hours, dozens of trucks began hauling sand, day and 
night, from Delta and stockpiled it near the construction site at Buck 
Chute. To speed the hauling operation, Warren County Sheriff Martin 
Pace coordinated with law enforcement agencies in Louisiana to allow 
the trucks to bypass the weigh station on Interstate 20 in Louisiana.
Changing the fl ow of water at the Muddy Bayou control structure 
also represented an obstacle. The structure was built to prevent agri-
cultural runoff from Steele Bayou from entering Eagle Lake. During 
dry periods, the control structure prevented the lake from draining into 
Steele Bayou. Raising the elevation of Eagle Lake represented a rever-
sal in the intended purpose of the control structure. Any such reversal 
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required a deviation from the water control plan for the Muddy Bayou 
control structure. Maj. Gen. Walsh, the president of the Mississippi 
River Commission, would need to approve the deviation, and he would 
not grant it automatically, given the potential impacts to more than 
800 residents and their property along Eagle Lake. Those potential 
damages originally gave the district reason to pause, but the inunda-
tion maps depicting a levee failure at Buck Chute quickly wiped away 
the hesitation. According to the inundation map, a breach would cover 
nearly all of Issaquena and Sharkey counties with anywhere from fi ve 
to twenty feet of water. Higher elevated lands at Mayersville, Onward, 
Rolling Fork, and Cary might only see a few inches to fi ve feet of water, 
but the lower lying lands in the southern parts of the counties, as well 
as those in northern Warren County and western Yazoo County could 
possibly experience depths in excess of 20 feet. The devastation from 
a possible breach extended all the way into southern Washington and 
Humphreys counties. The potential damages were too great. The levee 
had to hold. The district team determined that the proposed plan was 
the appropriate safety measure to ensure the levee, in fact, held.181
As Coldiron’s crews continued constructing the dike, the district’s 
water control team began coordinating the deviation request for the 
Muddy Bayou water control plan with the watershed management team 
at the Mississippi Valley Division headquarters across town, as well 
as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Mississippi and Louisiana 
departments of wildlife, the Warren County Board of Supervisors, the 
Madison Parish president, and state and local entities. It took several 
days to get everything in order. Finally, on April 27, the district for-
mally sent the deviation request to Maj. Gen. Walsh. Charles Shadie, 
the chief of water management at the division offi ce, relayed Walsh’s 
desire for input from residents of Eagle Lake before approving the 
deviation. At the district offi ce, Goldman took this to mean that Walsh 
was not inclined to approve the deviation.
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The following day, Goldman, Mendrop, and Parrish accompanied 
Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, commander of the Vicksburg Engineer District, 
to meet with Walsh. Eckstein took command of the district in December 
2009, but this would be his fi rst major fl ood fi ght. Parrish had taken him 
to Buck Chute over Easter weekend to observe, fi rsthand, the criticality 
of the problem. The visit convinced Eckstein that the levee represented 
an imminent threat to the lower Mississippi delta. He was prepared to 
present his case to Walsh. At the meeting, Walsh asked pointed questions. 
The water control plan was established for a reason; deviating from the 
plan could leave the Corps of Engineers open to criticism. He wanted 
assurances that there were no other options available. As Walsh spoke, 
Goldman thought to himself, He is going to turn us down. Goldman 
understood that deviations should not be made lightly, but to him the 
Buck Chute dilemma represented an instance where a deviation was 
absolutely necessary. Eckstein and his staff provided pointed answers to 
Walsh’s direct questions. They informed the commission president that 
the levee at Buck Chute was the weakest link in the levee system. In 
their estimation, it would not withstand the pressure exerted by the river 
without the added counter pressure that the water berm would provide. 
If the levee failed, approximately 3,000 homes and 1,450 square-miles 
of land – nearly seven times the amount of land in the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway – faced inundation. They needed to act quickly. They 
had made a compelling case. Walsh concurred and signed the deviation 
approval letter before they left his offi ce.182
On the morning of April 28, the Mississippi River surged past 41 feet 
on the Vicksburg gage and completely engulfed the riverside borrow pit 
that Coldiron’s crew had been using to secure earth for the Buck Chute 
dike. The river had come up fast, but his crew loaded and hauled dirt 
24 hours a day as they raced the rising tide to get as much material out 
of the pit before the river overtook it. Nimrod, who stopped by to check 
on their progress, was amazed by their effort and dedication. These guys 
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are fearless, he thought to himself as he watched the loading opera-
tions with the river nipping at the margins of the pit. The crews had 
constructed an elevated, but narrow, access road constructed of timber 
mats so they could squeeze every possible yard of dirt from the pit. As 
the river climbed higher, the crew raised the road higher. Absolutely 
fearless! Having won the race against the river, Coldiron’s crew had no 
time to relax, though. Another race would soon commence. This time 
they would be racing against the rising water from Eagle Lake on the 
other side of the levee.183
The following day, Col. Eckstein and 
Peter Nimrod held a public meeting at 
Eagle Lake to explain the need and con-
sequences of raising the elevation of the 
lake. Approximately 500 people crammed 
into and around the Eagle Lake Fire Station. 
Most in attendance were not as concerned 
with raising the water level of Eagle Lake 
as they were with the potential failure of 
Hired-labor crews construct the earthen berm around Buck Chute, while continuing to clear the area.
Peter Nimrod and Jimmy Coldiron at 
Buck Chute.
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the Buck Chute levee. Rumors had run rampant through several local 
communities. The levee is going to fail! The Corps is doing everything it 
can, but failure is imminent! People were scared. They needed answers. 
Eckstein and Nimrod attempted to calm their fears. Eckstein explained 
the emergency action that the district and levee board had undertaken. 
“If we don’t do anything,” he explained, “we will have a 32-foot head 
differential” between the stage on the riverside of the levee and the 
natural ground. “We aren’t confi dent with that.” Eckstein explained 
that his geotechnical engineers wanted to raise the level of the lake 
to reduce that head differential to 19 feet “to take away the threat of 
imminent failure.” Still, he wanted everyone to know that the action 
did not alleviate all risk of failure. He urged the crowd to make prudent 
measures to protect their own lives and property.184
The hired-labor crew begins placing the clay cap over the sand fi ll as water from Eagle Lake climbs higher 
against the earthen berm.
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At 0700 hours on April 30, the Vicksburg district opened the gates 
at the Muddy Bayou control structure. Five days earlier on April 25, the 
district had closed the gates that allowed Steele Bayou to drain into the 
Yazoo River to prevent the Yazoo from backing into the bayou. With no 
outlet to allow the escape of interior drainage, Steele Bayou reached the 
elevation of 88.6 feet on April 30, but was expected to rise to 94 feet 
with additional normal rainfall. Opening the gates at Muddy Bayou 
allowed water from Steele Bayou to overfl ow into Eagle Lake until the 
two water levels reached equilibrium. To prevent the scour and erosion 
to lands on the Eagle Lake side of the control structure, the district only 
partially opened the gates. The slow release of water also served another 
purpose. It gave Coldiron’s crew time to complete the dike. The crew 
had completed the base, but it had yet to reach the fi nal height. None-
theless, it was of suffi cient height to allow the sand fi lling operation to 
begin. The dike, sand fi ll, and clay cap needed to be complete before 
the lake overfl owed and covered the area. The hydraulic engineers 
provided Coldiron with a sheet of paper depicting the anticipated lake 
elevation for each day of construction. They expected the lake to reach 
an elevation of 80 feet by May 2 and then rise roughly 1.5 feet per day 
thereafter until it reached its fi nal elevation around 87 feet. Coldiron’s 
crew fought to stay ahead of the rising lake. By the time the water from 
Eagle Lake reached the dike, it was about 75 percent complete, but the 
base was above the water line. They still had a dry working space to 
complete the operation. The weather continued to cooperate as well, at 
least in the lower Yazoo basin, where it had not rained since April 25. 
The same could not be said for the Arkansas and Ohio valleys to the 
north. Another round of heavy and persistent rains moved into that area 
on April 30 and lingered for several days, just as the fl ood crests from 
the upper Mississippi and Ohio rivers converged at the confl uence.185
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Yazoo Backwater Levee
On May 2, the major fl ood bearing down on the Vicksburg Engineer 
District was about to become worse. During the Lower-Ohio Mississippi 
River coordination teleconference that day, the National Weather Service 
formally delivered its revised forecast for the Cairo gage. “Sixty-three 
feet,” Robert Simrall said aloud in amazement. Henry Dulaney, the 
relatively new chief of engineering and construction at the Vicksburg 
district became alarmed by Simrall’s reaction. The obscure number on 
a distant gage did not register with Dulaney – who had a background 
in design and technical services – as it had with Simrall and the other 
members of the water control team present. He looked at Simrall and 
asked, “What does 63 mean?” Simrall replied, “It means our whole 
world is fi xing to change!”186
As the teleconference continued, the magnitude of the fl ood in the 
midsection of the MR&T project began to crystallize. The heavy rains 
had not only worsened fl ood conditions at the confl uence of the Mis-
sissippi and Ohio rivers, but they also wreaked additional havoc in the 
already swollen Arkansas and White basins. Three of the fi ve major 
reservoirs comprising the White river system – Beaver, Table Rock, 
and Norfolk lakes – went to emergency spillway operations. The two 
other major reservoirs – Greer’s Ferry Lake and Bull Shoals Lake –did 
not require spillway discharges, but experienced extremely high pool 
elevations, nonetheless. The Arkansas River also experienced signifi cant 
fl ooding. The rain fell where the eleven major fl ood control reservoirs 
in the Arkansas system could not be of use, but the Southwest Division 
deviated from its water control plans and reduced discharges from the 
dams to reduce fl ows downstream. By May 6, water control managers 
from the Southwest Division anticipated the combined fl ows entering 
the Mississippi River from the Arkansas and White rivers to approach 
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500,000 cfs, just days before the crest rolling down the Mississippi River 
arrived. All of this translated into a stunning forecast for the major gages 
in the Vicksburg Engineer District: Arkansas City 53.5 feet, Greenville 
64.5 feet, Vicksburg 57.5 feet, and Natchez 64 feet – a range of 14.5 feet 
to 16.5 feet above fl ood stage on each gage.187
While the mainline levees in the system stood high enough to hold 
back the river without overtopping – with the exception of signifi cant 
low spots spanning nearly 3,000 feet near Vidalia, Louisiana – the levees 
would soon be facing a level of pressure never before experienced. At 
Greenville, the predicted crest stage would fall about one foot shy of 
the record stage reached in 1927, but it would break the 1973 stage 
by more than six feet. At Vicksburg, the new forecasted stage would 
top them all – more than one foot higher than 1927, more than four 
feet higher than 1937, and more than six feet higher than 1973. The 
thought of a fl ood six feet greater than 1973 fl ood stages at Greenville 
Flooding in the Yazoo backwater area during the 1973 flood.
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and Vicksburg sent a shiver of fear through most of the people living 
in the Mississippi delta. Those people could not relate to the fl oods of 
1927 and 1937 because the events had taken place 84 years and 74 years 
ago, respectively. The same could not be said of the 1973 fl ood. The 
majority of delta residents 40 years of age or older vividly recalled 
the devastation of that fl ood, when nearly one million square-miles of 
land were inundated in the Yazoo basin alone. While areas in Arkan-
sas and Louisiana, particularly those in the Ouachita basin, suffered 
extreme hardships during the 1973 fl ood, approximately 45 percent of 
the land fl ooded during the event was in Mississippi. The Yazoo basin, 
particularly the area known as the Yazoo backwater area, served as the 
epicenter of devastation in Mississippi.188
Backwater areas are the necessary result of gaps left in the Missis-
sippi River levee system at the mouths of major tributaries that empty 
into the river. Prior to the construction of the levee system, the backwater 
areas were no different than most lands comprising the alluvial valley. 
They fl ooded when the Mississippi River overfl owed its natural alluvial 
banks or backed into the tributary streams. As the levee system gradu-
ally extended upriver, the confi nement of Mississippi River fl oodwaters 
protected lands upriver from the backwater areas from overbank fl ows, 
but fl oods continued to back up through the gaps and around the lower 
end of the levees, inundating the low-lying areas behind the levees. As 
originally authorized in 1928, the MR&T project did not contemplate 
protection of the major backwater areas in the lower Mississippi valley 
at the mouths of the St. Francis, White, Yazoo, and Red rivers. Histori-
cally, the Mississippi River Commission recognized the importance of 
maintaining the natural storage capacities of the backwater areas as a 
benefi t for fl ood control. The low-lying lands stored vast quantities of 
fl oodwaters, thereby lowering fl ood stages on the river by reducing the 
peak fl ows downstream of the backwater areas. After the initial success 
of Maj. Gen. Harley Ferguson’s channel realignment and rectifi cation 
program carried out in the 1930s, which improved the ability of the 
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river to carry more water at lower stages, calls for improving conditions 
in the backwater areas gained momentum. The call was particularly 
strong in the Yazoo basin, where several reservoirs and other improve-
ments had been authorized through the 1936 Overton Act to provide 
protection from headwater fl oods emanating from the hill country in the 
upper part of the basin. All that remained for the basin to maximize the 
benefi ts achieved through the enhanced mainline levees, the improved 
carrying capacity of the Mississippi River channel, and the protection 
from headwater fl ooding was protection from backwater fl ooding at 
the lower end of the basin.
While maintaining the position that the backwater area could never 
be fully redeemed from fl ooding, the Mississippi River Commission 
eventually conceded that the Yazoo basin could receive substantial pro-
tection from fl oods, provided the improvements did not hamper the natu-
ral reservoir effect the area provided during larger fl oods approaching 
project design fl ood elevations. The 1941 Flood Control Act authorized 
a plan developed by the Mississippi River Commission to provide for a 
level protection – corresponding to a height of 56.5 feet on the Vicksburg 
gage – for roughly 634,000 acres in the Yazoo backwater. The commis-
sion’s plan involved the construction of a backwater levee extending 
from the existing Mississippi River mainline levee along the west bank 
of the Yazoo River to Yazoo City, where the levee would connect with 
the levee authorized under the 1936 Overton Act to control headwater 
fl oods. Recognizing that the backwater levee would impound runoff 
from the tributaries that traversed the backwater area and emptied into 
the Yazoo River, the commission recommended constructing a drainage 
structure at the Little Sunfl ower River and a combination of structures 
and pumping plants at the mouths of the Big Sunfl ower River, Deer 
Creek, and Steele Bayou to evacuate impounded water. When stages 
on the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers were too high to allow for grav-
ity drainage, the plan made provisions for pumping stations at three 
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 locations with a total discharge capacity of 14,000 cfs – Big Sunfl ower 
River (11,000 cfs), Deer Creek (700 cfs) and Steele Bayou (2,300 cfs).189
Following a comprehensive review of the MR&T project in 1959, 
the Mississippi River Commission recommended changes to the plan 
after noting that channel improvements in the Mississippi River and 
reservoirs and associated works in the upper basin had reduced the fre-
quency and duration of fl ooding in the backwater area. The plan called 
for replacing the previously-authorized pumping stations at the Big 
Sunfl ower River, Deer Creek, and Steele Bayou with improved grav-
ity drainage structures and a 20-mile long and 200-foot wide channel 
connecting the Sunfl ower River and Steel Bayou ponding areas to the 
outlets at the Little Sunfl ower and Steele Bayou fl oodgates. The 1965 
Flood Control Act authorized the proposed modifi cations and construc-
tion of the project quickened. In 1969 the Steele Bayou drainage struc-
ture, designed to discharge 19,000 cfs from the ponding area into the 
Yazoo River, was completed. In 1975, the drainage structure at Little 
Sunfl ower River capable of discharging 8,000 cfs was completed.190
In between the dates of completion for the two drainage structures, 
the 1973 fl ood struck the lower Mississippi Valley. The backwater levee 
had yet to be constructed, leaving the lower end of the Yazoo basin 
exposed. In early April 1973, the swollen Yazoo River overtopped a 
natural ridge along Deer Creek and began fi lling the Steele Bayou 
ponding area. A week later, the river and backwater levels equalized 
at an elevation of 99 feet, creating a lake 60 miles long and 40 miles 
wide. But the water levels continued to rise, cresting another two and 
a half feet higher on May 15. The backwater continued to creep farther 
north into the Yazoo basin until more than 1,000 square miles lay under 
water. It took several more weeks for the water to drain out. Thousands 
of people, many of them farmers, returned to fi nd their homes and 
property destroyed.191
The May 2, 2011, forecast of 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage cer-
tainly caught the attention of the district’s water control engineers. Most 
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engineering analyses and model tests dating back to the 1950s indicated 
that the Yazoo backwater levee would overtop as designed when the 
Mississippi River approached a range of 56.2 to 56.6 feet on the Vicks-
burg gage. The information on channel conditions used in development 
of the studies, though, was several decades old. The 2008 fl ood afforded 
the Vicksburg Engineer District the opportunity to gather fresh informa-
tion. The river reached 57.3 feet on the Greenville gage and 51 feet on 
the Vicksburg gage in 2008. Both stages were less than one foot lower 
than stages experienced on both gages during the 1973 fl ood. Ronald 
Goldman, the district’s chief of hydraulic engineering, used the fl ood 
as an opportunity to gain more knowledge of the river. As the peak fl ow 
moved downstream through the district, contract crews in a survey boat 
measured the depth of the centerline of the channel, while additional 
crew members at the exact latitude on the levees on both sides of the 
river plotted the exact high water mark. They repeated the process every 
half mile. Hydraulic engineers used the data to develop a modern or 
updated profi le of the river in terms of its slope and the relationship 
between stage and discharge. From this profi le, the Vicksburg district 
developed a new baseline to more accurately determine how the river 
would respond under existing channel conditions. The 2008 profi le con-
fi rmed what previous studies had shown – the Yazoo backwater levee 
would overtop when the river reached 56.3 feet on the Vicksburg gage. 
With an anticipated crest stage of 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, the 
backwater levee would overtop by more than one foot.192
At the Mississippi Levee Board offi ce, Peter Nimrod could not 
believe what his ears were hearing. “What? No way!” Kent Parrish 
had called to inform him that the Vicksburg district’s hydraulic engi-
neers expected the 28-mile backwater levee to overtop by more than a 
foot for at least ten days. The overtopping itself did not concern him. 
It would certainly create some hardship in the lower Yazoo basin, but 
he believed that the levee board could manage the additional water. 
Nonetheless, he would press the Vicksburg district to fl ood fi ght at the 
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backwater levee; to raise the levee with sandbags and HESCO bas-
tions – large containers fi lled with sand. No, the overtopping was not 
Nimrod’s main concern. The prospect of losing the backwater levee 
entirely, though, terrifi ed him.
Ten days! Nimrod thought to himself. Ten days! The hydraulic engi-
neers at the Vicksburg district expected more than a foot of water to fl ow 
over the top of the 28-mile long backwater levee for ten days. It was 
disconcerting enough for him to know that the water on the river side 
of the levee would be approximately 17 feet higher than the ground on 
the landside. The highest differential the levee had ever experienced in 
the past was a little more than nine feet in 2008. The immense pressure 
on the levee from the head differential alone was extremely worrisome, 
but the added powerful and constant force of more than a foot of water 
eroding the crown, the landside slope, and the toe of the levee for ten 
consecutive days frightened Nimrod. The backwater levee was a fi ne 
and well-constructed levee, but under those conditions, ten days rep-
resented a lifetime. Nimrod started doing the calculations in head. If 
the levee failed, the south Mississippi delta faced a catastrophe. Water 
levels in the backwater area would be six feet higher than those expe-
rienced during the 1973 fl ood. Rolling Fork and Mayersville, both of 
which stayed high and dry during the 1973 fl ood, would be inundated. 
Nimrod pictured a map of the backwater levee in his mind. Twenty 
eight miles of levee overtopping for ten days! The levee had to hold.193
On May 3, Goldman, Simrall, and Wayland Hill began poring over 
profi les and data in more detail. Residents in the backwater area were 
about to catch their fi rst break. The 2008 profi le that Goldman had com-
missioned showed a steeper slope in the Yazoo River than originally 
thought – as much as a half a foot steeper. Using information collected 
during the 2008 fl ood, the district’s hydraulic engineers determined 
that if the river reached 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, the backwa-
ter levee would only overtop along a four-mile stretch extending from 
the junction of the Mississippi River mainline levee and the Yazoo 
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backwater levee up to the vicinity of the Steele Bayou control structure. 
Attempting to prevent a breach along 28 miles of levee in a short period 
of time seemed nearly impossible; doing the same along a four-mile 
segment was doable. Armed with this information, the district team 
decided to examine the impacts that temporarily raising the backwater 
levee would have on the Mississippi River levees. Nimrod was ecstatic 
upon hearing the news.194
At Buck Chute, Coldiron’s crew continued to push toward complet-
ing the emergency berm. By May 3, the three-foot sand layer inside the 
dike was complete and the process of capping it with a two-foot layer 
of clay had commenced, with an estimated completion date of May 7. 
All that remained was for Eagle Lake to rise to the prescribed height. 
The four-foot increase in the Mississippi River forecast meant that the 
water berm needed to go higher than an elevation of 87 feet, but Robert 
Simrall, who prepared the deviation request, wisely incorporated some 
leeway for the district to maneuver in the event that the forecast crest 
increased. While the original plan called for providing an elevation 
of 87 feet, Simrall worded the request to allow for raising Eagle Lake 
The clay cap nears completion at Buck Chute as water from Eagle Lake continues to rise.
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up to an elevation of 90 feet. The geotechnical engineers confi rmed 
that the elevation of 90 feet provided enough of a safety factor. There 
would be no need to secure an additional deviation request unless the 
National Weather Service raised the forecast. The concern at Buck Chute, 
in terms of completing the emergency measures to protect the levee, 
was getting enough water on top of the earthen berm. When the plan 
was originally conceived over Easter weekend and the gates closed 
on April 25, Steele Bayou stood at 87 feet. Water control managers 
expected the bayou to reach an elevation of 94 feet with normal rainfall, 
but Steele Bayou remained stable at 89.9 feet. The only way to raise 
the elevation of Eagle Lake was for additional precipitation to fall and 
drain into Steele Bayou. In another example of the unique nature of the 
2011 fl ood, the Vicksburg district and local levee boards were fi ghting 
a fl ood in the middle of a drought – the deluge they prepared for had 
emanated primarily from above the confl uence of the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers. It had not rained in the Yazoo basin since April 25, other 
than trace amounts. It would not rain again until after the gates were 
reopened on June 18 – a period of 55 days.195
During the morning commander’s briefi ng on May 4, Col. Eckstein 
informed Maj. Gen. Walsh that Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 
was gearing up a task force to assist in the fl ood fi ght. Eckstein knew 
that the state and the Mississippi Levee Board were prepared to formally 
ask the district to raise the backwater levee or armor the backside slope 
along the four-mile stretch from Steele Bayou to the mainline levee on 
the Mississippi River. Walsh stiffened in his chair as he heard Eckstein’s 
report, wincing at the thought of a fl ood fi ght at the backwater area. 
Walsh recognized the severity of the problem at the backwater levee, 
but he faced a tough dilemma. The Yazoo backwater area was meant 
to overtop to relieve pressure on the system. Only 34 hours earlier, he 
had directed the operation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway 
to protect the integrity of the system in the confl uence area, despite 
intense political and local pressure to fl ood fi ght along the fuseplug levee 
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instead. Now he was being asked to fl ood fi ght. His initial thought was 
that he simply could not approve the request. Walsh still remained on 
the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI in the confl uence area while overseeing 
the operation of the lower infl ow/outfl ow crevasses at the fl oodway. He 
had been there since May 1, so he did not have a good feel for system 
conditions in the Vicksburg region. He wanted more information. “We 
didn’t fl ood fi ght at Birds Point,” Walsh told Eckstein, “so we need to 
study the impacts of fl ood fi ghting on the system.” He asked Eckstein 
to talk to him offl ine after the briefi ng.196
At 0945 hours, Eckstein called Walsh as instructed. The engineering 
and operations staffs from the commission and the district were on the 
line as well to discuss the possibility of fl ood fi ghting. Confusion over 
the authorized height of the backwater levee ensued. The l941 Flood 
Control Act that authorized improvements in the Yazoo backwater area 
required the Mississippi Levee Board to provide assurances that it would 
not raise the backwater levee above limitations established by the Chief 
of Engineers. The Chief of Engineers, at the recommendation of the 
Mississippi River Commission, established the limitation at a height 
equivalent to 56.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage (elevation 107) as long 
as the backwater levee improvements did not confi ne fl oodwaters and 
push river levels to within fi ve feet from the top of the mainline Missis-
sippi River levees. The confusion over the issue came from subsequent 
authorizations stemming from the 1973 levee enlargements. The enlarge-
ment of the mainline levees authorized the enlargement of the Yazoo 
backwater levee by almost six feet. Some engineers from the district 
believed this justifi ed temporarily raising the backwater levee during the 
fl ood. Others argued that raising the backwater levee was contingent on 
the completion of the mainline levees and other improvements, which 
had yet to be fully constructed. To make matters worse, sections of the 
backwater levee were defi cient – a foot lower than authorized. Those 
areas needed to be raised to prevent premature overtopping.
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Walsh digested the information presented to him. There were still too 
many unknowns. He was concerned that the district staff in Vicksburg 
might be caving to pressure from friends and associates back home. 
The backwater area essentially represented the district’s back yard. He 
asked Eckstein to prepare and deliver a decision briefi ng later in the 
evening. “There will be pressure to the contrary,” Walsh told Eckstein, 
“but we need to operate as a system. The integrity of the mainline levee 
is of paramount importance.”197
Eckstein’s engineers quickly determined that they were not autho-
rized to fl ood fi ght along the backwater levee, even though protecting 
the levee from overtopping would raise fl ood heights along the mainline 
levees by only a fraction of an inch. They had to draw the line some-
where. Nimrod took the news generally well. The 2011 fl ood, thus far, 
had proved to be a battle of inches. He understood the situation – rais-
ing the backwater would place additional strain on the mainline levee 
system, particularly the low spot being raised with a HESCO bastion 
by the Fifth Louisiana Levee District near Vidalia. Nimrod, though, 
reminded the Vicksburg district that the backwater levee was designed 
to overtop, not fail. He pressed the district to authorize the armoring of 
the levee to prevent a breach if overtopping occurred. Nimrod also had 
a dilemma of his own. The anticipated fl ood crest was still two weeks 
away, but the levee board’s resources were already stretched to the limit. 
The board maintained 212 miles of levees, 37 miles of which were 
defi cient in height or section. Levee board crews were busily shoring 
up those areas. Crews were also preparing the levees for the ensuing 
fl ood fi ght by mowing the levees crowns, checking relief wells, and 
repainting station markers. Other crews were already ringing boils and 
sandbagging roads and infrastructure. Armoring the backwater levee, if 
approved, was beyond the board’s capability. He knew he needed the 
Vicksburg district’s help. That afternoon, he sent an offi cial request to 
Col. Eckstein asking the district to assume leadership of any fl ood fi ght 
or emergency actions on the backwater levee west of Highway 61.198
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As Eckstein’s staff continued to prepare the decision briefi ng to be 
given to Walsh later that night, Simrall and Parrish set out to provide 
desperately-needed information to residents of the lower Mississippi 
delta. Word of the forecast left those residents understandably shaken. 
The memories of the devastation caused by the 1973 fl ood remained 
fresh in their minds. Now, the National Weather Service predicted stages 
six feet higher than 1973. The Vicksburg district exacerbated the prob-
lem by informing people in Vicksburg that if they experienced fl ooding 
in 1973, they would be fl ooded again. The message was intended for 
unprotected areas south of the Yazoo River, not the Yazoo backwater 
area, because the backwater levee had been constructed after the 1973 
fl ood. Rumors began fl ying across the region. News of the forecast came 
on the heels of the nationally-televised Birds Point-New Madrid fl ood-
way operation. Genuine concern grew that the commission intended to 
blow the backwater levee to reduce pressure on the system.199
As their car got to within a mile of the meeting location at the 
National Guard Armory in Rolling Fork, Simrall and Parrish noticed 
cars lined up on both sides of the road for as far as they could see. More 
than 1,500 people waited for their arrival. As the two district employ-
ees pushed their way through the burgeoning crowd, Simrall thought 
The public meeting at Rolling Fork, Miss.
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to himself, they’re fi xing to hang us. He could feel the tension. As the 
meeting began, though, his fear quickly dissipated. The crowd was not 
angry; it was scared. No one pointed fi ngers. They simply wanted to 
know what was going to happen. Simrall and Parrish, along with Nimrod, 
spelled out the possibilities. They wanted the audience to clearly under-
stand the risks they faced. The district expected the backwater levee to 
overtop by as much as a foot of water for ten days, which would fl ood 
approximately 450 square miles. They also warned the audience that the 
levee might not survive the onslaught. If the torrent of water breached 
the levee, the water would engulf approximately 1,900 square miles 
– including Rolling Fork, Mayersville, and other towns not fl ooded in 
1973. To help prevent that scenario, the district was seeking approval to 
armor the landside slope of the levee. Much like the Buck Chute meet-
ing at Eagle Lake, they instructed their audience to prepare and make 
plans for evacuation. They also put to rest the rumor that the commis-
sion intended to blow the backwater levee.200
A similar situation played out at Yazoo City. City leaders planned 
on holding the meeting at the county courthouse, but the crowd quickly 
outgrew the capacity of the meeting space. They moved the meeting 
to the library. Again, the crowd grew beyond available space. Finally, 
they settled on the First Baptist Church, which could accommodate 
up to 700 people. It rapidly fi lled to near capacity. Simrall and Par-
rish found the Yazoo City crowd possessed a similar temperament as 
the Rolling Fork audience. Again, no one cast blame; they just des-
perately wanted to know more about what the two district employees 
thought would happen. But Simrall and Parrish could only posit the 
possibilities. The rest depended on the decision to be made that night 
by Maj. Gen Walsh.201
At 2100 hours on May 4, Walsh and the three civilian members of 
the commission – Sam Angel, R.D. James, and Clifford Smith – gath-
ered in the second fl oor conference room on the motor vessel MISSIS-
SIPPI to hear Eckstein’s brief on the Yazoo backwater area. Eckstein 
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delivered the briefi ng by telephone, but the slides he used projected 
onto a large screen that the commissioners could view from the con-
ference table. Eckstein explained the intent behind the backwater area 
and how its operation related to the Vicksburg gage. He showed two 
inundation maps, one depicting areas impacted by overtopping and 
the other depicting areas overfl owed with a levee failure. If the levee 
overtopped, approximately 286,000 acres faced inundation; if the levee 
failed the number grew to 1.2 million acres. Eckstein explained that 
more than 3,000 people would be impacted by a levee failure. He then 
went directly to the point of the briefi ng, “Sir, I request permission to 
raise low spots to elevation 107 and to armor the landside of the levee 
to protect against erosion.”202
Walsh only momentarily pondered the request before glancing 
around the room at Angel, James, and Smith, who all nodded their 
concurrence. “Recommendation approved,” Walsh replied.203
Eckstein’s engineers in Vicksburg had already begun researching 
the best way to armor the levee. They devised a plan to install a thick 
landfi ll liner over the landside slope of the levee. The liner, which was 
40 millimeters thick, had proven more durable than regular polyethyl-
ene plastic sheeting. Eckstein approved the plan. In the meantime, ten 
members from Coldiron’s crew moved from the Buck Chute operation 
to the Yazoo backwater levee to begin raising the low spots and fi ll-
ing cattle gaps on the backwater levee. They also began constructing a 
2,000-foot long makeshift HESCO bastion fl oodwall along the junction 
of the Mississippi river levee and the backwater levee to prevent any 
damage to the mainline levee.
The district offi ce soon encountered a problem. The supplier of the 
liner – GSE Lining Technology – could not install the product. To make 
matters worse, the liner came in rolls that needed to be overlapped. To 
be effective, the seams along the overlapped areas needed to be sealed 
with a special tool that acted as a large iron and melted or welded the 
two pieces together. The American Environmental Group (AEG), an 
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Ohio-based contractor, possessed the necessary equipment and expertise 
to install the liner and seal the seams, but it would be diffi cult to repo-
sition the necessary heavy equipment to move and lift the liner rolls to 
the backwater levee in a short amount of time. A local contractor would 
need to provide the equipment and infrastructure. Fordice Construction 
– a Vicksburg-based contractor – secured the contract. Dan Fordice, the 
company’s vice president, told Henry Dulaney, the district’s engineering 
and construction chief, that “My grandfather fought the ’37 fl ood and 
my dad fought the ’73 fl ood. This one is ours to deal with.” The fl ood 
fi ght, as with most fl ood fi ghts, was personal.204
Armoring the backwater levee necessitated several moving parts 
working together as a team. Each contractor had to know his or her par-
ticular part of the mission and work with the other contractors to accom-
plish the critical task. On May 7, GSE Lining Technology delivered the 
Armoring the Yazoo backwater levee.
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liner to the site. Fordice Construction dug a one-foot wide and two-foot 
deep trench along the landside crown of the levee. With AEG provid-
ing technical guidance on the installation process, Fordice positioned 
the liner rolls above the trench. Crews then moved down the landside 
slope of the levee and unrolled the liner until they reached and covered 
the toe of the levee.
 Next, the liner was pinned into place at the crown of the levee 
before the trench was backfi lled with dirt and gravel. At that point, 
AEG began welding the seams together. The contractors repeated the 
process until the landside slope of the four-mile levee segment was cov-
ered. By May 11 – four days after the operation began – the contractors 
completed the armoring process just as the river approached 54 feet on 
the Vicksburg gage. Everyone in the lower delta simply watched and 
waited as the river continued its rapid ascent.205
Water from Eagle Lake creates a water berm over the earthen berm at Buck Chute. Note the outline of the 
earthen berm under the water.
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The Pig in the Python
As water levels at Eagle Lake continued to cover the clay-capped 
berm at Buck Chute and the armoring of the Yazoo backwater levee 
raced toward completion, the Mississippi River, on May 8, topped 
60 feet on the Greenville gage for the fi rst time since the 1927 fl ood. 
The following day the river surged past 52 feet on the Vicksburg gage – 
the highest gage reading since the 1927 fl ood. Both stages represented 
the highest the river had ever climbed against the MR&T levee system 
– and the crest was more than a week away. Mississippi Governor Haley 
Barbour, as only he could, described the rapidly-swelling fl ood pulse 
bulging through the system as a pig moving through a python.206 As the 
river crept higher, pressure on the system mounted.
To the north in the Memphis Engineer District, Col. Vernie Reichling 
reported on May 9 that the river crested on the Memphis gage nearly 
one foot shy of the 1937 record, despite a discharge that exceeded the 
previous record fl ow by nine percent – a shade more than 200,000 cfs. 
In the St. Francis Levee District of Arkansas, Robert Rash, the captivat-
ing chief engineer of the levee district, possessed a cocksure attitude, 
despite the immense pressure on the system. The 160 miles of mainline 
levees in the St. Francis levee district, equipped with hundreds of relief 
wells, seepage berms, slope fl attening, and fl yash injections, represented 
arguably the fi nest in the MR&T system. At the fl ood crest, his levees 
maintained up to ten feet of freeboard above the swollen river. When 
a local offi cial approached him about concerns that the district was not 
properly protected, Rash replied, “I don’t care if you’re comfortable 
or not. I’m telling you, this is what we do. The levees won’t breach!” 
To Rash, the 2011 fl ood defi ned the improved state of the levee system. 
When Rash was fi rst hired by the levee district in 2001, Tommy Pat-
terson, a fi fty-year employee with the levee district, took him to Blue 
Lake, Arkansas. When they arrived, Patterson used his foot to draw a 
circle in the dirt. He told Rash, “This is the fi rst place we see seepage 
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in our district when the river reaches 34 feet on the Memphis gage.” 
Rash doubted the information, but the following year underseepage 
occurred at that exact spot when the Memphis gage reached 33.8 feet 
– Patterson’s assessment had been right on target. After the 2002 high 
water, the Memphis Engineer District installed 88 relief wells at Blue 
Lake. During the 2011 fl ood, the levee did not experience underseep-
age until the Memphis gage reached 44 feet. The relief wells and other 
levee improvements provided the St. Francis levee district with a ten-
foot head start in its fl ood fi ght effort.207
On the east bank of the river, where the Memphis district’s juris-
diction extended to the approximate latitude of Clarksdale, Mississippi, 
the levees remained under intense stress from the pressure exerted by 
the high stages. By May 11, the crest, for all intents and purposes, had 
passed through Reichling’s area of operations, but he expected the river 
to remain at dangerously-high stages for a week or more before slowly 
and steadily dropping off. The most pressing problem was near Rena 
Lara, Mississippi, where Kelly Greenwood and the Yazoo-Mississippi 
Levee Board combated underseepage and multiple sand boils with a 
large water berm.208
The mainline levees in the Vicksburg Engineer District in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi had been plagued by underseepage of vary-
ing degrees for days. The Vicksburg district used aircraft with forward 
looking infrared technology to identify colder river water fl owing from 
sand boils, which gave fl ood fi ghters an early warning and adequate time 
to address the problems. In Arkansas, the Southeast Arkansas Levee 
District and the state assembled what amounted to a well-equipped, 
small army to combat the fl ood. Flood fi ght teams consisting of National 
Guard soldiers, inmate laborers, hired laborers, and levee district mem-
bers worked around the clock to address sand boils at historically active 
areas near Rohwer, Dewey, Leland Chute, Otter Bayou, and Willow 
Lake with sandbag rings or water berms. The most serious trouble spot 
in Arkansas was at Lake Chicot. As Early as May 2, Eric Woerner, the 
195
Chapter Four – The River Wants Out
district’s deputy sector commander in southeast Arkansas, reported 
ten large boils and numerous smaller boils – called pin boils – near the 
Greenville bridge, approximately 500 feet from the toe of the levee. 
The area had not been considered a traditional seepage problem area, 
but the extent of sediment deposits – several hundred cubic yards of 
material – discovered by levee inspectors indicated that the sand boils 
had formed during previous high water events without being detected. 
With that being the case, the levee was already in a weakened state prior 
to the fl ood. Crews tried to ring the individual boils, but – much like 
the Darian Chasteen’s heroic effort at Fulton County – they could not 
keep pace with the development of new boils. The weakened state of 
the levee and the rapidly growing number of developing boils neces-
sitated the construction of a water berm.209
To the south, the Fifth Louisiana Levee District also worked around 
the clock to protect the integrity of the 260 miles of Mississippi River 
levees under its jurisdiction. As early as April 25, the Vicksburg district 
held a coordination call with Reynold Minsky, the levee district presi-
dent, and James Shivers, the superintendant, to make certain they under-
stood the scope and magnitude of the fl ood coursing through the system 
and to ensure they had the necessary resources to combat it. Minsky, 
White sand boil rings near the toe of the levee at the Greenville bridge in Arkansas.
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The river climbs high against the levee and towers above the protected town of Greenville, Miss.
The river encroaches upon the gravel road at the crown of the armored Yazoo backwater levee. Note the 
trapped interior drainage to the right of the levee.
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Shivers, and the levee district, though, were already prepared. Corps of 
Engineers offi cials considered them experienced, master fl ood fi ghters 
for a reason. Because of the small tax base in their district, Minsky and 
Shivers were accustomed to doing more with less. The Fifth Louisiana 
Levee District had highly-detailed and closely-coordinated standing 
orders for their fl ood fi ght teams to follow during fl ood events to get 
out ahead of the problems and treat them in advance. They knew the hot 
spots and they knew how to address them. Having fought a signifi cant 
fl ood only three years prior also helped. During the 2008 fl ood fi ght, the 
levee district utilized nearly 300,000 sandbags to construct rings and 
berms at many traditional problem areas – Henderson, Ice Box Hole, 
Milliken Bend, Mound, Davis Landing, Lake Bruin, Kemp Bend, and 
Lake St. John. Many of those sandbags remained in place. The various 
berms and rings needed to be repaired and solidifi ed, but the levee dis-
trict already had a head start. That head start and the advanced forecast 
Arkansas City, Ark., during the 2011 flood.
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from the National Weather Service were all that Minsky, Shivers, and 
their boys needed. In many cases, Corps of Engineers levee inspectors, 
who responded to reports of sand boils, arrived to fi nd the boils already 
ringed and stabilized. The Fifth Louisiana Levee District was ready 
and confi dent. A week before the crest, Minsky told Maj. Gen. Walsh, 
“We’re in good shape, General. We can pass this fl ood.”210
On the Mississippi side of the river, the fl ood fi ght took on a little 
different fl avor. The 2008 fl ood had highlighted numerous trouble spots 
in Arkansas and Louisiana. The levee districts in those states used that 
experience to their advantage in preparing for the 2011 fl ood upon them. 
The Mississippi Levee Board did as well, particularly at Buck Chute, 
but the 2008 fl ood had not highlighted as many problem areas as it had 
across the river. This was a refl ection of the fi ne condition of the levees 
managed by the Mississippi Levee Board, which had begun an exten-
sive levee enlargement and relief well program during the 1990s. The 
2011 fl ood, though, was a much larger fl ood. The pressure exerted by 
the river surged past the 2008 thresholds, causing new problem areas 
to rise to the forefront.211
By early May, with the river reaching stages not experienced since 
1927, potential problem areas exploded into existence throughout the 
Mississippi delta. The Mississippi Levee Board preferred close con-
sultation with the Vicksburg district fl ood fi ghters before taking action. 
Bradley Martin, an experienced geotechnical engineer from the Vicks-
burg district, spent a few days in the Greenville area at Peter Nimrod’s 
request inspecting boils and other potential trouble areas. By late after-
noon on May 9, he had not discovered anything out of the ordinary. 
Nimrod asked Martin to accompany Bobby Thompson, the levee board’s 
assistant engineer, to check on one last reported boil near Francis, Mis-
sissippi. The area, located at the northern end of Bolivar County, just 
upriver from the mouth of the Arkansas River, traditionally experienced 
signifi cant underseepage during fl ood events, but the inspectors noted 
at least one particularly massive boil. Martin agreed to survey the area. 
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At 1730 hours, he phoned Nimrod, “We’ve got a serious problem!” 
Martin had never seen a sand boil this large before, and it was located 
at the toe of the levee berm. It was a high-energy boil. Water gushed 
powerfully through the basketball-sized throat, spewing sediment that 
had eroded from beneath the surface. “We can’t leave this until morn-
ing,” he warned Nimrod. It would not take long for the sand boil, if left 
unchecked, to possibly undermine the levee.212
Nimrod arrived about an hour later and quickly surveyed the area. 
Underseepage had completely saturated the ground. As he traversed the 
site, Nimrod felt like he was walking across a waterbed. He had never 
before witnessed such complete and thorough saturation. He grabbed a 
nearby willow tree with both hands and shook it forcefully. The water-
logged earth rolled back and forth in rhythm with every push and tug. 
Martin and the levee board crew immediately began building a small, 
fi ve-foot high, C-shaped sandbag berm around the boil, with each end 
of the berm tying into the toe of the levee. After several hours of back-
breaking work, they fi nally gained control of the boil – at least so they 
thought. At approximately 2200 hours, as the ring fi lled with seepwa-
ter, a second boil suddenly developed a few feet from the original boil. 
The second boil undermined the berm, causing it to collapse. Martin, 
Nimrod, Thompson and the crew were back at square one; only now 
they had two large boils to contend with.
Nimrod and Martin conferred. They agreed that sandbagging alone 
would not remedy the problem. Additional measures were needed. As 
the crew immediately began constructing an extension to the sand-
bag berm to envelop both boils, Martin called Chuck Mendrop and 
informed him that a sandbag berm would not be able to produce enough 
 counter-pressure to completely check the boil. Martin recommended that 
Mendrop send a hired-labor crew to construct a 75-foot wide, 200-foot 
long dike around the massive boil – and several smaller boils that had 
since developed – to serve as a water berm. In the meantime, Nimrod 
knew the crew needed assistance, so he contacted Mack Grimmett, the 
200
Divine Providence
A sand boil spews sediment-laden waters at Francis, Miss.
From left to right: Robert Thompson, Chuck Mendrop, and Lanny Barfi eld discuss the flood fi ght at 
Francis, Miss.
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Bolivar County Sheriff. Grimmett secured volunteer inmate laborers 
from the Mississippi Department of Corrections to assist the opera-
tion. With the added manpower, the crew completed the extension by 
0530 hours the next morning. The fl ood fi ghters rested on the levee and 
anxiously watched the water levels rise inside the berm. The rate of 
sediment transport was beginning to decelerate. All of a sudden, they 
heard another abrupt “whoosh.” A section of the berm had collapsed 
again. The berm was too high. It did not withstand the weight of the 
water. They needed to build the berm wider to provide additional sta-
bility. They were back at square one again.
The weary fl ood fi ghters laid on the levee, trying to harness enough 
energy to tackle the boil for a third time. They were exhausted – both 
physically and mentally. Throughout the night and early morning hours, 
they had fi lled, carried, and stacked sandbags. The hired-labor crew 
would arrive soon. The fl ood fi ght team desperately needed the break. 
As they rested on the levee, they engaged in small talk. Thompson puffed 
on a cigarette and stated nonchalantly, “We really need some giant super 
sacks” or sandbags to plug the gap in the berm. Martin sat up. He felt 
a sudden bolt of energy. Thompson was correct – that is exactly what 
they needed. The small sandbags they used would not stay in place, but 
a giant sandbag would easily plug the breach. He pulled out his cel-
lular phone and called an acquaintance – an agricultural seed supplier 
in nearby Cleveland, Mississippi. The seed supplier had hundreds of 
large super sacks in stock only a short thirty-minute drive from Francis. 
Nimrod dispatched an employee to retrieve the bags.
Mendrop and Lanny Barfi eld, one of Mendrop’s section chiefs in 
the geotechnical engineering branch, arrived at Francis shortly thereaf-
ter. Laborers began constructing the water berm dike on the periphery. 
The three geotechnical engineers examined the boil. It was still piping 
a considerable amount of material. They knew it would take days for 
the crews to complete the dike and get enough water over the area to 
counteract the pressure. The high-energy boil demanded immediate 
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attention. Shoring up the berm with the “super sacks” would help in 
the short term. Barfi eld and Martin discussed a possible experiment – 
creating a fi lter over the sand boil. During a 2010 fl ood fi ght operation 
near Vidalia, Louisiana, Martin had dropped gravel in a boil to act as 
a fi lter that allowed the boil to continue to fl ow and relieve pressure. 
The gravel also trapped the sediment and checked further erosion of 
the subsurface foundation. Barfi eld and Martin approached Mendrop 
and asked if they could try it again. Mendrop looked at the ominous 
boil and replied, “I’ll try anything.”
The hired-labor crew hurriedly moved earth around the boil-plagued 
area. At the same time, Barfi eld, Martin and the levee board crew 
improved the sandbag berm. After two of the super sacks were fi lled 
with sand, a trackhoe lifted each bag from the levee and lowered them 
into place to plug the breach. To seal the remaining leaks, the fl ood fi ght-
ers stuffed smaller sandbags around the “super sacks.” Once the berm 
was stabilized and sealed, they poured large quantities of sand into the 
Bradley Martin, left, gives a “thumbs up” to the trackhoe operator as inmates guide a “super sack” into place.
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boil before dumping several loads of number 57 stone – a coarse gravel 
aggregate ranging from a half inch to 1.5 inches in size – on top of and 
around the boil. Martin had not slept for nearly 36 hours, so Mendrop 
drove him back to Vicksburg, leaving Barfi eld behind to oversee the 
operation. By the following day, the murky water contained by the sand-
bag berm began to lose its turbidity. The boil was running clear. The 
fi lter experiment worked. A few days later, the hired labor crew com-
pleted the earthen water berm, which provided a higher safety factor.213
As fl ood fi ghters addressed the Francis boil at the north end of the 
delta, Col. Eckstein escorted Maj. Gen. Walsh and the civilian members 
of the Mississippi River Commission – Sam Angel, R.D. James, and 
Clifford Smith – on a helicopter fl yover of the Vicksburg region on May 
10. The extent of fl ooding looked severe. Water stood high against the 
levees on both banks of the river. From the air, it appeared that the river 
had reached the tops of the levees, but in reality there was plenty of 
freeboard available—which was fortunate. The Vicksburg gage read just 
inches shy of 53 feet, but the river was expected to rise at least another 
The completed water berm at Francis, Miss. Note the additional sand boil rings in the foreground and the river 
stage in the background.
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4.5 feet. Sam Angel elbowed R.D. James and said, “The fl ooding here 
is different.” Indeed, it was different, compared to the conditions the 
commission had just witnessed over the past few weeks at the confl u-
ence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Violent storms had dropped 
up to nearly two feet of rain in some parts of southeastern Missouri, 
southern Illinois and western Kentucky and Tennessee. Standing water 
was everywhere in the confl uence area. Overfl owing creeks, bayous, and 
ditches had nowhere to drain because of the high river stages, causing 
them to back up and spread out across the surrounding terrain. But this 
was not the case in the heart of the MR&T project.
The commission observed the MR&T system working as designed. 
The river may have stood high against the levees, but the land and 
infrastructure on the protected sides of the levee remained dry. Wheat, 
corn, beans, and cotton fl ourished in the fl at, low-lying farmlands below. 
Smith mentioned the irony of irrigation pivots slowly spinning across 
several farms, “Look at that – a drought in the middle of a fl ood!” Cars 
and trucks sped east and west along Interstate 20, seemingly oblivious 
to the high river stages pressing against the levee. In the heart of the 
MR&T, the fl ood – at least thus far – remained confi ned between the 
levees, with the exception of backwater fl ooding along the Yazoo River 
and Steele Bayou. Still they noticed the rooftops of several homes jut-
ting from the water on the Mississippi side of the river. From the heli-
copter, they looked like stepping stones across a shallow pond. Those 
homes had been built on the riverside of the levee. Many stood above 
the 100-year fl ood elevation, but the MR&T levees towered above that 
elevation for a reason. The river was high and it was expected to rise at 
least another 4.5 feet. The pig had not yet fully reached the Vicksburg 
portion of the python.214
At the northern end of the Vicksburg district, with Francis water 
berm complete and the sand boil under control, Barfi eld set out to 
return to Vicksburg on May 12. As he drove south, his phone rang. 
It was Mendrop asking for him to meet up with Bobby Thompson to 
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check on a reported boil near Winterville, Mississippi, just a few miles 
north of Greenville. Barfi eld met Thompson and they drove to the site 
together. Thompson wanted Barfi eld’s advice on whether or not the boil 
needed immediate attention or if it could wait until the morning. With 
each passing day, as the river climbed higher and exerted more pres-
sure, numerous boils exploded everywhere across the region, further 
thinning the stretched resources of levee districts.
As they drove along the levee, Barfi eld detected water violently 
erupting from the ground in a clump of trees near the toe of the levee 
berm. He looked at Thompson, “Oh, no! This is not good!” He climbed 
from the car and rushed to examine the boil. Like the Francis boil, the 
18-inch throat piped heavy sediment-laden water. “We’ve got to do 
something and we have to do it now!” he told Thompson. “This can’t 
wait!” As Thompson hurriedly phoned in a request for men and material, 
Barfi eld inspected a ditch next to the sand boil for freshly-deposited silt. 
By his fi eld estimation, the boil had eroded more than 100 cubic yards 
Lanny Barfi eld checks the high-energy boil at Winterville, Miss.
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of subsurface material. He had never seen a boil develop to the point of 
a levee failure other than on training videos. He wanted to keep it that 
way. The heavy sediment load erupting from the boil and the amount 
of silt already deposited in the ditch worried him. No matter how badly 
he wanted to, Barfi eld could not possibly know what was happening 
beneath the surface. He checked with the landowner, who told him that 
the sand boil was not there the day before. It was a high-energy boil. 
It had virtually exploded into existence out of nowhere and quickly 
moved a large quantity of material – 100 cubic yards of material. As he 
rechecked the freshly-deposited sediment, Barfi eld thought to himself, 
Where did it come from? Just beneath the surface? Was it piping ver-
tically? Was it piping horizontally under the landside seepage berm? 
Was the boil working toward the levee? To make matters worse, the 
boil continued to grow before his eyes.
The sand boil sat at an extremely critical location under the Mis-
sissippi Levee Board’s jurisdiction. It was nearer the upper end of the 
district, slightly north of two of the larger population centers in the 
Mississippi delta – Greenville, with a population of nearly 35,000, and 
Leland, with a population of approximately 5,500. Unlike a possible 
levee breach at Buck Chute or the Yazoo backwater levee at the lower 
end of the district, where fl oodwaters would slowly back up through the 
delta, a levee break at the upper end of the levee district would unleash 
a torrent of water that would rush southward and engulf the delta much 
like the devastating crevasse at Mound Landing during the 1927 fl ood. 
Perhaps more threatening, a levee break at Winterville would inundate 
Greenville in less than six hours; Leland in twelve hours. More than 
40,000 people would need to be evacuated in less than one-half of a 
day, most of them sooner than that. For this reason, Governor Barbour’s 
task force had quietly staged buses in the area to quickly evacuate large 
quantities of people on short notice. Having gained valuable emergency 
management experience during Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater-
Horizon oil spill, and several nasty tornados, Barbour knew how to 
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prepare for a disaster. The state was ready to act, but it would not need 
to if Barfi eld and Thompson could get the boil under control.
Once the necessary resources arrived, Barfi eld, Thompson and the 
fl ood fi ght team – mainly composed of inmate labor – formed a human 
conveyor belt, passing sandbags from the levee through the knee-deep 
water in the ditch to construct a sandbag and plywood dike to trap the 
seepage and create a water berm. Fresh off of the successful experi-
ment at Francis, Barfi eld also decided to create a fi lter over the boil. 
The deep water and the clump of large trees partially blocked access 
to the site, but the team used a trackhoe to reach between the trees and 
across the water berm to dump the sand and number 57 stone on the 
boil. The experiment went smoother than the initial test at Francis the 
day before. Within a matter of hours, the fi lter was complete. Barfi eld 
checked the ditch for newly-developed boils and found none. Clear 
water began cascading from the gravel mound. The high-energy boil 
had been checked.215
Ups and Downs
The high-energy sand boils at Francis, Winterville, and other loca-
tions were indicative of the enormous pressure exerted by the extremely 
swollen river on the levee system. Across all ten of the Vicksburg 
Levee workers and inmates address the high energy boil at Winterville.
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district’s fl ood fi ght sectors covering Arkansas, Mississippi, and Loui-
siana, levee inspectors responded to more than 300 sand boil incidents. 
Reported incidents most often involved clusters of boils, rather than 
single or isolated boils, so the number of boils that actually developed 
dwarfed the number of incidents reported. The system was springing 
leaks everywhere, but it was holding together. “The river wants out,” 
Col. Eckstein told a group of reporters in trying to explain the signifi -
cant number of boils in the area, “We want that, too. We just want to 
control it so it doesn’t move material and undermine the levee.” That 
much was true, but treating and controlling a sand boil could only be 
accomplished if the problem was identifi ed. As the river continued to 
rise and the pressure on the system continued to mount, undetected 
activity below the surface of the levees threatened to materialize at a 
moment’s notice. Geotechnical engineers, levee board members, and 
fl ood fi ghters throughout the region asked themselves the same ques-
tions that Chuck Mendrop asked himself back at the Vicksburg Engineer 
District, What is out there that I am missing? What is out there that I 
cannot see?216
On May 12, the Mississippi River reached 63.5 feet on the Green-
ville gage and 54.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage. The river was also 
climbing fast at the Natchez gage, having reached 58 feet, more than 
ten feet above fl ood stage. By 0800 hours the following day, the river 
stormed past 64 feet on the Greenville gage. The crest, which had yet to 
reach the Arkansas City gage further upriver, was still at least four days 
away. Everyone expected the river to continue to rise. At 1400 hours, 
the gage stood at 64.13 feet, but the gage reading an hour later depicted 
a drop in river levels by three-hundredths. The reading at 1600 hours 
showed another drop. By 1800 hours, the river had dropped back below 
64 feet on the gage. The 2000 hours gage reading recorded yet another 
drop, down a tenth of a foot from two hours earlier. Walter Mattingly, 
working in the Vicksburg district’s emergency operation center, called 
Ron Goldman at home and told him, “The stage is falling at Greenville.” 
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Those words hit Goldman like a bombshell. He was scared and under-
standably so. A sudden drop in a river gage prior to the arrival of the 
crest could only mean the gage had malfunctioned or, worse, a levee had 
fi nally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the river. He immediately 
returned to the district offi ce to determine the cause of the problem. 
Mattingly also contacted Paul Keene at the district’s Greenwood area 
offi ce. Keene began organizing the sector commanders on both sides of 
the river to inspect the levees to determine if a breach had taken place.217
Keene, in turn, notifi ed the Mississippi Levee Board. Upon hearing 
the news, Thompson decided to call Nimrod, who was at his Greenville 
home stealing a few hours to get some much needed sleep. Nimrod 
had left his cellular phone in the kitchen and did not hear it ringing. 
Thompson hung up and called Nimrod’s house phone. When Nimrod 
answered Thompson informed him of the news, “Peter, something’s 
wrong! The gage just dropped!” The sudden rush of adrenaline imme-
diately sapped the fog of weariness from the chief engineer of the levee 
board. Thompson passed on the Vicksburg district’s belief that either 
the gage had malfunctioned or a levee had breached. Within minutes, 
the Greenwood area offi ce notifi ed Nimrod that the gage was working 
properly and that water marks on a nearby sign post also depicted a drop 
in river levels. By 2100 hours, the gage reading had dropped another 
tenth of a foot, which confi rmed water was leaving the system some-
where. Nimrod began calling members of his crews. They had spent the 
day riding the levees with personnel from the Greenwood area offi ce 
and would have noticed any problems. None reported noticing anything 
substantial. Nimrod pondered his next step. The gage had checked out. 
It was working properly. His levees checked out. No breaks were found. 
Perhaps a levee crevassed on the other side of the river. The clock was 
nearing midnight. The river had dropped six inches over the previous 
nine hours. Nimrod called Sam Angel, a member of the Mississippi 
River Commission who lived across the river in Lake Village, Arkansas. 
“Mr. Angel, did the levee break on your side?” he asked. Angel, who 
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had been asleep when his telephone rang, considered the question an 
odd one. “Not that I know of,” he replied. Nimrod explained the situ-
ation. Angel indicated that he would check with levee district offi cials 
in Arkansas, but he soon discovered that no break had been reported.218
By 0300 hours the following morning – May 14 – the river stopped 
falling on the Greenville gage and resumed its ascent. Within hours, the 
water control managers at the district offi ce had determined the culprit. 
On May 12, the river overtopped an abandoned MR&T levee at Wilson 
Point, near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The Mississippi River Commis-
sion had constructed a new mainline levee further to the west, but the 
abandoned levee remained intact, providing substantial protection for 
approximately 12,000 acres of prime farmland. In the early afternoon 
of May 13, the abandoned levee –with close to a foot of water violently 
pouring over its crown and landside slope – crevassed, allowing the river 
to fi ll the 12,000-acre bowl between the levees. The incident proved to 
be a false alarm in terms of a possible catastrophic break in the levee 
system, but it served notice of the destructive dynamics involved in 
the overtopping of a levee. The Wilson Point levee had crevassed with 
a foot of water pouring over the levee after only one day. Residents in 
the Mississippi delta took notice of that. All eyes nervously turned to 
the newly-armored Yazoo backwater levee, which was expected to be 
overtopped by more than a foot of water for ten long days. Admittedly, 
the Wilson Point levee was not an MR&T levee, and it had not been 
armored as the backwater levee had, but it was originally constructed 
to MR&T specifi cations. Residents continued to watch and pray as the 
river inched higher and higher against the backwater levee.219
Their prayers were soon answered. At the onset of the 2011 fl ood, 
Ron Goldman wanted to gather more data on the river. He instructed 
Michael Warren to establish a temporary gage near a small spur levee 
that jutted out toward the channel from the mainline levee at its junc-
tion with the backwater levee. The 2008 profi le had established a high 
water mark on the upstream side of the spur levee. Data obtained from 
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that 2008 high water mark had led to the discovery of the greater slope 
along the Yazoo River and the determination that only the lower four 
miles of the backwater faced overtopping when the Vicksburg gage 
would reach 57.5 feet. Upon arriving at the levee, Warren witnessed 
the fl urry of activity where the hired-labor crew busily prepared the 
HESCO bastion fl oodwall on the backwater levee. Attempting to stay 
out of the way, Warren established the gage on the downstream side of 
the spur levee, only a few hundred feet away from the location of the 
2008 high water mark.
The new gage started collecting data on May 8, the day after the 
Vicksburg gage surged past 50 feet and the day after the backwater levee 
armoring project commenced. Within a few days, the district’s hydraulic 
engineers noticed something odd. The new gage depicted a one-foot 
drop in the slope of the river from the upstream and downstream sides 
of the spur levee. The development piqued Goldman’s curiosity. The 
normal fall in the river averaged one-half foot per mile, yet the gage 
depicted a one-foot slope spanning a distance of only a few hundred feet. 
Goldman went to inspect the gage personally. He could hear water rush-
ing along the spur levee. Goldman surmised that the water was hitting 
the spur and piling up. If the same thing happened in 2008, it probably 
caused an artifi cially high reading on the temporary gage upstream of 
the spur. If that was the case, the backwater levee might not overtop 
until the Vicksburg gage reached 57 feet or higher. That prospect excited 
Goldman, but he remained uncertain. The situation was too unique, too 
odd. The possibility remained that the differential could equalize and 
therefore dissipate as the river continued to rise. He wanted to see how 
the river responded before reaching a concrete conclusion. By May 14, 
Goldman was convinced that the one-foot differential would not change. 
He went to see Col. Eckstein. In the colonel’s offi ce, Goldman drew 
a schematic of what was transpiring on a large piece of butcher board 
paper. Eckstein fl ashed a broad smile. It was becoming more and more 
evident that the backwater levee would not overtop.220
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On May 15, the worst of the fl ood was nearly upon the entire Vicks-
burg district. The river climbed back above 64 feet on the Greenville 
gage. On the Vicksburg gage, the river surpassed the 1927 high water 
mark of 56.2 feet. During the morning commander’s briefi ng, Walsh 
asked Eckstein for an update on the Yazoo backwater levee. Eckstein 
reported that the river was about a foot from the gravel road on the crown 
of the levee. “It’s going to be close if it overtops at all,” he informed the 
commission president. Eckstein closed his report by informing Walsh 
that fl ood conditions in the Vicksburg Engineer District had reached a 
steady state – at least for the time being. Conditions seemed not only to 
be holding steady, but improving slightly, with no new boils reported in 
the Vicksburg district over the preceding 24 hours. Still, Dennis Norris, 
Walsh’s chief of operations, reminded everyone to stay vigilant, “the 
unprecedented boils and seepage we are experiencing may translate 
into levee slides after the river falls off.”221
Robert Thompson intently watches the development of a sand boil.
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On May 16, the Mississippi River crested on the Arkansas City 
gage, but the steady-state of conditions came to a crashing end. A levee 
inspector discovered a cluster of boils in the levee toe near Albemarle, 
Mississippi, just a short distance north of Buck Chute. Chuck Men-
drop dispatched Lanny Barfi eld to take a look at the boils, but Peter 
Nimrod and a levee board crew arrived at the scene fi rst. They imme-
diately discovered the boils were the least of their problems. They had 
a levee slide to contend with. A slide may occur when a portion of the 
levee face becomes saturated and shifts or slides down the slope of the 
levee, typically when the river recedes. Most slides that occur along 
the Mississippi River levee system in the region are, for the most part, 
unrelated to high water events, with most slides caused by various wet-
ting and drying cycles that weaken the soil. Slides typically occur on 
the riverside of the levee, where the levee slopes are steeper. The slide 
at Albemarle was on the landside slope of the levee, less than 50 feet 
downriver from the boils.
The water gushing from the face of the levee terrifi ed Nimrod. The 
Albemarle levee had yet to be enlarged, so it was not equipped with a 
landside seepage berm or relief wells. The ongoing levee enlargement 
program had advanced and stopped approximately 2,000 feet upriver. 
While the levee was constructed to a substantial height and width, it 
was not as strong as the levees located a few thousand feet to the north. 
Nimrod was worried. The levee was completely saturated. The river 
was nearing its crest, and it placed tremendous pressure against the 
weakened levee. He called Barfi eld, who was in transit to the site, and 
notifi ed him of the slide. Barfi eld arrived minutes later. He examined 
the boils fi rst. They were good-sized boils that piped a considerable 
amount of sediment. Compared to the boils at Francis and Winterville, 
though, the boils were noticeably less aggressive, leading Barfi eld to 
conclude that the inspectors had discovered the boils early in the devel-
opmental stage. Barfi eld studied the slide next. He tried to determine 
if the water fl owing from the face of the levee was underseepage or 
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seepage through levee. The origin of the seepage mattered to Barfi eld. 
He hoped it was underseepage. Seepage through the face was more 
disconcerting because it would be easier for the newly-formed cavity 
to creep back toward the levee face and cause a failure, than to crawl 
under the levee. Barfi eld concluded that it was probably underseepage 
fl owing from the levee, but he was not certain. He called Mendrop and 
apprised him of the situation.222
Mendrop and two of his senior geotechnical engineers – Noah 
Vroman and Brad Arcement – dropped what they were doing and drove 
to Albemarle to assist Barfi eld. Together, the engineers determined 
that the levee had been constructed in an abandoned river channel. 
The existence of sand boils and clay deposits near the toe of the levee, 
along with the presence of what appeared to be iron in the seepwater, 
led them to conclude that the slide was the result of underseepage and 
the uplift pressures associated with it. Mendrop decided to get the boils 
under control fi rst, before addressing the slide. He shared Barfi eld’s 
view that the boils, while severe, were not as problematic as the boils 
at Francis and Winterville. The boils and slide did not overly concern 
him at that moment, but he knew the situation could deteriorate rapidly. 
If they were not able to get the problem under control, he knew they 
could possibly lose the levee and unleash fl ooding far worse than what 
had been predicted if the levee at Buck Chute failed. Mendrop called 
Jimmy Coldiron. Within hours, Coldiron’s hired-labor crew was on the 
scene building a rock dike at the landside toe of the levee. The dike was 
to be fi lled with sand to stabilize the levee.223
On May 17, as Coldiron’s crew constructed the rock dike at Albe-
marle, the Mississippi River crested at 64.2 feet on the Greenville gage, 
approximately one foot lower than the 1927 high water mark. Two 
days later, it crested at 57.1 feet on the Vicksburg gage, which broke 
the old record mark set in 1927 by almost a foot. The river climbed to 
the gravel road on the crown of the Yazoo backwater levee but stopped 
four inches shy from overtopping it. The fl ood, though, was far from 
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over. After fi rst reaching 60 feet on the Greenville gage on May 7, the 
river remained above that mark for a staggering 19 days before fi nally 
dropping below it on May 26. At the Vicksburg gage, the river remained 
above 51.6 feet – the high water mark of the devastating 1973 fl ood – 
until June 4. The river had fi rst topped that mark on May 9 and remained 
there for 26 days.
The Vicksburg and Memphis districts, along with the levee boards 
in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had faced several harrowing 
moments, but the MR&T system held the fl ood in check despite facing 
unprecedented pressure. The river wanted out and the MR&T system 
provided room through managed seepage. The project had advanced a 
long way since the 1973 fl ood. The 2011 fl ood set stage records from 
Cairo to Caruthersville and from Vicksburg to Natchez by one to two 
feet, but from Memphis to Greenville the fl ood crested from one to 
six feet below the records established in 1937 at Memphis and 1927 
Col. Jeff rey Eckstein discusses the Yazoo backwater armoring operation at a press conference on the levee.
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in Greenville. Yet at the same time, the fl ood established new record 
fl ows from Cairo to Baton Rouge. The fl ood exceeded previous record 
fl ows at Helena by 8 percent; Arkansas City by 6 percent; Vicksburg 
by 11 percent; and Natchez by 9.5 percent. The improved capacity of 
the river to carry more water at lower stages – resulting from Fergu-
son’s channel realignment and rectifi cation program and the subsequent 
channel stabilization measures to maintain the stage-lowering benefi ts 
achieved – was primarily responsible for the reach between Memphis 
and Greenville not setting new stage records in 2011 and for keeping 
stages more manageable along the entire reach between Memphis and 
Natchez. The improved carrying-capacity also proved pivotal in pre-
venting the Yazoo backwater levee from overtopping and preventing 
similar damages as those experienced during the 1973 fl ood.
Chapter 5
Through the Spout 
to the Gulf:
The 2011 Flood in the 
New Orleans District
Can you imagine what this river would look like without engi-
neering controls? It would resemble a Third World country – 
no power, no water intakes, no sewer, no navigation, no farms. 
The entire lower valley would be destroyed and useless.
Stephen Gambrell
Executive Director
Mississippi River Commission
May 14, 2011
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ON THE MORNING OF MAY 2, THE Mississippi River Commission and its staff gathered in the second fl ood conference room on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI for the daily 0800 hours 
briefi ng. Only four hours earlier, Bill Frederick, the staff meteorolo-
gist at the division offi ce, had informed Maj. Gen. Walsh, the president 
of the commission, of the new forecast for 63 feet at the Cairo gage. 
Everyone in the tension-fi lled conference room knew what that meant. 
They could not mask the concern on their faces, nor their exhaustion. 
The violent thunderstorm that rocked the vessel the previous night had 
not been conducive for sleeping. They all realized the persistent rains 
made activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway unavoidable. 
As the commission members and staff waited for the conference call 
to begin, the normally-gregarious group said little, which refl ected on 
the gravity of the situation.
Edward Belk, the MVD chief of programs, surveyed the room as the 
district commanders phoned in the situational reports for their areas of 
operations. He could sense the fatigue – both mental and physical – of 
the group before him. He knew they were running on the adrenaline 
created by the crisis unfolding at the confl uence of the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers. That concerned him. While still at least fourteen hours away, 
the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was, for the 
most part, fait accompli. It was going to happen. Nothing could stop it 
from operating if Col. Reichling’s task force could load the pipes with 
explosives in time. The tension-packed series of events from the past 
week were rapidly building toward a crescendo – the ultimate activation 
of the fl oodway. The natural reaction after the operation, Belk knew, 
would be for the tired and weary decision-makers and fl ood fi ghters to 
let down their guards as if the worst of the fl ood was behind them. But 
it was not behind them. The fl ood was just beginning. Activating the 
fl oodway would only serve as the opening salvo of a larger battle. With 
this in mind, Belk calmly and astutely warned the participants on the 
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conference call, “As the fl ood moves downstream, we need to reload 
and re-cock, and be ready for the next challenge.”224
The Need for Engineering Control
The ammunition in Belk’s “reload and re-cock” analogy referred to 
the engineering controls in the lower end of the MR&T project. If the 
Mississippi drainage basin represents a gigantic funnel stretching across 
41 percent of the United States, and the lower Mississippi represents 
the spout, then the MR&T project below Natchez represents the tip of 
the spout. Under project design fl ood conditions, the tip must convey a 
fl ow of three million cfs – a massive amount of water roughly 12.5 times 
greater than the amount of water that passes over Niagara Falls each 
second. To control that discharge, the developers of the MR&T proj-
ect devised what amounts to an elaborate plumbing system, with two 
entrance points – the Mississippi River fl owing past Natchez and the 
Red River; three transfer points – the Old River control complex, the 
Morganza fl oodway, and the West Atchafalaya fl oodway; and four exit 
points – the Bonnet Carré spillway into Lake Pontchartrain, the Wax 
Lake outlet into Atchafalaya Bay, and the mouths of the Mississippi and 
Atchafalaya rivers into the Gulf of Mexico. The goal of the system is to 
divert fl ows a little at a time so that the Mississippi River discharge will 
not exceed the manageable rates of 1.25 million cfs past New Orleans 
and 1.5 million cfs past Baton Rouge, while insuring a distribution of 
thirty percent of the combined waters and sediment of the Mississippi 
and Red rivers at the latitude of Red River Landing are passed through 
to the Atchafalaya basin.
Since the early nineteenth century, engineers had been debating 
the merits of creating expansion room for the river as a way to supple-
ment the rapidly-extending line of levees. George Graham, the U.S. 
General Land Offi ce Commissioner, fi rst proposed a fl oodway through 
the Atchafalaya basin in 1828. In 1852, Charles Ellet, Jr., a prominent 
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civil engineer working under a commission from the secretary of war, 
proposed a system of outlets through the Atchafalaya River, Bayou 
Plaquemine, Bayou Lafourche, and Lake Borgne. A month later, the 
State of Louisiana published a plan developed by Samuel Ricker that 
mostly mirrored Ellet’s proposal, but expanded it by calling for man-
made outlets at Morganza and Red River Landing. A decade later, Army 
engineers Capt. Andrew Humphreys and Lt. Henry Abbot published 
the Delta Survey, which advocated using, but not enlarging, the natural 
outlets through bayous Plaquemines and Lafourche. More importantly, 
Humphreys and Abbot urged complete resistance to the growing temp-
tation of divorcing the Atchafalaya River from the Mississippi River, 
as such an action would deprive the Mississippi fl oodwaters of a vital 
diversion route.225
Instead of heeding these recommendations, the Mississippi River 
Commission recommended upon its establishment the completion of 
the levee line begun by local levee districts and the closure of most 
outlets, with the exception of the Atchafalaya River. Levees – at least 
conceptually – promised protection from the river; while fl oodways, 
outlets, and spillways meant surrendering land to the river. The com-
mission’s policy rested on the theory that closing off the outlets would 
increase the velocity of the river and scour the riverbed deeper, perhaps 
to the point that levees would no longer be needed to confi ne fl oods. 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, though, the commission began to 
ease on its stance against dispersion. Following the 1912 fl ood, which 
set a record stage of 21 feet near New Orleans on the Carrollton gage, 
Louisiana interests began pushing for the construction of emergency 
spillways to relieve pressure on the levee system during fl oods. The 
commission relented and studied the feasibility of constructing a spill-
way. The commission investigated six sites: Bonnet Carré, Kenner, 
and Lake Borgne on the east bank of the river; Willow Bend, Wag-
gaman, and Jesuit’s Bend on the west bank. Coming as no surprise to 
spillway advocates in New Orleans, the report concluded that a fl ood 
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stage exceeding 21 feet on the Carrollton gage, indeed, threatened the 
security of the region’s commercial and business interests. The report 
suggested as a solution the construction of a 6,000-foot long spillway 
capable of diverting 230,000 cfs from the main channel, but—citing 
fears of interrupting the continuity of the existing levee line and the 
threat of backwater fl ooding to New Orleans—surmised that a suitable 
location for a spillway could not be found.226
The call for spillways again jumped to the forefront during the 
1922 fl ood, when the river established a new record on the Carrollton 
gage at 21.3 feet before the levee crevassed at Poydras, approximately 
12 miles downriver from New Orleans. Although more than four feet 
separated the fl ood crest from the crown of the levee protecting the 
city, New Orleans residents believed that the Poydras crevasse lowered 
fl ood heights to the point of sparing them from calamity. In short order, 
several plans emanated from the civilian engineering community. John 
Klorer, the New Orleans city engineer, revitalized Ellet’s 1852 plan for 
an artifi cial outlet from the Mississippi into Lake Borgne. John Freeman, 
the principal advocate for establishing a national hydraulic laboratory, 
set forth his own plan to draw fl ows out of the Mississippi above New 
Orleans through the enlargement of the Atchafalaya.227
In 1924, the Louisiana state legislature authorized the Orleans Levee 
District to design a spillway below New Orleans to protect the integ-
rity of the levees lining the city front. On January 26, 1925, the levee 
district submitted a plan to lower eleven miles of levees at Pointe-a-la-
Hache, approximately 50 miles downriver from New Orleans, to serve 
as a spillway. The Louisiana Board of State Engineers reviewed the 
plan and soon fragmented over differences of opinions on the subject. 
One faction believed that the spillway would reduce fl ood heights by 
as much as two feet. Another faction, while still advocating the neces-
sity of spillways, believed Pointe-a-la-Hache was too far downriver to 
have any impact. Both factions did agree, however, that construction 
and implementation of the spillway would provide “an opportunity to 
224
Divine Providence
procure valuable data for future reference.” That statement refl ected a 
matter of considerable importance. New Orleans interests hoped the 
data gathered through the spillway experiment would ultimately lead 
to a more systematic employment of spillways to protect southern Lou-
isiana. This hope manifested itself through the efforts of Louisiana 
Congressman Riley J. Wilson, who was busily preparing a bill seeking 
authorization of a federal survey to determine the feasibility and cost of 
controlling Mississippi River fl oods between Old River and the Head 
of Passes through controlled spillways.228
The Louisiana Board of State Engineers approved the plan on Feb-
ruary 10, two weeks prior to the next session of the Mississippi River 
Commission. On February 25, Gervis Lombard, the assistant state engi-
neer for the board, and Marcel Garsaud, chief engineer for the Orleans 
Levee District, appeared before the commission to plead their case. 
Lombard took the lead, explaining that the proposed spillway would 
benefi t the levee system near New Orleans and that all parties impacted 
by the plan agreed to the necessity of its construction. Colonel Potter, 
the commission president, refl ecting on the irony of the people near 
Pointe-a-la-Hache agreeing to lower their own levee to benefi t people 
upstream, commented, “It is not very long ago that levees were guarded 
with shot guns down in that country.” Lombard answered, “In times 
of stress people do lose their heads.” On February 26, the commission 
passed a resolution endorsing the state’s plan to modify the 11-mile 
stretch of the levee. The State of Louisiana completed the Pointe-a-la-
Hache spillway in 1926 at a cost of nearly $500,000. Shortly after its 
completion, President Calvin Coolidge signed Congressman Wilson’s 
bill authorizing the Corps of Engineers to study the feasibility and costs 
of controlling Mississippi River fl oods south of Old River by means 
of spillways and levees. The Corps of Engineers, in turn, established 
a spillway board to survey plans to keep fl ood stages in New Orleans 
below 20 feet and at Simmesport on the Atchafalaya River below 48 feet. 
As the spillway board commenced its investigation in the fall of 1926, 
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heavy rains drenched a large portion of the Mississippi drainage basin. 
The rains continued into the winter and spring of 1927, sending one fl ood 
crest after another through the lower Mississippi Valley. The spillway 
board’s fi nal analysis would come too late.229
As the 1927 fl ood developed and placed tremendous pressure against 
the levees in south Louisiana, fear of a levee crevasse reached panic 
levels, particularly after word spread of the crevasses at Laconia Circle 
and Whitehall in Arkansas and at Dorena, Missouri. On April 19, New 
Orleans Mayor Arthur J. O’Keefe and Garsaud met privately with the 
Mississippi River Commission in St. Louis to inquire about the steps 
to create an artifi cial cut in the levees to lower fl ood levels if it became 
necessary. Among the requirements outlined were getting permission 
from the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War as required by 
Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the assumption 
of all costs and responsibility by the local government. Two days later 
the Mound Landing levee crevassed, inundating the entire Mississippi 
delta and further spiking panic levels in New Orleans. On April 25, with 
gage readings exceeding 21 feet, Garsaud, publisher President James W. 
Thompson, Sen. Joseph Ransdell, Rep. James O’Connor, and other 
Louisiana powerbrokers urged permission to breach the levee. The 
Mississippi River Commission quickly passed a resolution that “to 
avoid the loss of life and property” it “is advisable to create a break” if 
Louisiana Gov. Oramel Simpson provided a formal statement request-
ing it and assumed responsibility for damages. The commission would 
then get permission from Maj. Gen. Jadwin, the Chief of Engineers. 
Only fi ve hours later, Governor Simpson sent a telegram with his and 
Mayor O’Keefe’s concurrence to cut the levee near the site of the 1922 
Poydras crevasse. The following night, Jadwin and Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover conferred with the commission. Jadwin sent 
telegrams to Simpson and to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, who 
telegrammed Simpson, that they “interpose no objection” to the state’s 
plan to dynamite the levee.230
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Three days later, on April 29, after the evacuation of residents of 
St. Bernard Parish, George C. Schoenberger, chief of the Louisiana 
board of state engineers, oversaw the execution of the proposed cut 
with the national guard standing by to prevent interference. The actual 
site selected was at Caernarvon, Louisiana, about 13 miles below New 
Orleans. As reporter George W. Healy, Jr., observed, “The fi rst blast, on 
Friday, April 29, was a fl op, literally and fi guratively. Soil blown out 
of the levee went straight up in the air and then fl opped down into the 
The Caernarvon levee in late April 1927. (Library of Congress)
Workers prepare the Caernarvon levee crevasse site. (Library of Congress)
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holes in the levee’s crown whence it had been blown.” Only a trickle 
of water was getting through the hole. Several attempts to dynamite 
the levee followed, expanding it to about 800 feet on May 1, but Roger 
McWhorter of the New Orleans Levee District noted, the “batture is 
scouring more slowly than expected.... This levee was built of ideal 
material and is one of the best in the state.” Only after a diver placed 
additional charges under the batture on May 3 did the levee fi nally 
collapse, opening up a 2,600-foot gap. The Carrollton gage showed an 
immediate decline. No one had taken measurements during the 1922 
crevasse at Poydras, so the Caernarvon cut was the fi rst opportunity to 
prove the effect of spillways on the city. According to Klorer, “Ocular 
demonstration has convinced most of those not committed to spillways 
that relief of this kind is essential.” The Corps of Engineers spillway 
board agreed. Its fi nal report, which the board submitted to Jadwin on 
November 12, 1927, recommended the construction of fl oodways at 
Bonnet Carré and on both banks of the Atchafalaya River. The report 
concluded that “it is by this means only that the safety of the city and 
port of New Orleans can be positively and unqualifi edly assured.”231
After the Caernarvon levee crevasse. (Library of Congress)
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Less than a month later, Jadwin submitted his formal plan to the 
project design fl ood in Louisiana with a combination of levees and 
fl oodways. The dynamiting of the levee at Caernarvon had blasted the 
levees-only policy out of existence. The end result transformed the 
lower Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya basin into some of the 
most engineering-controlled waterways on the planet.
One Flood, Three Floodways
By midday on May 2, 2011, Edward Belk’s call for vigilance proved 
insightful. The second round of storms that began hammering the White 
and Ohio valleys late on the night of April 30 had quickly transformed 
the fl ood into a game-changing event, not just at the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway, but the entire MR&T system – particularly along 
the lower reaches of the project in the New Orleans Engineer District. 
Based on that additional rainfall, the Lower Mississippi River Forecast 
Center predicted record stages at Natchez, Red River Landing, and 
Baton Rouge. Estimates for the peak discharge expected at Red River 
Landing exceeded 1.8 million cfs. During the 84-year lifespan of the 
MR&T project, the peak discharge at Red River Landing had never 
reached 1.5 million cfs – the key rate of fl ow and trigger point in the 
elaborate plumbing system designed to convey the project design fl ood 
below the Old River control structures. The river had come close to 
reaching that magic number on several occasions, exceeding 1.4 mil-
lion cfs during the fl oods of 1937, 1950, 1973, 1979, 1983, 1997, and 
2008, but in each instance the discharge stayed below 1.5 million. But 
in 2011, the New Orleans district faced the possibility of exceeding 
that discharge by nearly twenty percent. As the forecast became public, 
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal tried to calm any fears, “We are going 
to do everything we can to prepare for the worst-case scenario, while 
we are still hoping for the best case.”232
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On the morning of May 3, Col. Edward 
Fleming, commander of the New Orleans 
Engineer District, informed Walsh that he 
intended to make a formal recommendation 
to open the Bonnet Carré spillway later in 
the day. Depending on the outcome of an 
ongoing engineering analysis by his staff, 
Fleming hinted that he would request to 
open the structure on either May 6 or May 9. 
He also informed Walsh that the National 
Weather Service and his own water con-
trol managers anticipated the river would 
quickly surpass the trigger point (1.5 mil-
lion cfs at Red River Landing) to activate 
the Morganza fl oodway, perhaps as early as 
Col. Edward Fleming, New Orleans Engineer District Commander.
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and 
Col. Edward Fleming discuss flood 
readiness.
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May 11. Fleming’s announcement that the Morganza fl oodway was in 
play stunned the commission staff, which only hours before had wit-
nessed the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Walsh 
noticed the inquisitive looks – raised brows and darting eyes – on the 
faces of those sitting around the conference table on the MISSISSIPPI. 
Grasping for a talking-point to take to the press, Walsh, who had ordered 
the operation of the Bonnet Carré spillway during the 2008 fl ood, asked 
his staff if he would be the fi rst commission president to operate the 
structure twice. “It’s bigger than that, sir,” one staff member replied, 
“This will be the fi rst time we’ve activated three fl oodways during the 
same fl ood.”233
The statement testifi ed to the historic nature of the 2011 fl ood. The 
commission had opened the Bonnet Carré to limit fl ows past New 
Orleans on nine occasions since its completion in 1932 or about once 
every nine years. Opening the structure had become fairly commonplace, 
but three fl oodways was an entirely different story. Prior to 2011, the 
commission had placed multiple fl oodways into operation during the 
same fl ood on only two occasions. During the 1937 fl ood, the commis-
sion activated the Bonnet Carré and Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodways. 
The Morganza fl oodway, though, had not been completed, although river 
discharges would not have necessitated its use. During the 1973 fl ood, 
the commission opened the Bonnet Carré and Morganza structures. 
The discharge rate of the river did not reach the trigger point to place 
the Morganza fl oodway into operation, but Maj. Gen. Charles Noble, 
the commission president, ordered its activation to relieve pressure on 
the low sill component of the Old River control structures after scour 
threatened the integrity of the structure. Now in May 2011, the com-
mission faced the prospect of activating three fl oodways simultaneously. 
Walsh and the others in the room understood the message. It was time 
to reload and re-cock.
On the afternoon of May 3, Fleming sent a memorandum to Walsh 
that requested permission to open the Bonnet Carré spillway. Walter 
231
Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf
Baumy, Fleming’s chief of engineering at the district offi ce, authored 
the district’s recommendation, which Fleming attached to his offi cial 
request. The district had anticipated the possibility of opening the 
Bonnet Carré spillway as early as April 25. The new forecast on May 2 
transformed the possibility into a necessity.234 Historically, opening 
the structure had proven less controversial than operating the other 
fl oodways in the MR&T system because the federal government had 
purchased the property behind the spillway, rather than merely paying 
for the right to fl ood it. That land was all federal property; no homes 
or farms stood to be inundated. The most controversial aspect of open-
ing the spillway involved the introduction of a large amount of fresh 
water into the brackish water of Lake Pontchartrain, which could impact 
oyster populations and related industries. Many oyster grounds in the 
lake had reported damage during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and 
were only beginning to recover.
Citing the National Weather Service forecast of 1.8 million cfs at 
Red River Landing, Baumy stressed that the fl ood bearing down on 
the New Orleans Engineer District “would rank as the largest since 
measurements began in 1930.” He pointed out that from a historical 
standpoint the approval to open the spillway had been granted when the 
discharge at Red River Landing reached 1.3 million cfs combined with 
a rising hydrograph. The weather service and the district’s water con-
trol managers expected this to occur on May 10. Baumy also expressed 
concerns about freeboard defi ciencies in the levees and fl oodwalls at 
Avondale, Carrollton, Holy Cross, and the Industrial Harbor Naviga-
tion Canal, as well as seepage concerns along the levees at Jefferson 
Heights, Algiers, Chalmette, Lake Borgne, and other known problem 
areas. Baumy noted that the authorized water control manual govern-
ing the operation of the structure was clear. The Bonnet Carré spillway 
was to be opened when the Mississippi River discharge below Baton 
Rouge reached 1.25 million cfs on a rising hydrograph or to preserve a 
desired freeboard on defi cient levees in the New Orleans area. Opening 
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the Bonnet Carré spillway would keep stages lower and reduce pres-
sure and the resulting seepage along the system. In anticipation of fl ows 
in excess of 1.25 million cfs below Bonnet Carré on May 10, Baumy 
recommended that Fleming request “approval to have the fl exibility to 
initiate operation” of the Bonnet Carré spillway as early as May 9, “as 
the rate of rise may necessitate gate openings in a suffi cient manner to 
limit fl ows” on May 10.235
Walsh acknowledged receipt of the Bonnet Carré spillway request 
and informed Fleming that the commission had it under advisement. 
In the meantime, he wanted Fleming to prepare an informational brief-
ing on the Morganza fl oodway, which had not been opened since 1973. 
At 2030 hours on May 4, Col. Fleming provided a brief detailing the 
layout, trigger points, and processes of the Morganza fl oodway. Once 
the preliminaries were covered, he set forth his operational concept for 
activating the fl oodway. Fleming’s timeline called for Walsh’s approval 
of the operational plan on May 5 and the issuance of a public notice of 
intent to operate Morganza on May 6. The notice of intent would initi-
ate the fl oodway evacuation phase. Fleming explained that the National 
Weather Service anticipated a discharge of 1.8 million cfs at Red River 
Landing, which meant that the Morganza fl oodway would siphon off 
roughly 300,000 cfs from the Mississippi River and divert it to the 
Atchafalaya basin. The 300,000 cfs represented roughly one-half of 
the 600,000 cfs design capacity of the fl oodway under project design 
fl ood conditions.
Although the National Weather Service did not expect the discharge 
at Red River Landing to reach the trigger point of 1.5 million cfs until 
May 13, Fleming planned for a slow opening of the Morganza structure 
on May 10, when the anticipated discharge would reach 1.3 million cfs. 
The slow release procedure amounted to partially opening the gates to 
allow a gradual introduction of fl oodwaters under minimum veloci-
ties. Fleming’s staff believed the slow release was necessary from the 
environmental viewpoint in that it would allow wildlife, particularly 
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the endangered Louisiana Black Bear, time to seek refuge before the 
heaviest fl ows inundated the fl oodway. The black bear had been listed 
as a threatened and endangered species in 1992 and the fl oodway des-
ignated as its critical habitat in 2009.
A gradual opening would also serve notice that the commission was 
serious about its intent to operate the fl oodway and force people to get 
out of harm’s way. The commission had not activated the spillway in 
38 years, and even then it only did so because of the problem with the 
wing wall at the Old River low sill structure. Like Milus Wallace at 
the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, some residents that would be 
impacted by the Morganza fl oodway did not think the commission would 
activate they fl oodway. They had been lulled into complacency. With an 
assumed fl ow of 272,000 cfs through the fl oodway and 760,000 cfs fl ow-
ing through the Atchafalaya River, Fleming’s inundation map showed 
much of the fl oodway and the lower Atchafalaya basin covered with 
anywhere from ten to twenty feet of water, which would impact a popu-
lation approaching 10,000 people and nearly 6,000 homes. These fi gures 
included people and homes protected by ring levees at Simmesport, 
Krotz Springs, and Melville, but did not account for potential impacts 
from backwater fl ooding. The local citizens needed to know that the 
commission was serious about sticking to the plan.236
Fleming expected a decision from Walsh, but the commission presi-
dent offered none. Walsh intended to stick to the trigger of 1.5 mil-
lion cfs laid out in the offi cial Morganza water control plan and the 2011 
MVD operation plan. Similar to the situation at the Yazoo backwater 
levee, when the Vicksburg Engineer District fi rst advocated fl ood fi ght-
ing, Walsh did not feel comfortable that he had enough information 
to announce his intention. Because there were so many variables and 
unknowns that had not been fully vetted with the commission and its 
staff, he desired more information on the impacts to the backwater area 
at the lower end of the Atchafalaya basin. That area represented a very 
sensitive situation. Much of it was not in the fl oodway, but opening 
234
Divine Providence
the Morganza spillway would put additional pressure on Morgan City 
and more water in surrounding areas. Fleming’s inundation map did 
not depict those impacts. Walsh also had questions about evacuation 
plans. Although Fleming assured his commanding offi cer that the district 
staff would be meeting the following day with Governor Jindal, parish 
presidents, levee boards, and other stakeholders – all of whom knew 
the trigger points – Walsh was not yet sold. He wanted everything on 
the table handled properly and deliberately.237
The following morning, May 5, the commission voted unanimously 
to give Fleming the authority to open the Bonnet Carré spillway “in 
accordance with the approved Water Control Manual,” but Walsh did 
not open the discussion on the request to open the Morganza spillway. 
On May 6, Fleming sent a memorandum to Walsh offi cially request-
ing approval to activate the Morganza fl oodway. He attached another 
detailed engineering justifi cation developed by Baumy, his engineering 
chief. In his analysis, Baumy mentioned that the river had reached a 
stage of 15 feet on the Carrollton gage and 37 feet on the Baton Rouge 
gage. If the discharge at Red River Landing reached 1.8 million cfs as 
expected, the National Weather Service anticipated crest stages at Car-
rollton and Baton Rouge to reach 19.5 and 47.5 feet, respectively, with-
out the Morganza fl oodway in operation. The higher stages, according 
to Baumy, would place unprecedented pressure on the levee system and 
required major fl ood fi ght efforts along more than 200 miles of levees 
that protected large population centers and numerous chemical plants 
and refi neries between Baton Rouge and Bonnet Carré. Of particular 
concern were Duncan Point, where the district had placed nearly 12,000 
sandbags to serve as a seepage berm; a three-mile segment of levee at 
Manchac Bend, which would overtop by up to two feet of water; and the 
Baton Rouge front. Baumy also noted that the Morganza structure itself 
faced overtopping. The resulting scour “could potentially jeopardize the 
stability of the structure,” and place more stress on the Old River control 
structures. Even if fl ood fi ghting efforts proved successful throughout 
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the reach of the Mississippi below Morganza, Baumy warned that the 
increased velocity in the channel posed another level of unacceptable 
risk by increasing the probability of errant barges or vessels damaging 
or breaching the levee system. All of these potential threats could be 
alleviated, though. With the fl oodway in operation, the predicted crests 
would only reach 17 feet on the Carrollton gage and 43.5 feet on the 
Baton Rouge gage and river velocities would remain manageable.238
After formally submitting the written request, Fleming verbally 
delivered a second decision briefi ng to Walsh and the commission. To 
avoid any confusion, Fleming stated at the onset that the purpose of the 
briefi ng was to secure the commission president’s approval to operate 
the fl oodway. Fleming’s new operational timeline called for the fl ood-
way evacuation to commence immediately and for Walsh to approve 
the operation by the following day – May 7. Fleming still intended to 
begin with a slow release, but he pushed the date back from his original 
proposal of May 10 to May 11. River forecasters expected the Missis-
sippi River discharge at Red River Landing to approach 1.4 million cfs 
on May 11. Fleming’s timeline, as it had originally on May 4, still called 
for the structure to be fully operational by May 14. To support his argu-
ment for the slow opening, the district commander emphasized that the 
Flood of 1973 Post-Flood Report prepared by the district recommended 
a gradual introduction of fl oodwaters to limit velocities to one foot per 
24 hours to “provide terrestrial wildlife an opportunity to vacate the 
fl oodway with a minimum of distress.” It was one of the lessons learned 
from the one and only operation of the fl oodway. The slow release also 
addressed a crucial engineering concern in that it would help to alleviate 
scour on the downstream side of the structure. This was an important 
consideration and another key lesson learned from the 1973 activation 
of the fl oodway. During the 1973 operation, massive scour holes devel-
oped below the stilling basin causing extensive damage. Left unchecked, 
the scour could work its way back toward the gates and undermine the 
structure. Scour was such a concern that the district placed more than 
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a dozen scour indicators below the stilling basin. The indicators, eight 
inch by eight inch wooded fl oats anchored to metal disks, were buried to 
a depth of fi ve feet. In the event that releases through the gates scoured 
the land on the backside of the structure and uncovered the indicators, 
the fl oats would surface and alert the district of the problem.239
The inundation map Fleming used in the briefi ng was the same as the 
one he used on May 4, at least in respect to the Atchafalaya basin fl ood-
way guide levees. According to the new map, which used roughly the 
same assumptions as the previous map – 300,000 cfs fl owing through the 
Morganza spillway and 760,000 cfs down the Atchafalaya River – the 
Morganza fl oodway and much of the Atchafalaya basin fl oodway below 
Interstate 10 would be inundated with anywhere from ten to twenty feet 
of water. Sections toward the lower end of the West Atchafalaya fl ood-
way in the vicinity of Melville and Krotz Springs could expect anywhere 
from a few inches to ten feet of water. The Pointe Coupee loop and the 
northern portions of the West Atchafalaya fl oodway would remain dry, 
as would the towns of Simmesport, Melville, and Krotz Springs, whose 
combined populations of 2,800 received protection from ring levees. 
By Fleming’s estimation, operating the fl oodway would impact nearly 
2,500 people and nearly 2,000 homes, with the highest concentrations 
of people being found along State Highway 105 between Melville and 
Krotz Springs (600 residents), along the West Atchafalaya Levee Road 
south of Krotz Springs (350 residents), and in the Butte La Rose area, 
east of Henderson (475 residents).
Fleming also sought to address concerns about impacts to the back-
water area presented by Walsh during the May 4 briefi ng. The inundation 
map indicated that large sections of Iberville, Assumption, and Terre-
bonne parishes to the east of the eastern basin levee would be inundated 
by up to fi ve feet of backwater fl ooding from the combined fl ows of the 
Atchafalaya River and the Morganza fl oodway. Fleming informed Walsh 
that fl ooding would impact up to 22,500 people and nearly 11,000 homes 
in the backwater areas, including Amelia and Stephenville near Morgan 
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City in St. Mary Parish; communities in Terrebonne Parish between 
Houma and Morgan City, including Humphreys, Gibson, and Donner; 
Pierre Part and Belle River in Assumption Parish; and communities 
along Bayou Sorrel and Grand River in Iberville Parish.240
The potential impacts to the large numbers of people and property 
in the backwater area left an impression on Walsh. Although they were 
not in the fl oodway, he knew that the fl ood would impact them and 
that they would need to seek legal remedies for their losses. After the 
briefi ng, Walsh sent a note to Maj. Gen. Bo Temple, the deputy chief 
of engineers, informing him of the backwater situation and asking the 
Corps headquarters “to seek authority and funding to set up a claims 
process that would include paying for impacts.” Temple responded by 
suggesting a review of alternate scenarios to compare the impacts of 
operating the fl oodway against potential impacts to the MR&T system 
below Morganza. “The less impact we have in either case, the better,” 
Temple wrote to Walsh, “realizing there’ll be impacts no matter what 
we do.” Walsh, in turn, instructed Charles Shadie, his chief of water 
management, to work with the New Orleans Engineer District to develop 
an assessment of various scenarios.241
Only three basic scenarios existed. The fi rst was to stick to the 
approved water control plans and divert 300,000 cfs through the Mor-
ganza fl oodway, while passing 1.5 million cfs through the system 
between Baton Rouge and the Bonnet Carré spillway. The second 
involved not operating the fl oodway and attempting to pass 1.8 mil-
lion cfs – a discharge roughly twenty percent greater than the project 
design fl ood – past Baton Rouge, while fl ood fi ghting along 200 miles 
of levees along the vital corridor. The third was to avoid operating the 
fl oodway and compensate by pushing an additional 300,000 cfs through 
the Old River control structures to maintain a project design fl ood 
discharge past Baton Rouge. The fi rst two scenarios had already been 
addressed in Baumy’s engineering justifi cation attached to Fleming’s 
May 6 written request to open the Morganza fl oodway. As for the Old 
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River control scenario, Baumy had already commenced developing an 
assessment the previous day. It was a tricky situation.
Congress authorized the Old River control structures in 1954, after 
Mississippi River Commission studies revealed a “defi nite” possibil-
ity that the Mississippi River might change course and divert its fl ow 
through the Old River link to the Atchafalaya River, thereby causing 
greater fl ooding in the Atchafalaya basin and the abandonment of the 
existing Mississippi River channel below Old River, which would have 
created extreme economic hardship to ports, the navigation industry, 
and industrial facilities between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.
The original structures consisted of a closure dam across Old River, 
a gated low sill structure to regulate the daily fl ow of water at all stages 
from the Mississippi River into the Red-Atchafalaya system, a massive 
overbank structure to pass excess fl ows during fl oods, and a navigation 
lock to maintain the waterborne commerce link between the Missis-
sippi, Red, and Atchafalaya rivers. A hydropower plant and an auxiliary 
structure – designed to reduce stress on the low sill structure after it 
was damaged during the 1973 fl ood – were added to the control com-
plex in 1986 and 1990, respectively. Because the Atchafalaya River 
was a distributary of the Mississippi River, it received a continuous 
fl ow of water and sediment from the Mississippi via the Old River link. 
To maintain that existing relationship, the law required the Corps of 
Engineers to regulate the structures so that 70 percent of the combined 
fl ows and sediment of the Red and Mississippi rivers would continue 
down the Mississippi River, while thirty percent of combined Red and 
Mississippi River fl ows and sediment would be conveyed through the 
Atchafalaya River.242
The Old River area is a very dynamic place, with a long history 
of attack from the river. For that reason, Baumy’s assessment of the 
scenario refl ected a harsh reality. If the goal was to not activate the 
Morganza fl oodway, but still maintain project design fl ood fl ows past 
Baton Rouge, he contended that a total fl ow of 920,000 cfs needed to be 
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conveyed through the Old River control structures. The project design 
fl ood called for 620,000 cfs to pass through the structures, so the sce-
nario necessitated a fi fty percent increase. To distribute the increased 
fl ows under this scenario, Baumy intended to pass 350,000 cfs through 
the low sill structure, 350,000 cfs through the auxiliary structure, and 
220,000 cfs through the overbank structure. The potential for increased 
velocity and scour was the main concern. The control structure had 
passed 620,000 cfs during the 1973 fl ood. The increased velocity caused 
numerous bank failures and severe erosion to levee setback. In 2009, the 
New Orleans Engineer District fully opened the gates at the auxiliary 
structure to fl ush sediment. The surge of water fl anked the revetment 
on both banks of the infl ow channel and caused bank failures near the 
upper guide levee and the south entrance channel. Baumy also surmised 
that the additional water would overtop the levees on the east bank of 
the Atchafalaya River and reduce the freeboard on the west bank levees 
to less than one foot at their intersection with the Melville and Krotz 
Springs ring levees.243
More problematic were the low sill and overbank structures. In 1964 
and 1965, the district closed the gates after barges had broken free from 
their upstream fl eeting areas and crashed into the low sill structure on 
separate occasions. The reopening of the gates resulted in extensive 
scouring in the outfl ow channel. Less than a decade later, the 1973 fl ood 
severely damaged the low sill structure. The high-velocity fl ow through 
the structure scoured a 50-foot-deep hole in front of and partially under 
the structure. It was this scour that resulted in the infamous collapse of 
the wing wall and the subsequent activation of the Morganza fl oodway. 
Had the scour holes in the infl ow and outfl ow channels connected, the 
entire low sill structure may have collapsed. The low sill structure had 
since been repaired, but it had sustained permanent damage, which 
resulted in restricting the head differential from the Mississippi River 
side of the structure to the downstream side of the structure from 37 feet, 
as originally designed, to 22 feet. It was this restriction that necessitated 
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the construction of the auxiliary structure. Baumy touted the soundness 
of the low sill structure, but cautioned, “excessive velocities can cause 
damage in unanticipated ways…the potential for scour and undermin-
ing, undetectable during the event, could result in signifi cant damage 
or failure.”244
The overbank structure also posed two problems – Baumy addressed 
one in his analysis. When the structure was fi rst used during the 1973 
fl ood, severe scour occurred near the south guide levee that connected 
the overbank exit channel to the low sill structure outfl ow channel. The 
New Orleans Engineer District addressed the problem by installing a 
120-acre gabion fi eld over the scour area. During the 1983 fl ood, though, 
a massive scour hole developed in the gabion fi eld. The added capacity 
to convey water through the auxiliary structure had alleviated the need 
to open the overbank structure during larger fl oods in 1997 and 2008. 
As the 2011 fl ood developed, the district had no intention of using the 
overbank structure in an effort to avoid new scour to the gabion fi eld. 
Therein lay the second problem. The overbank structure had limita-
tions. It needed to be operated before the head differential between the 
riverside and landside of the structure reached thirteen feet. As Baumy 
developed the scenario, the river rapidly approached that level. Use of 
Water seeps through the overbank structure at the Old River Control Complex on May 4, 2011.
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the overbank structure required a quick trigger. The river would exceed 
the thirteen-foot head limitation by the afternoon of May 11.245
When you gonna do it?
By May 8, the Mississippi River reached 40 feet on the Baton Rouge 
gage, fi ve feet above fl ood stage. The river had risen seven feet in 
seven days. At the Carrollton gage near New Orleans, the river reached 
16 feet. Pressure mounted on the levee system, but it held fi rm. For 
fl ood fi ghting purposes, the New Orleans Engineer District divided the 
reach of the river below Baton Rouge into sectors. The Pontchartrain, 
Orleans-Jefferson, and Lake Borgne sectors comprised the 183 miles 
of levee on the east bank. The Pontchartrain sector covered 98 miles 
of levees between Baton Rouge and the Bonnet Carré spillway. The 
Orleans-Jefferson sector encompassed 37 miles of levees from Bonnet 
Carré to the Orleans-St. Bernard Parish line. The Lake Borgne sector 
started at the same county line and covered 48 miles of levees extend-
ing down to Bohemia. On the west bank, the Lower West Mississippi 
sector covered 92 miles of levee between the Morganza spillway and 
Donaldsonville. The Lafourche sector encompassed the 90 miles of 
levee between Donaldsonville and the Algiers Canal. The Lower Coast 
sector covered the 77 miles of levee extending between the canal and 
Venice. Stuart Waits served as the area engineer for the east bank sectors, 
as well as the Lafourche and Lower Coast sectors, and Ted Eilts as the 
area engineer for the West Lower Mississippi sector and all sectors in 
the Atchafalaya basin and on the Mississippi River above Morganza.246
The river regularly climbs above 11 feet on the Carrollton gage, the 
trigger point for phase I fl ood fi ght activities. In fact the New Orleans 
district had been in phase I since early March. Phase I activities equate 
to inspecting every mile of levee in the system, two to three times a 
week. Phase II – daily inspections and 24-hour operations – commences 
when the Carrollton gage exceeds 15 feet. Going into the 2011 fl ood, the 
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New Orleans district was well prepared. The 2008 fl ood had helped the 
district and levee boards indentify potential problem areas. That fl ood 
had crested at 43.1 feet on the Baton Rouge gage and 16.8 feet on the 
Carrollton gage, therefore, the 2008 high water had placed similar pres-
sure loads on the system and exposed problematic underseepage areas, 
sand boils, and other related issues. As the river climbed higher in May 
2011, exerting its force and weight against the levees as it sought an 
escape route under the structures, fl ood fi ghters knew exactly where 
to look for potential weak spots identifi ed during the 2008 fl ood fi ght.
The ongoing dry spell in the region also assisted in the identifi ca-
tion of problem areas. Unlike previous major fl oods, like 1973 and 
2008, persistent localized rainfall did not accompany the 2011 high 
water. The 2011 fl ood emanated entirely from above. Normally during 
fl oods, ditches, low spots, and surrounding fi elds are covered with 
impounded rain, making it diffi cult for fl ood fi ghters to determine the 
difference between seepage and runoff. While the drought conditions 
had a downside, namely causing shrinkage and cracks in the levees, the 
dry conditions made the identifi cation of underseepage easier for weary 
levee inspectors. As Waits noted, “it had been so dry for so long, that 
any landside water we saw was seepage.” According to Waits, the dry 
conditions also allowed fl ood fi ghters “to identify a lot of areas that we 
wouldn’t have noticed before.”247
Despite these good fortunes, not all was well within the system. 
There were several areas of intense concern, particularly with regard to 
underseepage. Chief among them was the levee at Duncan Point, just 
south of Baton Rouge. The levee had been plagued with severe under-
seepage since the 1973 fl ood. It was a known trouble spot. Following 
the development of several sand boils during the 2008 fl ood, the New 
Orleans district constructed a stability berm to address the problem, 
but as the river placed pressure on the levee during the 2011 event, the 
underseepage migrated to the north of the berm on the landside toe of 
the levee. This prompted the Pontchartrain levee district to construct 
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an extension to the berm using in excess of 12,000 sandbags. Aside 
from underseepage, another cause for heightened anxiety among the 
levee districts involved barges. Several levee districts complained that 
barges were pushing and mooring too far up on the levees. They were 
concerned that the barges might bump or push against the levees and 
threaten the integrity of the all-too-important structures. The levee dis-
tricts found some comfort in the fact that the district had formed a Rapid 
Response Team, which had developed a number of “what if” scenarios 
and accompanying plans to address a catastrophic levee failure, but that 
comfort only went so far. The only thing that would ease their fears was 
the activation of the Morganza fl oodway.248 The Morganza fl oodway was 
really at the heart of the issue. Walsh had not authorized its opening or 
even hinted that he would, despite two very public requests by Fleming. 
Flood stages of 44 feet and 17 feet at the Baton Rouge and Carrollton 
gages, respectively, would certainly test the system from Baton Rouge 
The levee along the corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans holds back the river.
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on down the river, but the system had already passed that test in 2008. 
Without the Morganza fl oodway in operation, though, the predicted 
stages on those same gages would reach 47.5 feet and 19.5 feet. That 
represented an entirely different test – one that the levee districts, the 
state, and the public wanted to avoid.
Governor Jindal and the levee districts simply wanted predictability. 
The fact that the commission and the district were analyzing alternatives 
to operating the fl oodway created a strong sense of uncertainty. From 
the state’s perspective, they had the resources they needed to get into 
place. They needed to evacuate the fi rst fl oors of hospitals, open shelters, 
pre-position food and water, and prepare for evacuations. They had to 
consider high population centers, schools, and infrastructure. They had 
to allocate fl ood fi ghting resources. Where would the national guard 
and inmate laborers be needed most to fi ll sandbags? All depended on 
whether or not Walsh intended to operate the Morganza fl oodway and 
when. If he intended to activate the spillway, those resources would be 
needed in the Atchafalaya basin. If he intended to pass the water past 
Baton Rouge and through the system, the resources needed to be staged 
farther to the east. The same went for the Mississippi River levee dis-
tricts. They desperately wanted Fleming’s staff to provide a little fore-
sight. They needed to know how high to raise their levees during the 
fl ood fi ght. Defi ciencies in levee heights under project design fl ood fl ows 
certainly existed but not along the entire reach below Baton Rouge. The 
defi ciencies were manageable, but raising 300 or more miles of levees 
was no simple task. The effort would use up resources – resources that 
could be devoted to other purposes, such as levee inspections. If Walsh 
intended to use the fl oodway, the levee districts could reallocate those 
resources.249
The private sector was feeling the heat, too. The emergency pre-
paredness manager the Waterford nuclear power station in St. Charles 
Parish – one of two nuclear plants in the state – sent a message to 
Michael Stack, the New Orleans district’s emergency management 
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chief, asking for the district’s intention with respect to operating the 
Morganza fl oodway. He was worried that the plant would be forced 
to initiate a shutdown if the Morganza fl oodway was not placed into 
operation. Citing concerns about the station’s intake structure and the 
stability of the power grid, he noted that the plant’s leadership faced 
several decisions about moving assets and equipment to provide protec-
tive measures. He was not trying to infl uence the decision one way or 
the other. Rather, he simply asked whether or not the district anticipated 
opening the structure before river stages would force the plant to shut 
down. The plant’s emergency preparedness manager may not have been 
pressuring the district for a decision, but Steve Wilson, the president 
of the Pontchartrain levee district, did. “Folks, this is a nuclear power 
plant,” he wrote to the district, “You think we might want to consider 
Morganza? Please.”250
Forecasted stages between Baton Rouge and New Orleans also led to 
concern for the Coast Guard, which acted as the manager of commercial 
transportation, a mission that included overseeing maritime safety. The 
The Mississippi River levee between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.
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Coast Guard notifi ed the Corps of Engineers that if the predicted stages 
materialized, it would close the river to navigation. The threshold for 
closure would only be reached if the Mississippi River Commission did 
not activate the fl oodway. The notifi cation was not a threat or an attempt 
to infl uence a decision – the Coast Guard respected that it was Walsh’s 
call – but their potential action was a reality necessitated by the river 
forecasts. The navigation industry, recognizing that nearly 500 million 
tons of water commerce moved through the Mississippi River system 
annually, began placing pressure on the district to operate the fl oodway. 
“I can’t tell you how many times the navigation folks said, ‘Hey, Corps, 
pull the trigger, baby,’” Christopher Accardo, the New Orleans district’s 
chief of operations, later recalled. All Col. Fleming and New Orleans 
district staff could do was relay the concerns to Maj. Gen. Walsh and 
the Mississippi River Commission. Fleming would oversee the execu-
tion of the project, but it was Walsh’s decision as to if and when the 
structure would be operated.251
As pressure on the system mounted, so did the public pressure on 
Col. Fleming and his staff. By this point in the overall system-wide 
fl ood fi ght, Walsh’s modus operandi with respect to the fl oodways took 
on a hint of brinksmanship. Making room for the river by dispersing 
excess fl ows through the fl oodways made perfect engineering sense on 
paper, but actually making the decision to intentionally fl ood people’s 
homes, property, and business interests, though unavoidable, was no 
easy task. Whether intentional or not, Wash’s deliberate decision pro-
cesses created the impression that he was willing to push the system 
to the limit and avoid using the fl oodways. One theory is that Walsh 
wanted to build a regional consensus on the necessity of operating 
fl oodways. He wanted to create anxiety among the public who stood 
to benefi t from the operation of the fl oodways. He wanted them to 
experience the same level of tension as those living in the fl oodways. 
He wanted them and their elected offi cials to put pressure on him, as 
the commission president, to operate.252 Such had been the case at the 
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Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, where Walsh’s deliberate process 
created a high level of discomfort. By the time he gave the order to 
activate at Birds Point-New Madrid, he had received several notes from 
offi cials from Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee – even from Missouri 
offi cials from outside the fl oodway – pleading for him, even demanding 
for him, to blow the levee. The same was beginning to happen at the 
Morganza fl oodway. Population centers, levee districts, the navigation 
industry, the power industry, the Coast Guard, and the governor were 
anxious. Their level of discomfort grew with each passing day, as did 
their acknowledgement that the fl oodways were vital parts of the system 
for a very important reason.
On the morning of May 9, Maj. Gen. Walsh, along with fellow com-
missioners Sam Angel and Clifford Smith, travelled to the Bonnet Carré 
spillway to oversee the opening of the structure. The Mississippi River 
roared past the structure at rate of 1.24 million cfs. This resulted in a 
reading of 16.5 feet at the Carrollton gage. Farther upstream, the dis-
charge rate at Red River Landing reached 1.32 million cfs. Higher fl ows 
Aerial view of the Bonnet Carré floodway just moments after the spillway was opened.
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and higher stages were on the way, 
necessitating the opening of Bonnet 
Carré. River water seeped through the 
needles at the structure, partially inun-
dating the fl oodway on the protected 
side of the structure. A large crowd of 
people were in attendance, which cre-
ated a festival-like atmosphere. That 
atmosphere would continue for days, 
as more than 40,000 visitors would 
ultimately travel to the spillway to 
witness the diversion. At 0900 hours, 
Fleming gave the order to open the fi rst 
set of needles to allow the swollen and pressure-packed river to relieve 
its pressure and crash into the fl oodway. Crews continued raising needles 
until the river fl owed through 28 bays at a rate of 26,000 cfs. The onrush-
ing water quickly formed small channels that began wending through 
the fl oodway toward Lake Pontchartrain, approximately seven miles 
to the north. Within fi ve days, crews had opened 300 of the 350 bays, 
allowing so much water to escape the river that the discharge through 
the spillway actually exceeded its design capacity of 250,000 cfs.253
Later in the afternoon, Fleming presented the three scenarios that 
Walsh had requested with respect to the Morganza fl oodway. Going 
into the briefi ng, Fleming was confi dent that his commanding offi cer 
would grant permission to operate the Morganza fl oodway now that 
the opening of the Bonnet Carré spillway was out of the way. He knew 
it was unrealistic to try to pass more than 1.5 million cfs past Baton 
Rouge. Furthermore, the previous day Walsh had instructed Fleming 
to develop “a sequence of activities to open Morganza into discrete 
actions” and put those action into a timeline of H-hours, similar to the 
operational plan Col. Reichling had developed for the Birds Point-New 
Madrid fl oodway activation. Fleming responded that there were not any 
Raising the needles at the Bonnet Carré 
spillway.
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discreet actions at Morganza fl oodway. The process was entirely differ-
ent from the process used by Col. Reichling and the Memphis Engineer 
District. The operational plan for the Missouri fl oodway contained a 
series of decision points that telegraphed the ultimate outcome. There 
was a separate decision to load and move the barges, to locate and 
uncover the access wells, to pump the explosives into the pipes, and to 
activate the fl oodway. At Morganza there was only one action – open it 
or do not open it. Still, the request signaled to Fleming that Walsh was 
moving closer to making a decision. Governor Jindal shared Fleming’s 
confi dence. Aware that the district commander was prepared to brief 
Walsh, Jindal expressed optimism to the media that “Walsh will make 
a decision today.”254
During the briefi ng, Fleming informed Walsh of the many levees, 
freeboard, and seepage concerns that he had in the system and com-
municated the issues involving the navigation industry and the nuclear 
power plant. He also presented the three scenarios. After emphasizing 
Walter Baumy, left, explains the three scenarios to Sam Angel and Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh.
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that the second and third scenarios (attempting to pass more than 1.5 mil-
lion cfs past Baton Rouge and deviating through the Old River control 
structures) posed too great a risk to the system, Fleming recommended 
opening the Morganza spillway. Walsh concurred with Fleming’s rec-
ommendation. Sticking to his practice of brinksmanship, though, he did 
not grant permission to open the spillway; rather, he confi rmed that he 
would operate the fl oodway according to the operations plan “when I 
make the decision concerning the use of the Morganza Floodway.” This 
at least confi rmed that the commission would not try to pass a discharge 
greater than 1.5 million cfs past Baton Rouge or deviate through the 
Old River control structures.255
The decision relieved some of the anxiety demonstrated by the 
levee districts along the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, but 
for Col. Fleming and the district staff, the questions from the public 
merely went from “are you going to do it?” to “when are you going to 
do it?” As Fleming later recalled, “When you gonna do it? When you 
gonna do it? When you gonna do it? That’s all anyone wanted to know. 
When you gonna do it?” Even Maj. Gen. Temple asked Walsh, “When 
do you estimate you’ll make the Morganza decision?” The governor’s 
offi ce wanted to know the same thing. They needed to issue a mandatory 
evacuation, but they also needed to know when to make the declaration. 
The governor’s offi ce and local offi cials encouraged a voluntary evacu-
ation, but any progress proved slow. Instead of moving their belongings, 
many fl oodways residents were sandbagging and building temporary 
levees to protect their homes.256
We Have Serious Issues
By the morning of May 10, Fleming realized that he had an addi-
tional specter with which to contend. The New Orleans district had com-
pleted the construction of the Morganza spillway by the time Congress 
authorized the Old River control structures in 1954. The operational 
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plan for the fl oodway rested on the assumption that a Mississippi River 
discharge of 1.5 million cfs at Tarbert Landing – located about 4 miles 
upriver from Red River Landing – would equate to a stage no higher 
than 56 feet at the Morganza spillway. With the top of the gates reaching 
an elevation of 60 feet, the structure possessed four feet of freeboard 
above the maximum expected stage of the river – at least conceptually. 
The 1973 fl ood, as it had at so many MR&T project features, exposed a 
problem. Rating curves developed after the fl ood indicated a “progres-
sive deterioration of the discharge capacity” for the reach of the river 
between the Old River control structures and the Morganza spillway, 
possibly due to the changes in the dynamics of the river created by the 
control structures. In other words, higher stages than expected for a 
given fl ow had materialized. The phenomenon occurred again during 
subsequent fl oods. In 1983, the discharge at Tarbert Landing peaked at 
1.47 million cfs, but the stage at the structure reached 58.1 feet, more 
than two feet higher than expected. Further changes to the dynamics 
of the river were created by the construction of the auxiliary structure 
and hydropower plant at Old River in 1986 and 1990, respectively. In 
2008, the Tarbert Landing discharge measured 1.46 million cfs and 
the river crested at 57.6 feet in the spillway. The New Orleans district 
water control managers noticed the same anomaly in 2011. When the 
discharge at Tarbert Landing reached 1,335,000 cfs in 1973, the esti-
mated corresponding stage at the spillway was 52 feet. In 2008, when 
the discharge reached that same rate of fl ow, the stage at the spillway 
reached 54 feet, an increase of nearly two feet. By May 9, 2011, the 
discharge at Tarbert Landing reached 1,335,000 cfs. The stage at the 
Morganza spillway was 55 feet. The discharge trigger for operating the 
fl oodway was not correlating to the proper stage. The phenomenon did 
not catch the district off guard, but it was becoming clear to Fleming 
that, based on the rate of rise, there was a strong probability that the 
river would overtop the gates at the Morganza spillway.257
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The potential overtopping of 
the gates presented several prob-
lems. From an operational stand-
point, overtopping threatened the 
ability to open the gates. The spill-
way is a 3,906-foot-long structure 
with 125 gated openings, each a 
little more than 28 feet wide and 
separated by three-foot-wide piers. 
Each opening contains steel ver-
tical lift gates. Upper and lower 
leafs comprise each gate. Each leaf 
is equipped with rollers that allow 
the gates to slide up and down in 
the slots between the piers. The 
structure has two gantry cranes 
that move along the structure and 
raise the gates. The gantry cranes 
lift the gates to allow water to 
pass through the structure. Each 
gate leaf has two lifting eyes. The 
gantry cranes lower lifting beams 
equipped with pins into the slots. 
The pins attach to the lifting eyes 
and the gantry crane raises the gates. 
Aligning the pins into lifting eyes 
requires visual assistance and con-
fi rmation. The concern with over-
topping was two-fold. First, head 
pressure higher than the design limit 
of 56 feet increased the possibility 
of the roller gates locking up, which, 
Water spills over the gates at the Morganza spillway.
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in turn, could stress or possibly damage the gantry cranes. The facility 
possessed a back-up crane, but its operation depended on the use of 
slings that had to be manually connected to the gates. Such an operation 
would be impossible with water cascading over the gates. The second 
concern was that overtopping would inhibit the crew’s ability to visu-
ally align the pins with the lifting eyes.258
Not being able to operate the structure was a concern in terms of 
maintaining the project design fl ood discharge and safeguarding the 
levees below Baton Rouge, but higher head stages and overtopping 
threatened the integrity of the structure itself. Geotechnical and struc-
tural engineers from the district were somewhat concerned that the pres-
sure from the extremely high stages might actually move or uplift the 
structure. The probability was low, but the concern warranted surveys 
and observation. The more pressing concern centered on the curtain 
walls at both ends of the spillway. The curtain walls extended from the 
gated sections of the spillway to the abutments on either end. The walls 
were constructed to the same elevation as the gates. The areas immedi-
ately below the curtain walls did not have scour protection. If the walls 
overtopped, the resultant scour threatened to undermine the structure. 
The district contemplated sandbagging the curtain walls to add height, 
but concerns for the safety of the individuals who would have to work 
on the narrow wall – with little margin of error separating them from 
the rising river – forced the abandonment of the idea. Little could be 
done, other than to open the spillway to relieve stages.
During the May 11 daily briefi ng, Charles Shadie reported that the 
National Weather Service had adjusted the forecast fl ows at Red River 
Landing downward from 1,800,000 cfs to 1,626,000 cfs. For several 
days, the water control managers at the New Orleans district and MVD 
believed the forecast was too high and coordinated their suspicions with 
the offi cial forecasters. They suspected that the raw models used by the 
weather service were interpreting the higher stages in the tributaries as 
infl ow into the system, rather than the Mississippi River backing into 
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the tributaries, which was actually the case. The downward revision 
simply confi rmed the age-old axiom that forecasts always get better 
closer to the event. The downgrade was both good news and bad news 
for Fleming. It was good news from the standpoint that it meant less 
water that needed to be diverted from the Mississippi River into the 
Morganza fl oodway. On the other hand, he knew that forecast might 
infl uence Walsh to reconsider his May 9 decision to operate according 
to the operations plan when the river discharge reached the 1.5 million 
cfs trigger point at Red River Landing.
Fleming went into immediate damage control mode when it was 
his turn to speak during the briefi ng. He pointed out that the river had 
climbed two feet in two days at the Morganza structure. By the morn-
ing of May 11, the river exceeded 57 feet – one foot higher than the 
assumed design stage for operating the spillway. The river was within 
three feet of overtopping the spillway gates and the south guide levee. 
He relayed his newest concern to Walsh, “If we overtop, we will have 
great diffi culty moving the gates when the time comes.” He also relayed 
his concerns about the curtain wall, which he warned “cannot tolerate 
overtopping.” He then almost pleaded with Walsh not to change direc-
tion by arguing, “I understand the forecast fl ow change at Red River 
Landing, but nothing we have heard changes our recommendation to 
operate the fl oodway.” Sensing that “there will be further affects as the 
fl ows hit backwaters and trees and friction points in the river,” Walsh 
instructed Fleming to “Hold the line as you are.” In the meantime, he 
wanted Fleming’s staff to run the three scenarios presented to him on 
May 9 against the new predicted discharge numbers.
To Fleming, the tasking to run the scenarios only amounted to home-
work. He saw the river racing toward the trigger point. In the early 
morning hours of Friday, May 13, he sent a note to Walsh, seeking his 
permission to inform Jindal at the governor’s daily briefi ng that “we 
will open Morganza within 36 hours as long as the fl ow at Red River 
hit 1.5M [1.5 million cfs].” Based on the forecasts, the river would 
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reach the trigger point on the afternoon of May 14. Fleming knew 
he was pressuring his commanding offi cer, but he had a good reason. 
The evacuation was still progressing slowly. The governor’s unifi ed 
command group would be at the briefi ng and they could notify people 
quickly that the fl oodway would be activated. Fleming was concerned 
that if they waited until later in the day, state offi cials would experience 
diffi culties in getting the word out. He also requested permission to tell 
his staff, so that they could stop working on other scenarios and focus 
entirely on the fl oodway operations. The request drew a strong rebuke 
from Walsh, “The decision has not been made.” Walsh instructed Flem-
ing to “Tell [Governor Jindal] as always at 1.5 [million cfs] on the gage 
we will operate . . . work all scenarios until a decision is reached.”259 
A little more than an hour later during the daily commanders brief-
ing, Fleming announced that he expected the Bonnet Carré spillway to 
reach its design capacity discharge of 250,000 cfs sometime during the 
course of the day; the discharge fl owing past New Orleans had reached 
the project design fl ood dimension of 1,250,000 cfs. The stage at Mor-
ganza had reached 58.6 feet, less than 1.5 feet from overtopping the 
gates. “We are ready to operate,” Fleming told Walsh. He also informed 
Walsh that once the district received the order, the district would notify 
the Louisiana National Guard, the state police and individual mayors and 
“they will go door-to-door in the communities to insure the fl oodway 
is clear.” At 1500 hours that same day, Walsh sent an offi cial order in 
writing that directed Fleming to “be prepared to operate the fl oodway 
within 24 hours,” upon Walsh’s order to execute and in accordance with 
the approved operational plan.260
The approved operational plan specifi ed a trigger point of a 
1,500,000 cfs discharge at Red River Landing. Because the Morganza 
spillway was designed under the assumption that the gates would open 
prior to river stages reaching 56 feet at the structure, all tables, graphs, 
and data in the water control manual ended at that stage. Rating curves 
and various equations used by the district’s hydraulic engineers to 
257
Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf
extrapolate stages, therefore, were not as precise as needed. This posed 
an incredible challenge for the district. Baumy had sent personnel to 
the Morganza spillway and Old River control structures to monitor the 
situation and check gages around the clock. At 2200 hours on May 13, 
Nancy Powell, the district’s chief of hydraulics, was at her home check-
ing the gages from her phone, when she noticed a sizeable uptick in the 
river stages at Morganza. She checked the most current reading against 
previous readings. The river was climbing at a rapid pace. At that rate, 
Powell knew the gates at the spillway would overtop sometime during 
the night. She called Baumy and advised him of her assessment. Not 
knowing whether or not Walsh intended to open the spillway, Baumy 
instructed the gate operators at the Old River auxiliary structure to 
divert more water from the Mississippi River to keep the gates from 
overtopping. The gate change increased the total discharge through the 
Old River control structures to 672,000 cfs, more than 50,000 cfs above 
the project design fl ood discharge. The gate change had prevented the 
The Low Sill Structure at the Old River Control Complex on May 14, 2011.
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river from overtopping the gates at Morganza, but it also siphoned off 
some of the discharge at Red River Landing.261
On the morning of May 14, the Mississippi River Commission and 
its staff assembled in the conference room on the MISSISSIPPI, which 
was moored at Baton Rouge, for the daily 0800 hours conference call. 
It was a few minutes prior to the meeting, so all were present but Walsh, 
who was in his stateroom reviewing situational reports from his district 
commanders. As was usual, individual paper copies of the slides for the 
morning presentation sat on the conference table in front of each chair. 
Upon taking their places the commission members and staff examined 
the briefi ng and intently fl ipped to the page that contained the opera-
tional timeline for the Morganza fl oodway. The timeline was a chart that 
mapped out the previous, current, and forecasted daily high discharges 
at Red River Landing, along with key decision points. Almost everyone 
anticipated that the May 14 forecast would depict at least 1,500,000 cfs 
at Red River Landing. To a person, they were shocked to see the fore-
cast at 1,480,000 cfs.262
On paper, 20,000 cfs seems like a huge difference, but in reality it 
is not when it pertains to predicting the discharge of a river as big, fast, 
and deep as the Mississippi River. Various phenomena such as reverse 
fl ow, vertical fl ow, underwater sand dunes, and anti-dunes constantly 
form and disappear. Furthermore, when predicting the fl ow of the river, 
forecasters do not have an infi nitely fi ne ruler. They can only mea-
sure with a certain degree of accuracy, with the typical margin of error 
being from fi ve to ten percent. William Veatch, a hydrologist for the 
New Orleans district, described the difference between 1,480,000 cfs 
and 1,500,000 cfs as almost a “philosophical question – you’re almost 
asking what minute did you measure it.” Philosophical question or not, 
that 20,000 cfs might impact Walsh’s decision. One commission staff 
member walked up to Stephen Gambrell, the executive director for the 
commission, and tapped his fi nger on the May 14 discharge entry on 
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Gambrell’s copy of the timeline and whispered, “Does this mean he 
won’t pull the trigger?”263
Col. Fleming and the district staff were asking themselves that very 
same question: Does this mean he won’t  pull the trigger? To Fleming, 
it was a moot point. It did not matter what the fl ow was. The gates 
were about to overtop. Walsh needed to approve opening the structure. 
Fleming was convinced that Walsh would give the order. “There was no 
other way we could go. It was a slam-dunk,” he later recalled. He had 
been confi dent that he would secure approval after his initial request 
on May 4, and again on May 6 and May 9, though. Fleming was con-
fi dent, but not overly so. In fact, Walsh still had not reached a decision 
in his own mind, even as the commission departed the MISSISSIPPI at 
Baton Rouge and drove to the Morganza spillway. Walsh did not want 
to operate the structure prematurely. While he was certainly leaning 
toward opening the gates, he intended to stick to the operational trig-
ger point of 1.5 million cfs at Red River Landing as spelled out in the 
approved water control manual.264
When the commission arrived at the Morganza spillway, they imme-
diately went out on the structure to gain a more thorough perspective 
on the gates and their relationship to the height of the river. Going 
in, Walsh was convinced that the crews would be able to connect the 
pins to the lifting eyes and raise the gates even if the gates were under 
water. His trip to the structure convinced him otherwise. Water lapped 
at the top of the gates and spilled over when wave after wave crashed 
against the structure. Walsh turned to Russell Beauvais, the operations 
manager for the Morganza spillway and Old River control structures, 
and asked him, “Will you be able to lift the gates?” Beauvais, a burly 
Cajun, answered in his thick accent, “Yes, sir. It shouldn’t be an issue, 
as long as we don’t overtop.” The district had taken a precautionary 
measure to insure that they would at least be able to open the fi rst two 
gates on the structure. Fearing that they might lose the ability to hook 
the lifting mechanisms into the gates as water spilled over the top, the 
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crews had already made the necessary connections. Lifting the fi rst two 
gates would not pose a problem; lifting the remaining gates necessary 
to keep pace with the rising river was another story.265
Moments later, Maj. Gen. Walsh and the three civilian members of 
the commission, Sam Angel, R.D. James, and Clifford Smith gathered 
in the cramped main offi ce at the spillway for another decision briefi ng. 
Col. Fleming, Christopher Accardo, Michael Stack, Thomas Holden, and 
Beauvais represented the district in person, while Baumy and Powell 
phoned in from the district offi ce in New Orleans. Fleming set the stage 
by informing the commission that the river had set a new record stage 
of 62 feet at the Red River Landing gage. The river was higher than it 
had ever been and it was heading toward the Morganza structure, which 
already had reached the stage of 59.4 feet. Fleming expressed concern 
that the system was unraveling, “as you just saw, water is spilling over 
the gates.” Furthermore, the district had lost its battle to save the south 
Col. Edward Fleming, left, delivers his fi nal decision brief to the Mississippi River Commission.
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guide levee. For days, the district had been sandbagging the levee to 
keep it from overtopping and crevassing. The levee did not protect 
property – it merely served the purpose of guiding water toward the 
structure – but it tied into the spillway and the adjacent mainline levee 
that protected the town of Morganza. The river was now overtopping 
and eroding the levee, which generated concern that the crevasse would 
work its way toward the structure and the mainline levee. “Operating 
the spillway will take the head pressure off that levee,” Fleming advised.
Baumy followed with an update on river conditions. The latest 
National Weather Service forecast only called for the Mississippi River 
discharge to reach 1,430,000 cfs at Red River Landing later in the day, 
approximately 70,000 cfs below the trigger point for opening the gates. 
The district water control staff projected the discharge would not reach 
1.5 million cfs until the following day – May 15. “We have serious 
concerns about gate openings, particularly at night,” Baumy warned. 
He stated fl atly that there were only two possible actions to address the 
freeboard problem at the structure and to relieve pressure on the guide 
levee, “open the gates now or deviate through Old River.”
Fleming interjected, “Sir, the National Weather Service forecast 
does not change my recommendation. We have serious issues at this 
structure!”
Perhaps sensing that Walsh was bothered by the forecast, Thomas 
Holden, the Deputy District Engineer for Project Management, entered 
the conversation. Holden had served as the secretary for the commission 
from 2001 to 2002, so he knew how the commission and the MR&T 
project operated. Holden stated bluntly, “General, this is not an ‘if” but 
a ‘when’ scenario.” He went on to add, “If we don’t operate today, we 
will have to deviate through Old River. We simply cannot go another 
day without doing something. We simply can’t!”
Fleming interjected again, “Sir, I request permission to open one 
gate at 1500 hours. Then we’ll let the river dictate how we proceed.”
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Sitting erect at the small offi ce desk in the center of the room, Walsh 
nodded to acknowledge he understood the seriousness of the situation. 
He jotted a few notes in his green fi eld notebook and then looked at the 
civilian members of the commission that sat crowded around him on 
the opposite side of the desk. “Members?” Walsh asked, signaling that 
he wanted their input. Angel, James, and Smith each concurred with 
Fleming’s recommendation. He looked at Fleming, “Approved!” He 
then called Governor Jindal to notify him of the decision. The governor 
informed Walsh that the fl oodway was clear.266
Outside the offi ce, Holden had the demeanor of a person who had 
just survived a car crash or near-death experience and was left to ponder 
the “what ifs.” Holden and Walsh had served together as army majors 
in the 92nd engineer regiment, so he had a history with the commission 
president. He knew Walsh’s command style – never let anyone know 
what you are thinking. As Holden walked hurriedly past a throng of 
reporters, trying to burn off the adrenaline that had accumulated in his 
system, he slowly shook his head and huffed, “I thought he was going 
say no. I REALLY thought he was going to say no.”267
The commission made the half-mile trek to the middle of the spill-
way to get another overview on the gate lifting process. It was actu-
ally a pleasant day weather-wise, with the mild temperatures and low 
humidity ushered in by the cool, stiff breeze out of the north. The sun 
shone brightly, with only a few isolated clouds present. A large crowd of 
reporters gathered at the south end of the structure, but unlike the open-
ing of the Bonnet Carré spillway, the Morganza operation was closed to 
the public. Still there was a buzz in the air – literally – as several state 
police and news helicopters fl uttered across the peaceful blue sky. The 
view from the structure allowed a glimpse of two worlds. On one side 
of the structure stood a 23-foot wall of water. The angry river itched to 
be freed from its shackles, looking for room to expand and relieve its 
own pressure. Wind-driven waves slammed against the structure. Violent 
eddies swirled near the structure like vultures circling prey. The water 
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Aerial views of the Morganza floodway shortly after activation.
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was literally at the top of the gates. On the other side of the structure 
rested a serene and tranquil timbered landscape that seemed oblivious 
to the threat just a few hundred feet to the east.268
At 1500 hours, Col. Fleming made the long walk from the south 
end of the structure to the middle, where the commission awaited his 
arrival and the opening of the gates. He appeared confi dent and relaxed. 
A thin smile stretched across his face as if a large weight – not to men-
tion the enormous pressure of the system in his area of operations – had 
been lifted off of his shoulders. Without hesitation, he gave the signal 
to open the fi rst gate. The entire structure vibrated from the sudden and 
loud surge of water as the gantry crane lifted the gate. The violent tor-
rent of water unleashed its energy into and across the shallow stilling 
basin below before beginning its slow crawl across the dry land and 
disappearing into the timber.269
The Atchafalaya Basin
The activation of the Morganza fl oodway had immediate results on 
the MR&T protection system on the Mississippi River. By May 15, the 
district had opened nine bays at the spillway which siphoned off roughly 
100,000 cfs per second from the Mississippi River. At the 0800 hours 
daily briefi ng on May 15, Shadie announced that the system was con-
trolling the fl ood as designed. Because of the diversion at Morganza, 
the National Weather Service lowered the projected crests at Baton 
Rouge and New Orleans by 2.5 feet. The weather service expected 
the river to fl atten out and crest at 17 feet at the Carrollton gage that 
day and for the river to crest at 45 feet on the Baton Rouge gage by 
May 16. With the lower forecasts would come less stress and pressure 
on the levee system than originally anticipated. Stuart Waits, the area 
engineer for the levees below Baton Rouge, reported that most seep-
age problems and freeboard concerns dissipated after the opening of 
the spillway. Unfortunately, the transfer of water from the Mississippi 
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River had the opposite effect on the Atchafalaya basin. The additional 
water, expected to reach upwards of 175,00 cfs, would put more stress 
on the Atchafalaya basin levees and the unprotected communities in the 
backwater area. At Butte La Rose, a small community on the river near 
Interstate 10, the National Weather Service expected the Atchafalaya 
River to reach 27 feet on May 24, just inches shy of the record stage set 
in 1973. The projected stage was only 2 feet above fl ood stage, but that 
represented a signifi cant river elevation for the low-lying town that had 
no fl ood protection system. At that stage, some areas could expect more 
than ten feet of water. For Morgan City, at the bottom of the basin, the 
weather service expected the crest to reach 11 feet, a half a foot higher 
than the 1973 record stage. During that fl ood, the fl oodwall protected 
the city to a stage of 11 feet, but it had since been raised to 22 feet. Still, 
Mayor Tim Matte expressed concern that the improved fl oodwall had 
never been tested by the amount of pressure expected.270
An example of “flood proofi ng” in the Atchafalaya basin.
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In the days leading up to the opening of the Morganza fl oodway, the 
New Orleans Engineer District held public meetings at most communi-
ties that would be impacted by the introduction of additional water in 
the Atchafalaya basin – Butte La Rose, Morgan City, Berwick, Pierre 
Part, Stephenville, to name but a few. Fleming suspected that the meet-
ings would be very intense, maybe even hostile, but he felt it a personal 
obligation to provide the best information at his disposal, whether good 
or bad. “It is not easy telling folks that they are going to fl ood, but you 
have to let them vent,” he later recalled. Based on the inundation maps 
developed by the district, Fleming or his surrogates – Lt. Col. Mark 
Jernigan, Holden, Accardo and Eilts – informed the public that they 
could expect to see the same amount of water, if not more, than expe-
rienced during the 1973 fl ood. At meeting after meeting, Fleming heard 
loud gasps emanating from the audiences, and for good reason. The 
1973 fl ood produced “extensive fl ooding to depths seldom experienced,” 
according to the post-fl ood report of that year. More than 1,226 square 
miles of land had been inundated in the Atchafalaya basin, resulting in 
an estimated $37 million in damages.271
Fleming and his representatives had to contend with the “us versus 
them” mentality, with the “us” representing Atchafalaya basin residents 
and the “them” representing the cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge. 
The issue fi rst gained traction as far back as May 3, when Fleming 
announced that operating the Morganza fl oodway was on the table. That 
statement drew a rebuke from a Morgan City councilman, “If there’s 
a choice between Morgan City and New Orleans, we know who the 
choice is going to be.” To Fleming, it was not an either/or choice. The 
system was designed around the fl oodway to keep the fl ows manageable 
at and below Baton Rouge. Operating the system did not preclude fl ood 
fi ghting at Morgan City and other locations. “We will not fl ood Morgan 
City to save New Orleans,” Fleming argued, “We will run the system 
how it is designed to run and we will fl ood fi ght where we can.”272
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The New Orleans Engineer District, the state, parishes, and levee 
districts were well-prepared for the fi ght. During the 2008 fl ood, a 
single area engineer had responsibility for the 650 miles of levees in 
the Atchafalaya basin and along the west bank Mississippi River levees 
extending from the lower end of the Fifth Louisiana levee district and 
Donaldsonville. It was a large area for one person to administer the 
resources necessary for a fl ood fi ght. During the after-action review 
process, the district decided to split that responsibility between two 
area commanders – one for the Atchafalaya sectors and one for the 
Mississippi sectors. The change afforded the opportunity for the area 
commanders to focus on a smaller area and more precisely manage their 
assets and resources. The two area commanders – Kinney Siffert with 
the Mississippi River sectors and Kinney Benoit with the Atchafalaya 
basin sectors – would now report to Ted Eilts, the Lafayette area engi-
neer. The 2008 after action review also convinced the district to realign 
the trigger points for fl ood fi ght activities. Prior to 2011, the district 
based all fl ood fi ght movements off of stages on the Carrollton gage. 
When the gage reached 11 feet, the entire district mobilized for Phase I 
actions. When the gage reached 15 feet, the entire district transitioned 
to Phase II. The 2008 fl ood fi ght demonstrated that incorporating trig-
ger points at the Simmesport and Morgan City gages provided greater 
local control over the necessary assets and resources in the Atchafalaya 
basin than a central trigger at the lower end of the Mississippi River.273
The 2008 fl ood, like it had in the Mississippi delta and the Missis-
sippi River below Baton Rouge, also provided a strong test of the levee 
system in the Atchafalaya basin, exposing numerous potential trouble 
spots. With the experiences gained in that fl ood and the data contained in 
the 1973 post-fl ood report, levee inspectors and levee district personnel, 
for the most part, knew where to look for problem areas. The drought 
conditions also aided their efforts in identifying underseepage, just as 
it had in the Mississippi River sectors. While the fl ood was aided by 
past experience and dry conditions, the engineers at the district offi ce 
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still had concerns about I-walls in the Atchafalaya basin. The Corps of 
Engineers had learned much about I-walls during the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina and issued new guidance about pressure loads, but that 
guidance had only recently been fi nalized, so the improvements had not 
been implemented in the basin. In preparing for the high river stages 
building the Atchafalaya system, the district conducted load tests by 
simulating the pressure anticipated under the forecasted stages to deter-
mine if any of the I-walls needed reinforcing in advance of the fl ood.274
To back up his earlier promise to fl ood fi ght in the backwater area, 
Fleming established a command post in Morgan City to coordinate 
the delivery of HESCO bastions, sandbags, and other resources, while 
helping levee districts address gaps in the system. He wanted a strong 
presence in the backwater area to send a clear message that someone 
was there to look out for south Louisianans and that the district did 
not operate the spillway and then walk away. Fleming’s actions, along 
with Mayor Matte’s leadership, and proactive planning by local levee 
The Atchafalaya River climbs against the floodwall at Morgan City.
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districts, imparted a strong level of confi dence to local residents that the 
fl ood was manageable. For these reasons, Walsh and the commission 
travelled to the backwater area to meet with parish presidents and the 
levee districts. On May 15, the commission drove from Baton Rouge 
to Morgan City, travelling alongside the west bank Mississippi River 
levees between Port Allen and Donaldsonville. The levees towered 
above the surrounding terrain. Although the commission members could 
not see the river, it was obvious that the water level on the opposite 
side of the levee was several feet higher than the farms, homes, busi-
nesses, industry, and infrastructure on the protected side of the levees. 
The scene served as a clear validation of the vision of the designers of 
the MR&T project.275
Clifford Smith, a thirteen-year veteran member of the Mississippi 
River Commission with more than 55 years of engineering experience, 
was clearly exhausted after nearly two weeks of non-stop meetings, 
Cliff ord Smith explains the flow of water in the Atchafalaya basin to Capt. Todd Mainwaring in Col. Fleming’s 
command post at Morgan City.
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briefi ngs, and site visits, but the drive through the bayous rejuvenated 
him. Smith, a native of Houma, Louisiana, was in his element. He 
seemed to know the complete history of every city, body of water, busi-
ness, and nook and cranny in south Louisiana. Long ago, that ability 
had earned him the loving moniker “Uncle Clifford” from his fellow 
commissioner, R.D. James. As the commission travelled past a farming 
operation, Smith noticed a tractor kicking up dust in a parched fi eld 
adjacent to the road. He put his arm around Sam Angel and directed 
his attention to the wind-driven dust cloud, “This north wind is exactly 
what we need!” The north winds kept the moist air from the gulf in 
check. “It’s so dry in the Morganza that the ground and the wind are 
going to soak all the water up.”
During its visit to south Louisiana, the commission held face-to-
face meetings with various leaders to assess the situation on the ground 
and to answer their concerns. They met with state representatives and 
local elected offi cials, the mayors of Morgan City and Berwick, the 
parish presidents of St. Mary, St. Martin, and Terrebonne parishes, 
Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, Morgan City Mayor Tim Matt e, and Cliff ord Smith at Amelia, Louisiana.
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representatives from the Chitimacha Nation, the navigation industry, 
and levee districts. Despite its decision to operate the Morganza fl ood-
way, the commission was well-received at each meeting. Because of 
its annual inspection trips through the Atchafalaya basin and the many 
engagements that accompanied those trips, the commission had devel-
oped strong bonds with many partners in the basin. The commission 
was not a faceless governmental bureaucracy. Those people knew the 
commission personally. They understood its mission. They respected the 
commission for having their boots on the ground in the affected areas.276
Perhaps the most compelling part of the trip involved an emergency 
operation at Bayou Chene, where a joint effort by the New Orleans 
district, the state, and the newly-formed St. Mary Parish levee district 
aimed to seal off the bayou from the Atchafalaya River. The current from 
Bayou Chene generally fl ows in a southerly direction before entering 
the Atchafalaya River south of Morgan City. When stages in the Atcha-
falaya River rise higher than the stage in the bayou, the river actually 
surges into Bayou Chene, forcing the current to reverse its fl ow and 
Aerial view of the operations at Bayou Chene.
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threaten backwater communities, such as Amelia, with inundation. The 
St. Mary Parish levee district devised the operation, which consisted 
of sinking a massive 500-foot-long submersible oceangoing barge in 
the center of the channel, fl anked by smaller barges sunk on both ends. 
Once the barges were in place, crews drove 70-foot-long, interlocking 
sheet pile on the Atchafalaya River side of the barges, with the sunken 
vessels providing added weight and reinforcement. The sheetpile dam 
extended across the channel and tied into higher elevations on both 
banks. The tie-ins, in turn, were reinforced with 17,000 tons of rock. As 
Bill Hildago, the levee district president explained to the commission, 
the goal of the $6 million operation was to create a makeshift dam to 
block the reverse fl ow from the Atchafalaya and force the excess water 
to sheet fl ow into lower elevation marshes away from communities and 
investments. Clifford Smith smiled as he looked over the operation, 
“This is Cajun ingenuity at its fi nest!”277
The Mississippi River Commission and staff  view the Bayou Chene operation.
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On May 19, the Mississippi River crested on the Vicksburg and 
Natchez gages. With the river having already crested on the Baton 
Rouge and Carrollton gages because of the engineering controls at Old 
River, Morganza, and Bonnet Carré, the only major gage where the 
Mississippi had not crested was at Red River Landing, but even it was 
only inches shy of cresting. Intense pressure on the Mississippi River 
levee system would remain until river levels subsided, but exhausted 
fl ood fi ghters could at least see the light at the end of the tunnel. In the 
Atchafalaya basin, though, the crest was still another ten to eleven days 
away. By May 19, the Morganza spillway had 17 bays open, contribut-
ing approximately 180,000 cfs into the basin. The Butte La Rose gage 
reached 21 feet; six feet shy of the expected crest elevation. The Morgan 
City gage exceeded 8 feet; three feet shy of the expected crest.278
On May 21, Atchafalaya residents caught their fi rst break. The 
National Weather Service adjusted the forecast crest for Butte La Rose 
downward from 27 feet to 24.5 feet, roughly three feet higher than the 
stage of 21.3 feet reached on the gage that day. Clifford Smith’s obser-
vation had proven correct. Dry conditions in the Morganza fl oodway 
allowed the parched land to absorb more water than expected. Dry 
ditches and culverts, half-empty ponds and lakes, and dry stream beds all 
held more water – realities that computer models had no way of predict-
ing. During his many trips through the Atchafalaya basin, Col. Fleming, 
noting the irony of massive sandbag rings and temporary levees built to 
keep water out of homes while sprinkler systems watered lawns within 
the rings, had drawn the same hopeful conclusion as Smith. Four days 
later, the weather service lowered the Butte La Rose by another foot. 
On May 27, the river crested on the Butte La Rose gage at 23.2 feet. 
The lower crest at Butte La Rose translated into lower stages at Morgan 
City. On May 30, the river crested on the Morgan City gage at a stage 
of 10.2 feet – approximately eleven inches below the original crest. 
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Finally, during the daily briefi ng on the morning of June 1,  Col. Flem-
ing reported to Maj. Gen. Walsh, “Sir, it is safe to report that the crest 
has completely passed through the MR&T system.”279
If the intense rainfall and snowmelt that caused the massive fl ood to 
build at the confl uence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers was, indeed, 
“Divine Providence,” then the extreme drought in Louisiana that helped 
to absorb the Morganza fl oodway waters and made life easier and less 
of an impact on residents was a sign of His grace – a rainbow, in a sense, 
across the south Louisiana parishes parched by the sun.
Postscript
There are a lot of trade-offs you make, but the idea that the 
untouched, natural way of life is the correct way of life is only 
for people who have never lived with nature. Nature is won-
derful, but try living in a fl ood. Try living with droughts. Not 
so wonderful. That is how nature comes. She doesn’t come 
packaged with cows in green fi elds.
John Briscoe
Gordon McKay Professor of the 
Practice of Environmental Engineering
and Environmental Health
Harvard University
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THE NATION HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF the lower Mis-sissippi Valley. Nineteenth century capitalists coined it the “Alluvial Empire” for its untapped potential, fertile lands, and 
abundant natural resources. Frequent and devastating Mississippi fl oods 
were the main impediments to the realization of that potential. Follow-
ing the Great Flood of 1927, the nation united behind a bold vision to 
prevent another similar tragedy from happening again. The Mississippi 
River and Tributaries system that controlled the 2011 fl ood is the result 
of that vision. The MR&T system has prevented roughly one-half tril-
lion dollars in damages since its inception. The estimated value of the 
total benefi ts to the nation is many times greater if consideration is 
given to the fact that not all can be calculated and captured in bland, 
one-size-fi ts-all formulas. Despite the overall success of the MR&T 
project, we have yet to realize the vast benefi ts of the Alluvial Empire, 
the additional under-developed resources of America’s Great Watershed. 
The high-value economic engine in the heart of the country has been 
long overlooked or undervalued by many as a true difference maker in 
national and global competition.
A benchmark. The fl ood will be remembered by most for the 
activation of three fl oodways, but the 2011 event set several records. 
More than a dozen fl ood control reservoirs in the Ohio, Arkansas-White, 
and St. Francis basins established new pool elevation records as water 
control managers desperately tried to store water to keep downstream 
stages at manageable levels. Several of those reservoirs went beyond 
full capacity. As the fl ood wave consolidated at the confl uence and 
rolled down the lower Mississippi River, it established new gage records 
through much of the system. The fl ood also established new peak fl ood 
discharge records from Cairo, Illinois, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The 
event was also lengthy. It was not until June 1 that the Mississippi River 
Commission declared the fl ood crest had passed through the MR&T 
system, but the Mississippi River remained above fl ood stage at the Red 
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River Landing gage until June 26, and the Atchafalaya River stayed 
above fl ood stage on the Morgan City gage until July 26 – nearly four 
months after the Cairo gage reached fl ood stage on April 3rd.
Diversions. Engineered structures in the system diverted more than 
1,573,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to provide a level of protection 
and predictability for the nation’s corridor of commerce. The U.S. Geo-
logical Survey recorded peak fl ows of 186,000 cfs at Morganza Flood-
way, 316,000 cfs at Bonnet Carré Spillway, 400,000 cfs at the Birds 
Point-New Madrid fl oodway, and 671,000 cfs at the Old River Control 
Structures. This level of control brings to mind something that John 
Briscoe, a McKay professor of the practice of environmental engineer-
ing and professor of the practice of environmental health at Harvard 
University said:
There are a lot of trade-offs you make, but the idea that the 
untouched, natural way of life is the correct way of life is only 
for people who have never lived with nature. Nature is wonder-
ful, but try living in a fl ood. Try living with droughts. Not so 
wonderful. That is how nature comes. She doesn’t come pack-
aged with cows in green fi elds.
Room for the River. The MR&T system is designed to pass a larger 
fl ood. It has room to handle more water. The 2011 fl ood, while record-
setting in many areas, remained below project design fl ood levels. At 
the Cairo gage, the 2011 fl ood reached 89 percent of the project design 
fl ood; at the Arkansas City and Red River Landing gages, the fl ood 
reached 79 percent and 78 percent, respectively, of the project design 
fl ood. This equates to another 360,000 cfs at the Cairo gage, 597,000 cfs 
at the Arkansas City gage, and 459,000 cfs at the Red River Landing 
gage. Additional room for larger fl oods can be accommodated by the 
river’s use of fl oodways and backwater areas. At peak discharges, the 
three fl oodways placed into operation had the design capacity to divert 
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a combined total of approximately 1.4 million cfs from the Missis-
sippi River. During 2011, the combined maximum discharge barely 
exceeded 900,000 cfs, or 65 percent of the maximum design capacity. 
Adding in the unused West Atchafalaya Floodway and its 250,000 cfs 
maximum design discharge, the total percentage drops to 55 percent. 
Put another way, the four fl oodways possess the capacity to divert an 
additional 750,000 cfs over what was diverted in 2011. Likewise, the 
total acreage in the massive backwater areas numbers 1,652,000 acres, 
but only 20 percent (335,000 acres) were used during the 2011 fl ood. 
That leaves a little more than 2,000 square miles of land available to 
store water up to 20 feet deep.
Local people have a voice. One of the things that made the MR&T 
project successful in the fl ood of 2011 was the long-term, regular dia-
logue and input from the local people. The comprehensive MR&T 
project is so unique because it captures all the decisions from regular 
systematic local input and dialogue with the federal government and 
the many interests and partners convened over the past 133 years (since 
1879). The thoughts, ideas, changes, additions, and improvements are 
captured in the form of the current project as it exists today.
State of the system. The engineers have assessed damages to the 
system with the tools available, but the extent of the damage can only 
be determined by the next fl ood event. The fl ood tested the system and 
the system worked – that much we know. We do not know the potential 
damages that cannot be seen clearly on the system – a system comprised 
of thousands of miles of earthen and concrete structures and channel. 
By the end of May, teams of engineers and inspectors started damage 
assessments as the fl ood water receded, compiling a list based on spe-
cifi c criteria to determine priorities. By the time the Mississippi River 
Commission met in August 2011, a senior engineer team had reviewed, 
developed, and negotiated a priority list of 93 critical repair needs total-
ing $800 million. The commission deliberated during the Low-Water 
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Inspection trip and the commission president forwarded the list to the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to help receive emergency funds related 
to life safety impacts for immediate work. Due to the leadership of the 
Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association, the voice of the local 
citizens, and the action of congress, a bill passed at the end of Decem-
ber 2011 to cover the initial cost of infrastructure damages. It will take 
another billion dollars to restore the system. The nation has no option 
other than to reset, restore, and continue to improve the system based on 
regular dialogue with citizens and other interests so that future genera-
tions will be able to live, work, and produce in a sustainable, reliable, 
and  productive living environment. The people’s MR&T project is the 
foundation of the success of this great productive valley.
Much to learn! As engineers, our deliberate processes rooted in 
science, engineering, and logic are a part of our training and respon-
sibilities. But, we do not have all the answers — it takes local on the 
ground knowledge, diverse resources and relationships, and understand-
ing along with the ever present questions … “what’s the federal inter-
est” and “what’s the public value.” Our successful, highly productive 
agrarian, maritime nation continues to benefi t from the infrastructure 
investments of the past, yet the long-term sustainable approach for the 
nation’s economy and man’s environment is yet to be fully realized. 
Our decisions and investments over the next couple of decades will 
determine the success of our nation’s next 200 years.
A common occurrence and local sentiment that the Commission 
experienced from the pre-fl ood days and throughout the fl ood fi ght 
among many of the people and stakeholders in the valley refl ected a 
thoughtful sincere expression of dependence on the Divine that was 
expressed in conversations with the Creator about the resources that 
we, the locals and the government, get to help manage.
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The Mississippi River Commission and the strong partners in the 
valley continue to keep an ear to the past, a hand on the present, and a 
clear voice for our nation’s bright and productive future.
Many of the nation’s leaders agree on the need for a thoughtful, 
regular, and structured water infrastructure investment based on the 
nation’s priorities for economic and social development. This will help 
relieve the burden of imminent system failure and the subsequent ridicu-
lous amount of resources wasted on recovery and rebuilding brought 
about by a shutdown of an economy generating part of the fabric of our 
infrastructure. While that need, indeed, sounds simple, we have yet to 
see it addressed. We still have an embarrassingly poor report card from 
science and engineering on the state of the nation’s water infrastructure 
and investment. A strong future requires the dedication of the world’s 
best minds and untiring, focused effort of wisely-blended practitioners 
and academics. The art of which we speak will serve watersheds around 
the globe for generations.
Listening, Inspecting, Partnering and Engineering!
T. Stephen Gambrell
Executive Director
Mississippi River Commission
February 1, 2012
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